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Vietnam implemented the Doi Moi (or Renovation) policy in 1986. This 
policy involved the introduction of many structural reforms in an attempt to move 
Vietnam towards a market economy. As part of Doi Moi, Vietnam’s two ongoing 
microeconomic reform programs aimed at domestic enterprises are of particular 
significance, including state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms and the private sector 
development (PSD) policy. This thesis develops a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model of Vietnam (referred to as VNGEM) with twenty four industries, six 
labour groups based on educational qualifications and one representative household, 
which aims to assess the likely effects of these reform programs on Vietnam’s 
national economic outcomes and industries.  
 These reform programs are found to be pro-growth as reflected in their 
contribution to increasing aggregate output in both short and long run. This output 
increase is largely the result of export expansion and local market expansion due to 
relatively lower domestic price levels. Hence, Vietnam experiences an expansion in 
aggregate employment and a trade surplus in the short run. Likewise, these reform 
programs generate positive welfare effects on household consumption in the long run 
as real wages and labour incomes rise. In terms of industry winners and losers, the 
most favourably affected industries in the short run include steel, electrical, and 
textile, clothing and footwear (TCF), while the least favourably affected industries 
include construction and public administration. These least favourably affected 
industries are either non-traded or inward-oriented. Hence, they do not benefit much 
from trade expansion. Similarly, the most favourably affected industries in the long 
run include electrical, steel and other manufacturing, while the least favourably 
affected industries include rice and paddy, and oil, gas and petroleum (OGP). These 
industries are least favourably affected because of rising labour cost and an 
increasing land rental rate, which significantly hamper their economic activities.   
 The findings in this thesis suggest that promoting the private sector and, at 
the same time, reducing or removing the preferential treatment by the government of 
the SOE sector can solve Vietnam’s employment problem. Export-oriented industries 
such as the TCF industry are well positioned to absorb Vietnam’s labour force. To 
reduce trade deficits, domestic import-substituting producers need to improve their 
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product quality and prices that are comparable to foreign goods in the medium and 
long term. Besides providing vocational training for workers, the government needs 
to improve domestic human capital through education, and research and development 
(R&D) in order to acquire a sufficient number of high-skilled personnel to work with 
new technologies, machinery and equipment. Finally, to achieve greater reform 
outcomes, SOE reforms should be extended to include medium to large SOEs across 
all industries. Some areas of improvement include: (i) managing and utilising the 
compensation funds more wisely; (ii) unleashing the private sector and encouraging 
its participation in the equitisation process; (iii) improving the fairness and 
transparency of the equitisation process; (iv) improving the asset valuation method 
and strictly governing activities related to management buyouts and bankruptcy; (v) 
establishing a new structure of corporate governance to provide checks and balances 
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After its national unification in 1975, the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(VCP) led a Soviet-style centrally planned economy (CPE). This economic model 
failed to achieve almost all planned economic targets in the period 1976-80. At the 
same time, many economic problems occurred including slow economic growth, 
high unemployment, food shortages and rising food prices, aggravated by Vietnam’s 
loss of financial aid from the Soviet Union and China. These contributed to the 
country’s overall poor economic performance up until the beginning of the 1980s 
(Sepehri and Akram-Lodhi, 2002).  
To escape from those crises, Vietnam introduced the Doi Moi (or Renovation) 
policy in 1986 in an attempt to move towards a market economy. The Doi Moi policy 
was implemented with many structural reforms, most of which have been 
implemented on an ongoing basis consistent with Vietnam’s overall gradualist 
approach. As a result, Vietnam’s performance since Doi Moi has improved 
significantly. In other words, Vietnam’s impressive economic performance since Doi 
Moi has been the result of a vast number of policy changes implemented from 1986 
onwards. Among these, Vietnam’s two ongoing microeconomic reform programs 
aimed at domestic enterprises are of particular significance, including the state-
owned enterprise (SOE) reforms and the private sector development (PSD) policy.  
1.2 Issues and Questions 
Microeconomic reform has been a common practice, which aims at 
improving the economic efficiency of sectors in an economy. Many countries around 
the world, such as Australia and New Zealand, implemented such reform in the 
1980s and 1990s and acclaimed its successes upon completion. However, many 
transitional economies in Eastern Europe, such as Ukraine, Belarus and Czech 
Republic, struggled with many problems associated with a big bang approach to 
reform.  
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China, and then Vietnam, a transitional economy, soon realised the 
seriousness of such approach, thereby adopting a gradualist approach to reform 
instead. The Vietnamese reform, in particular, had a mixture of both successes and 
failures. For instance, successful reform outcomes were linked to high output growth 
rates, increasing labour incomes and moderate unemployment rates. However, many 
problems were worth considering, such as persistent current account and trade 
deficits, huge external debt, and relatively high inflation rates. Worse still, there 
remain many unfavourable economic conditions such as weak public management, 
bureaucracy, red-tape, corruption, and rapidly changing laws and regulations.  
Over time, the influence from the central planning days largely explains why 
Vietnam has made such a slow and incomplete transformation process towards a 
market economy. Such influence restricted the ability of the Vietnamese government 
in formulating and implementing its public policies, which were often designed with 
multiple contradictory objectives and lacked consistent coordination across ministry 
lines. Likewise, many policies (such as industrial and trade policies) were aimed at 
creating high protection for domestic SOEs. Regardless of being granted many 
privileges, these SOEs failed to deliver outstanding performance and also failed to 
lead the economy’s growth. The weaknesses of the SOE sector, coupled with the 
under-development of the non-state enterprise (NSE) sector, have been a formidable 
challenge to Vietnam’s future growth path. To accelerate and sustain growth, 
Vietnam has to re-examine its SOE reforms and PSD policy, aiming at further 
improving economic efficiency of all domestic enterprises.  
Given its unique features of having a historically low resource endowment 
due to wartime and a very complex socio-economic setting, Vietnam represents a 
good case study for investigating microeconomic reform since Doi Moi. Therefore, 
the key objective of this thesis is to develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model of Vietnam (referred to as VNGEM) to assess the likely effects of SOE 
reforms and the PSD policy on Vietnam’s national economic outcomes and 
industries. VNGEM is a comparative-static model, representing the Vietnamese 
economy with twenty four industries producing twenty four commodities, which can 
be produced domestically or imported from abroad. There are four margin 
commodities, six labour groups categorised by educational qualifications and one 
representative household. Both short-run and long-run simulations are conducted by 
hypothetically increasing the across-the-board primary factor productivity by 5 per 
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cent. In so doing, this thesis provides a numerical benchmark for investigating the 
direct and indirect effects, as well as identifying the winners and losers from these 
reform programs. Accordingly, this thesis attempts to answer the following research 
questions: 
i. How does Vietnam’s microeconomic reform contribute to the national 
output and employment growth? 
ii. How does such reform affect different industry groups? 
iii. What is the effect on the labour market in both short and long run? 
iv. Does the reform generate any positive welfare effects? How? 
v. What can be done to further improve the reform outcomes? 
The development of VNGEM in this thesis is aimed at closing several 
literature gaps. First, this thesis contributes to the literature of privatisation in a 
context of a transition economy like Vietnam, which has not been investigated at the 
macro level in any great detail. Second, this thesis extends the current literature by 
investigating the impacts of Vietnam’s reform programs not only on GDP growth 
and employment, but also on many other macroeconomic variables mentioned above 
in a general equilibrium context. Third, while previous studies investigate whether or 
not privatisation, as part of the reform packages, generates positive, negative, or 
neutral effects on productivity, this thesis deliberately assumes the positive impacts 
of Vietnam’s reform programs not only on firms’ efficiency, but also on industries’ 
efficiency. It then investigates the likely impacts of these efficiency gains on 
industries, and on the macro-economy of Vietnam. Fourth, this thesis extends the 
work of Chisari et al. (1999) by using more generalised CES (constant elasticity of 
substitution) functional forms in replacement of the Cobb-Douglas ones. It also 
extends the work of Pham and Mohnen (2012) by adopting a more realistic 
assumption of a small open economy of Vietnam. Finally, the use of VNGEM could 
generate simulation results for both short-run and long-run effects of SOE reforms on 
the Vietnamese economy. In addition, VNGEM identifies winners and losers from 
such reforms, and quantifies the general welfare effects on the overall Vietnamese 
economy. The decomposition technique in VNGEM provides detailed expositions of 
the sources of output growth. 
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1.3 Chapter Outlines 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 starts with an 
overview of the Vietnamese economy since Doi Moi. The discussion on some of the 
key performance indicators of Vietnam shows that the country’s post-Doi Moi 
economic performance has changed dramatically and impressively. The changes in 
economic performance have been the result of many macroeconomic policies being 
implemented during this period. Among these, Vietnam’s industrial, trade and 
monetary policies play an important role in fostering the country’s economic growth. 
Therefore, Chapter 2 also discusses these macroeconomic policies to provide a better 
understanding of the contributing factors to Vietnam’s impressive economic 
performance after Doi Moi. Such policy discussion also sheds light on why Vietnam 
still struggles with many difficulties such as persistent trade deficits, huge external 
debt and relatively high inflation rates. Over time, the influence from the central 
planning days largely explains why Vietnam’s macroeconomic policies were, in 
general, so restrictive, interventionist and protectionist, which seriously held back the 
liberalisation process, as well as holding back the overall transformation process 
towards a market economy. 
Vietnam’s restrictive, interventionist and protectionist macroeconomic 
policies largely explain the high protective barriers erected for domestic producers, 
especially domestic SOEs. Regardless of being granted many privileges, these SOEs 
could not lead the economy towards favourable economic outcomes. In this respect, 
Chapter 3 discusses Vietnam’s microeconomic reform of domestic enterprises to 
describe the overall SOE sector and its reform process since Doi Moi. To achieve 
favourable reform outcomes, the private sector needs to be developed to its full 
potential with consistent domestic policies. Ideally, the private sector should replace 
the SOE sector in leading the economy, creating more employment opportunities and 
sustaining growth in the future. First, Chapter 3 discusses SOE reforms by briefly 
introducing the SOE sector, which has long been enjoying preferential treatment 
from the government, explaining the reasons for reforming this sector, and evaluating 
the overall SOE reform process over the past decades. In this respect, the equitisation 
program and competition policy are important for promoting the economic efficiency 
and competitiveness of SOEs and other enterprises in Vietnam. Second, Chapter 3 
discusses the private sector development (PSD) policy, starting with a discussion on 
the private sector, which faces many ongoing obstacles. This section also discusses 
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the benefits of developing the private sector and proposes ways to develop this sector 
as a leading economic force in Vietnam. 
Because Vietnam’s equitisation program, which is commonly known as 
privatisation internationally, is an integral part of SOE reforms, Chapter 4 reviews 
relevant theoretical and empirical literature of privatisation in Vietnam and in other 
countries. First, Chapter 4 discusses the theory of privatisation, including a brief 
definition of privatisation, the types of privatisation, and the objectives and benefits 
of privatisation. Soft budget constraints and multiple conflicting objectives largely 
explain why most SOEs are inefficient compared with private enterprises. Hence, 
privatisation of SOEs is believed to improve their efficiency and profitability. 
Second, Chapter 4 analyses several empirical studies, both internationally and 
domestically, regarding the economic impacts of privatisation at the micro and macro 
levels. Due to differences in research methodologies, sample sizes and study periods, 
there are mixed results found in the empirical literature of privatisation. Chapter 4 
also identifies several research limitations in a number of reviewed studies, providing 
the basis for the development of VNGEM used in this thesis. 
In terms of methodology, this thesis adopts a positive economic approach to 
investigate the impacts of privatisation on the Vietnamese economy at the micro and 
macro levels, based on the balance of evidence that SOE reforms and the PSD policy 
would contribute greatly to Vietnam’s economic growth in the future. If these reform 
programs are implemented effectively, the domestic Vietnamese enterprises across 
all industries should be able to improve their competitiveness and efficiency. 
Therefore, Chapter 5 is built around this productivity improvement issue to examine 
the likely impacts of ongoing reform policies on Vietnam’s national economic 
outcomes and industries. First, Chapter 5 discusses the detailed specification of the 
model of Vietnam (referred to as VNGEM), which is a comparative-static model, 
used to quantify the economy-wide impacts of SOE reforms and the PSD policy on 
Vietnam’s national outcomes and industries. Second, it describes the model database, 
especially the schematic input-output (I-O) table, sources of data and data treatment. 
Finally, Chapter 5 briefly explains the model equations, model closures and 
simulation design, which altogether are very important for generating simulation 
results. 
Chapter 6 is aimed at interpreting the short-run and long-run results from the 
simulation, starting with the overall macroeconomic results and then examining 
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industry results. These results provide a numerical benchmark for investigating the 
direct and indirect effects, as well as identifying the winners and losers from policy 
reform. Two sensitivity tests are conducted to see how the dependent variables 
respond to changes in the model’s key parameters as well as changes in the simulated 
value of the across-the-board primary factor productivity. 
Chapter 7 is aimed at providing a brief summary of the main findings and 
concludes the thesis. It also cites some research limitations and provides useful 
directions for subsequent studies in the future. 
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Chapter 2 




2.1  Introduction 
This chapter starts with an overview of the Vietnamese economy since Doi 
Moi. The discussion on some of the key performance indicators of Vietnam shows 
that the country’s post-Doi Moi economic performance has changed dramatically and 
impressively. The changes in the overall economic performance have been the result 
of many macroeconomic policies being implemented during this period. Among 
these, Vietnam’s industrial, trade and monetary policies play an important role in 
fostering the country’s economic growth. Therefore, this current chapter discusses 
these macroeconomic policies to provide a better understanding of the contributing 
factors to Vietnam’s impressive economic performance after Doi Moi. Over time, the 
influence from the central planning days largely explains why Vietnam’s 
macroeconomics policies were, in general, so restrictive, interventionist and 
protectionist, which seriously held back the liberalisation process, as well as holding 
back the overall transformation process towards a market economy. 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 reports a number of 
key economic performance indicators in the period 1988-2011. Section 2.3 discusses 
Vietnam’s industrial policy in two distinct periods: (i) the development of heavy 
industry before Doi Moi; and (ii) the strategic shift to light industry development 
since Doi Moi. This has been the right move in placing more emphasis on developing 
the agriculture and light industries instead of heavy industry. Section 2.4 discusses 
Vietnam’s trade policy, which has been liberalised in an attempt to move towards a 
market economy, including: (i) Vietnam’s open-door policy on trade; (ii) Vietnam’s 
first round of trade reform during 1987-98; and (iii) Vietnam’s second round of trade 
reform during 1999-2009. Section 2.5 discusses the history of inflation during 1986-
2011 and the SBV’s conduct of monetary policy in controlling high levels of 
inflation since Doi Moi. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
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2.2  Economic Performance Indicators 
2.2.1  Population Growth 
In 2011, Vietnam’s population size was ranked fourteenth worldwide. Within 
the ASEAN region, Vietnam was the third populous country after Indonesia and the 
Philippines, and followed by Thailand (Annex 1). In two decades, Vietnam’s 
population increased by 24 million, from 64.3 million during 1988-89 to 88.3 million 
during 2010-11 (Table 2.1). The population growth rate slowed down from 2 per cent 
during 1988-89 to 1.1 per cent during 2010-11.1 
2.2.2  Output Growth 
The Doi Moi policy in 1986 changed Vietnam’s economic performance 
dramatically, with strong output growth from 1990 onwards (Table 2.1). For 
instance, real GDP increased steadily from the annual average of $US15.9 billion 
during 1990-94 to $US29.1 billion during 2010-11. Likewise, during 1990-2000, real 
GDP growth rate always exceeded 7 per cent per year, with a record high of 7.5 per 
cent per year in the period 1995-99. Most notably, 1995 was the best performing year 
when Vietnam for the first time approached the highest output growth rate of 9.5 per 
cent. However, during 2010-11, real GDP growth rate increased moderately at the 
annual average of 6.3 per cent.2 
2.2.3  Employment Growth 
Over the past two decades, total employment increased steadily from the 
annual average of 28.7 million during 1988-89 to 49.7 million during 2010-11 (Table 
2.1). On average, Vietnam created about 950,000 new jobs each year over the sample 
period. The average employment growth rate in the period 1988-2011 was recorded 
at 2.5 per cent per annum. Strong employment growth translated into favourably low 




                                                 
1 This may be the result of the ongoing nationwide family-plan program implemented since the 1990s, 
which encouraged each family to have only one or two children, regardless of whether they were boys 
or girls. This program was strictly applied to employees working in the public sector such that if they 
had more than two children, they would be penalised or even immediately lose their jobs. 
2 Note that real GDP level for the period 1988-89 was extremely high at $US113 billion mainly due to 
the exchange rate effect. The Vietnam Dong (VND) was very strong in 1988 and 1989 (607 and 4,464 
VND per USD, respectively). 
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Table 2.1- Vietnam’s Economic Performance (Period Average), 1988-2011 
 Performance Indicators 1988-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-11 
1 Population (million) 64.3  69.0  75.3  80.5  85.0  88.3  
2 Population Growth Rate (%) 2.0 2.0  1.6  1.2  1.1 1.1  
3 Real GDP ($US billion) 113.0 15.9 18.7 20.9 28.1 29.1 
4 Real GDP Growth Rate (%) 5.3 7.3 7.5 7.2 7.4 6.3 
5 Employment (million) 28.7  30.9  34.5  39.6  45.2  49.7  
6 Employment Growth Rate (%) 1.4  2.2  2.2  3.0  2.8  2.7  
7 Unemployment Rate (%) N/A N/A 4.5  2.3  3.7  3.1  
Note: N/A = Not Available. 
Source: Indicators (1) and (2) are sourced from IMF (Various Issues) and indicators (3) to (7) from 
ADB (Various Issues). 
2.2.4  Labour Incomes 
Labour incomes in Vietnam increased from year to year. The nationwide 
average monthly incomes increased by more than three times, from $US23.3 in 2002 
to $US74.5 in 2010 (Table 2.2). However, Vietnam is still categorised in the low-
income country group, with a relatively low monthly income level (averaging 
$US45.9 per month) compared with international standards. Noticeably, income gaps 
existed between rural and urban areas. On average, monthly urban incomes were 
more than double monthly rural incomes ($US74.3 and $US35.6 per month, 
respectively). Likewise, income gaps also existed across the eight economic regions 
with the South East region having the highest average monthly income ($US75.5 per 
month). In contrast, the North Central Coast and North West were the two lowest-











Table 2.2- Monthly Incomes by Economic Regions ($US), 2002-10 
Rank Regions 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Average 
  National 23.3  30.8  39.8  61.0  74.5  45.9  
 Urban 40.7  51.8  66.2  98.5  114.4  74.3  
 Rural 18.0  24.0  31.6  46.8  57.5  35.6  
 Regional       
1 South East 40.6  52.9  66.6  101.2  116.3  75.5  
2 Red River Delta 23.1  31.0  40.8  64.3  84.2  48.7  
3 Mekong River Delta 24.3  29.9  39.2  57.7  67.0  43.6  
4 South Central Coast 20.0  26.3  34.4  51.7  62.4  39.0  
5 Central Highlands 16.0  24.8  32.7  48.7  58.4  36.1  
6 North East 17.6  24.1  32.0  47.1  56.7  35.5  
7 North Central Coast 15.4  20.1  26.2  39.3  48.5  29.9  
8 North West 12.9  16.9  23.3  33.7  39.8  25.3  
Note: Data extracted from the GSO’s 2010 Household Living Standard Survey.  
Source: GSO (Various Issues). 
2.2.5  Balance of Payments (BOPs) 
Vietnam’s BOPs was in deficit in the periods 1988-89 and 1990-94. After 
that, its BOPs strengthened, increasing substantially to an average surplus of 
$US1.65 billion a year during 2005-09 before heading towards a deficit of $US307 
million a year during 2010-11 (Table 2.3). The current account deficit (CAD) 
jumped quickly from an average of $US667 million a year during 1988-89 to an 
average of $US4.9 billion a year during 2005-09 and $US2 billion a year during 
2010-11.3 Over time, Vietnam’s CAD was reduced by increases in both official 
unrequited transfers and private unrequited transfers (or overseas remittances). 
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB, Various Issues), these transfers 
increased considerably, on average, from $US593.2 million a year during the 1990s 
to $US3.8 billion a year during the 2000s. Most notably, the total transfers reached a 
record high of $US8.7 billion in 2010, of which $US8.4 billion was overseas 
remittances. The capital account surpluses showed an upward trend, increasing 
                                                 
3 This was chiefly driven by Vietnam’s trade deficit as the country accumulated a large amount of 
capital to equip its industrialisation process. 
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dramatically from $US350 million during 1988-89 to $US8.6 billion during 2005-09 
and $US6 billion during 2010-11.4 
2.2.6  Fiscal Balance, External Debt and ODA Funds
5
 
 Vietnam’s budget deficits tended to increase steadily, from $US621 million a 
year during 1988-89 to $US2.59 billion a year during 2010-11 (Table 2.3). Its 
external debt increased by three-fold from an annual average of $US10.7 billion 
during 1988-89 to an annual average of $US35.1 billion during 2010-11, in order to 
accumulate capital and machinery resulting in strong economic growth in the mid-
1990s. Likewise, the official development assistance (ODA) funds allocated to 
Vietnam were small in the periods 1988-89 and 1990-94, but increased sharply to an 
annual average of $US1.08 billion during 1995-99 and continued to increase to an 
annual average of $US2.94 billion during 2010-11. 
2.2.7 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Debt Burden 
During 1988-89, registered FDI remained low at of $US433.6 million, on 
average (Table 2.3). The figure increased steadily to the annual average of $US27 
billion during 2005-09 and $US19.88 billion during 2010-11. Nevertheless, FDI that 
was actually implemented in Vietnam was much lower than registered FDI.6 During 
2005-09, implemented FDI was recorded at the average of $US7.39 billion per year, 
which then increased remarkably to the average of $US11 billion per year during 
2010-11. The average debt burden (measured by external debt plus implemented FDI 
divided by nominal GDP) was extremely high during 1990-94 and 1995-99 (233.7 
and 103.2 per cent of nominal GDP, respectively), which was reduced substantially 




                                                 
4 This was driven by movements in net foreign investment. In the early stage of openness (1989-93), 
net foreign investment was quite small, averaging $US200 million per year. In the following period 
(1994-2006), the figure increased dramatically to an average of $US1.68 billion per year and 
continued to increase to an average of $US7.44 billion per year during 2008-11 (ADB, Various 
Issues). 
5 ODA funds took many forms such as grants (or non-repayable loans) and low-interest long-term 
loans. Major donor agencies included the ADB, Japan, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
6 ‘Registered FDI’ refers to the total value of investment recorded in foreign investors’ investment 
registration certificates. ‘Implemented FDI’ refers to the actual value of capital resources transferred 
to Vietnam for implementing foreign investment projects. 
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Table 2.3- Vietnam’s Economic Performance, 1988-2011 ($US million) 
(continued) 
 Performance Indicators 1988-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-11 
8 BOPs -271.0 -318.2 33.0 621.6 1,650.0 -307.0 
 Current Account -667.0 -466.6 -1,062.6 -340.4 -4,924.6 -2,008.5 
 Capital Account 350.0 210.0 1,527.2 1,500.8 8,600.4 6,009.5 
 Errors & Omissions 46.0 -61.6 -431.6 -538.8 -2,025.8 -4,308.0 
9 Fiscal Balance -621.0 -282.3 -586.1 -818.3 -1,243.5 -2,590.1 
10 External Debt 10,661.4 23,992.8 23,825.3 14,510.6 22,790.8 35,139.4 
11 ODA Funds 132.8 425.6 1,075.0 1,602.4 2,510.5 2,940.1 
12 FDI inflows       
 Registered FDI 433.6 2,292.2 6,071.5 3,343.9 27,005.0 19,886.1 
 Implemented FDI N/A 990.5 2,617.5 2,591.5 7,387.8 11,000.0 
13 Nominal GDP  15,858.6 10,688.7 25,626.1 36,780.5 74,624.1 106,426.8 
14 Debt burden (% GDP) N/A 233.7 103.2 46.5 40.4 43.4 
Source: Indicators (8) and (9) are sourced from ADB (Various Issues); indicators (10) and (11) from 
World Bank (Various Issues); indicators (12) and (13) from GSO (Various Issues). Indicator 
(14) is measured by external debt plus implemented FDI divided by nominal GDP. 
2.3  Industrial Policy 
Since 1986, Vietnam has created and implemented many policy changes to 
transform from a centrally planned economy (CPE) towards a socialist-oriented 
market economy.7 This increased the need to choose an appropriate development 
strategy for sustaining growth, thereby eradicating hunger and reducing poverty. The 
government asserted that these objectives could be achieved through industrialisation 
and modernisation of the Vietnamese economy.  
In relation to industrialisation, there are two well known, commonly adopted 
industrialisation strategies: (i) the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy, 
and (ii) the export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) strategy. First, the ISI strategy 
mainly involves developing the capability of domestic industries in producing goods 
that are substitutes for imported goods. In so doing, a country can reduce imports of 
foreign goods, thereby improving its trade balance and current account balance. As a 
result, the host country can lower its external debt and accumulate savings for 
domestic investment and growth. Second, the EOI strategy involves developing the 
capability and competitiveness of domestic industries in producing goods that have 
                                                 
7 The term ‘socialist-oriented market economy’ is commonly used by political leaders in Vietnam. It 
simply reflects their political and economic ideology in an attempt to orientate the country towards a 
socialist market economy. 
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competitive advantages over foreign goods. Hence, exports of domestic goods will 
increase, contributing positively to the trade balance and current account balance. 
The country can then re-invest its export earnings (in foreign currencies) to 
accelerate growth. 
Vietnam’s industrialisation strategy has combined features of the ISI and EOI 
strategies. Therefore, it can be considered as a dual industrialisation strategy. On the 
one hand, Vietnam wishes to establish industries that can sufficiently supply both 
intermediate inputs and final goods to domestic markets. This requires the 
government to erect high barriers to protect domestic industries. These barriers may 
include high import tariff rates applied to imported goods, and other non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) such as import licenses, quotas, custom surcharges and prohibitions 
of some imported goods. On the other hand, Vietnam wishes to promote exports of 
manufactured goods to accelerate growth (also known as an export-led growth 
strategy). This requires domestic industries to be able to compete with foreign 
companies, but they are generally too weak to do so. Their production technologies 
are almost outdated and managerial skills lag behind their foreign counterparts. 
Hence, the government deliberately established several general corporations (GCs), 
consisting of many SOEs and economic conglomerates to be able to compete equally 
with multinational corporations (MNCs). This represents another type of protection 
provided for domestic industries.  
This combined ISI-EOI strategy has its own limitations and is not necessarily 
superior to the ISI or EOI strategy alone. Manzur and Subramaniam (1995) argue 
that, in the case of Malaysia, the protection structure associated with the 
implementation of the ISI strategy remains unchanged for years, which is 
incompatible with the country’s current EOI strategy. Although some export 
incentives and assistance schemes have been given to encourage export expansion 
and they indeed have a compensatory effect, the net results are distortions and 
misallocations of resources caused by the existing tariff structure. In other words, 
import protection involves transfers of income (which is a zero-sum game) and if 
deadweight losses are taken into account, the net effect is negative. Therefore, 
instead of raising an import tariff to increase employment in the import-competing 
sector, the authors suggest using other alternatives such as wage cuts or employment 
subsidies.  
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On theoretical grounds, import protection has been proved to impose harmful 
effects on the export sector. Lerner (1936) develops a model with two countries, two 
goods (assuming perfect competition, full employment, zero transport costs and no 
capital movement between two countries), and demonstrates that a tariff on the 
imported good is equivalent to a tax on the exported good in terms of their effects on 
output decisions and resources allocation. That is, exporters are the victims of the 
government import protection policy. Lerner’s symmetry theorem also holds in cases 
with more than two goods as shown in McKinnon’s (1966) model with two countries 
and three goods (two importables and one exportable) taking account of trade in 
intermediate products. It is concluded that a tariff on one imported good is equivalent 
to a tax on the exported good and a subsidy on the other untaxed imported good. 
However, as argued by Ray (1975), the Lerner-McKinnon theorems do not hold 
under imperfection competition, which causes factor prices to be non-homogeneous 
of degree one in output prices, leading tariffs and taxes to have asymmetrical effects 
on production decisions. That is, the allocative effects under imperfect competition 
are significantly different from those under perfect competition. As opposed to Ray 
(1975), Kaempfer and Tower (1982) develops a model incorporating importables, 
exportables and non-tradables determined by relative prices, and recognises various 
forms of wealth and the possibility of multiple equilibria. They strongly believe that 
the Lerner-McKinnon symmetry theorems continue to hold even in the presence of 
imperfect competition, assuming private reciprocal currency holdings and people 
flows to be non-existent.8 Blanchard (2005) continues the debate with a notable 
conclusion that Lerner’s symmetry theorem does not hold in the presence of 
international investment (or cross-border capital flows). With international 
investment, both relative and absolute prices affect the real value of remittances paid 
to foreign investors, resulting in permanent trade imbalances and thereby affecting 
the real economy. However, she does not blatantly reject the whole symmetry 
theorem, but suggests imposing a tax on foreign investors’ returns as one of the 
conditions for such theorem to hold. 
To date, Lerner’s symmetry theorem has been supported by many empirical 
studies. For instance, Morrison (1976) empirically finds that high levels of protection 
in developing countries result in an overvalued exchange rate, which likely 
                                                 
8 See Kaempfer and Tower (1982) for more details. 
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discourages manufactured exports and reduces their competitiveness in the medium 
and long runs. Baldwin and Green (1988) use vector auto-regression techniques to 
investigate the relationship between import protection and the levels of output of five 
targeted industries producing colour television sets, non-rubber footwear, ceramic 
tableware, bolts, nuts and large screws, and stainless steel and alloy tool steel. They 
conclude that protection is not an effective means of stimulating domestic output. 
Dick (1994) conducts a regression analysis to test the hypothesis that import 
protection may act as export promotion. He finds that import protection is export 
deterring rather than promoting. This deterring effect is largest in industries 
experiencing strongest increasing returns to scale. Tokarick’s (2006) empirical 
results show that import tariffs impose an average implicit tax of 12.5 per cent on 
exporters among the 26 developing countries under examination. This is because 
import tariffs not only increase wages and rental rates (which must be absorbed by 
exporters) but also raise the cost of imported intermediate inputs used by the export 
sector. As a result, they create an anti-export bias affecting a country’s ability to 
export.  
In a general equilibrium context, Lerner’s symmetry theorem has also been 
supported by Clements and Sjaastad (1984) who develop a simple general 
equilibrium model to quantify the burden of protection being shifted from one sector 
to another, resulting in inefficient resources allocation and hence a lowering of real 
income. More specifically, the authors find that protection in several countries acts as 
a substantial implicit tax on their own exporters. This tax is transmitted to exporters 
via higher prices of imported goods and higher wages demanded by workers (who 
are also consumers of such goods), inflating the whole cost structure of the export 
sector. Choi and Cumming (1986) adopt the Clements-Sjaastad model to measure the 
transfers resulting from a protection in Australia. They find that import-competing 
firms gain approximately 0.5 per cent of GDP, consumers experience a net gain of 1 
per cent of GDP and exporters lose 1.5 per cent of GDP (equivalent to $AU2.8 
billion in 1983-1984 prices). Likewise, Manzur and Subramaniam (1995) also apply 
the Clements-Sjaastad approach to measure the incentive effects of protection in 
Malaysia. They find that exporters face a tax of about 9.2 per cent, costing them 
approximately 2.56 per cent of GDP (equivalent to $AU3.03 billion in 1989 prices).   
In general, although Vietnam’s growth experience continues to be impressive 
due to the rapid pace of industrialisation, its industrial and trade policies have been 
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seen to be restrictive, interventionist and protectionist. Based on the balance of 
evidence, these policies require urgent attention because they may be detrimental to 
Vietnam’s future growth path. The following sections will give more insights into 
these issues. 
2.3.1  Heavy Industry Priority (HIP) Strategy Since 1961 
In the period of economic recovery, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) 
was too ambitious to achieve rapid industrialisation. To do this, the VCP adopted a 
Soviet-style model that focused on developing heavy industry as a top priority, in 
order to provide necessary tools and equipment for light industry and agriculture 
(Beresford and Dang, 2000). This strategy often involved building up large-scale 
heavy industrial plants using imported material inputs, most of which could not be 
produced domestically (Beresford, 1988). Clearly, Vietnam jumped to the end of the 
common process of industrialisation, which usually started with developing 
agriculture and light industry before heavy industry, and went backwards (Figure 
2.1). 
Figure 2.1- Two Different Processes of Industrialisation 
 
Note: Author’s illustration. 
The State Investment Strategies 
From 1960 to 1985, Vietnam implemented the heavy industry priority (HIP) 
strategy in three phases (Vo, 1990). In the period 1960-75 Vietnam concentrated its 
investment in heavy industry, in order to provide tools needed for the development of 
agriculture and light industry. Light industry accounted for only 6.7 per cent of total 
investments during 1960-65, increasing slightly to 8.7 per cent during 1974-75. 
Agriculture investment exhibited the same pattern as in light industry, increasing 
The Soviet-style model (from right to left): heavy industry facilitates the growth of 
light industry and agriculture. 
The common process of industrialisation (from left to right): agriculture and light 
industry facilitate the growth of heavy industry. 
Light Industry Heavy Industry Agriculture 
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slightly from 14 per cent during 1960-65 to 14.3 per cent during 1974-75. Although 
the investment share of heavy industry declined from 31.4 per cent during 1960-65 to 
27.5 per cent during 1974-75, it still accounted for the largest share of total 
investments (Table 2. 4).  
In the period 1976-80 the VCP started to recognise the importance of 
agriculture in the early stage of socialist construction. Nevertheless, a large 
proportion of investment resources still went to industry (35.3 per cent). Within 
industry itself, heavy industry still dominated light industry (24.4 and 10.9 per cent, 
respectively). 
Similarly, in the period 1981-85 the VCP officially declared that agriculture 
and light industry played an important role in the early stage of Vietnam’s economic 
reconstruction. However, there were no significant changes in the allocation of state 
investments. Industry still captured the largest share of state investments in this 
period (40.1 per cent). Within industry itself, heavy industry continued to dominate 
light industry (32.0 and 8.1 per cent, respectively). 
Table 2.4- The Allocation of State Investments, 1960-1985 
 1960-65 1974-75 1976-80 1981-85 
Total state investments ($VN million) 814.4 1,936.3 3,688.2 N/A 
Industry (% total) 38.1 36.2 35.3 40.1 
Heavy industry (% total) 31.4 27.5 24.4 32.0 
Light industry (% total) 6.7 8.7 10.9 8.1 
Agriculture (% total) 14.0 14.3 21.1 N/A 
Forestry (% total) N/A N/A 2.9 N/A 
Capital construction (% total) N/A N/A 5.2 N/A 
Notes: Data was re-edited and expressed in annual averages over the relevant period to align with the 
discussion. N/A = Not Available. 
Source: Vo (1990). 
Consequences of the HIP Strategy 
Nevertheless, the HIP strategy led to numerous unresolved difficulties. First, 
Vietnam incurred trade deficits over time due to massive imports of material inputs 
from abroad for developing heavy industry. Second, although large-scale projects 
might be good for long-run growth, they did not generate any short-run productive 
capacity. Hence, shortages in production and consumption continued to be a major 
problem at that time. Third, the consumption goods sector received inadequate 
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investment since resources were over-invested in heavy industry. In fact, industry 
accounted for nearly half of total investment, of which more than 70 per cent went to 
heavy industry. By contrast, less than 25 per cent of total investment was allocated to 
agriculture and other related sectors (Beresford and Dang, 2000). To increase 
investment in industry, Vietnam had to sacrifice both current and future 
consumption, thereby worsening the living standard of the Vietnamese households. 
In addition, resources were drawn away from the consumption goods sector to 
industry, leading the former sector to grow slowly or even contract, which in turn 
might negatively affect the latter sector.  
Finally, Vietnam’s resulting industrial performance was poor because the 
VCP set high and unachievable targets in its five-year plans (FYPs). Hence, almost 
none of the targets were met during the period of implementing the HIP strategy 
(Annex 2).  
2.3.2  Strategic Shift from Heavy to Light Industry Since 1986 
Until 1986, the VCP realised that too much concentration on heavy industry 
was not a good strategy. Hence, Doi Moi was introduced in 1986 with a dramatic 
change in industrial policy from heavy to light industry. This strategic shift resulted 
in positive performance in the period 1986-88 (Annex 3). 
2.3.3  Discussion on Vietnam’s Industrial Policy 
Vietnam appeared to adopt a dual industrial strategy, which combined the 
features of both ISI and EOI strategies. However, more emphasis was placed on the 
ISI strategy and less on the EOI strategy (Perkins, 2001). Overall, Vietnam’s 
industrial policy was weak and inconsistent for three reasons. First, Vietnam’s 
industrial policy was designed with multiple contradictory objectives, which received 
much criticism because it was inconsistent and created excessive costs to Vietnam 
(McCarty, 1999). For instance, the country wanted to promote export-oriented 
industries while, at the same time, protecting the (inefficient) domestic 
manufacturing sector established in the days of central planning (Auffret, 2003). In 
the case of the motor vehicle industry, the government wished to develop this 
industry by imposing high quantitative restrictions (QRs) on imports of motor 
vehicles while, at the same time, the government discouraged the use of motor 
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vehicles in Vietnam because of its poor road infrastructure and frequent traffic 
congestion, according to the Centre for International Economics (CIE, 1999a). 
Second, during the implementation process of its industrial policy and 
strategy, the Vietnamese government usually practiced the picking-winners game 
(CIE, 1999b). This practice might affect the country’s overall economic performance 
because the chosen industries would win, but at the expense of other industries. 
Instead of picking winners, the government should give a fair chance to all economic 
agents and should improve its institutions and infrastructure, such as strengthening 
private property rights and improving the legal and financial systems, in order to 
speed up the industrialisation process. 
Finally, there are certain limitations in the formulation and implementation of 
Vietnam’s industrial policy. Policy makers did not collaborate with the business 
community when drafting and implementing such policy. These policy makers often 
lacked up-to-date information and disregarded the opinions of the business 
community when designing policies. Therefore, the industrial policy is often 
developed, reviewed and approved internally, with minimal debates on crucial issues 
and/or little involvement of outside stakeholders: “…if a domestic or foreign firm 
wants to raise its voice, it must devise its own way since the current procedure does 
not allow meaningful involvement of the business community…” (Ohno, 2009, p. 
15). This situation is in sharp contrast with that in Malaysia, Thailand and Japan, 
where private businesses are highly encouraged to participate in the process of policy 
formulation and implementation. Worse still, the implementation of policy was not 
well coordinated across ministry lines. For these reasons, most of the time, the 
approved policies in Vietnam are not effective nor are they implementable (Ohno, 
2009). A report by MoIT and UNIDO (2011, p. 21) indicates that “Vietnam does not 
lack policies for industrial development, but rather lacks an effective implementation 
plan to incorporate a harmonised approach that takes account of various sectoral 
needs”.  
At the moment, Vietnam is in the first stage of industrialisation (developing 
simple manufacturing under foreign guidance), which is now trying to reach the 
second stage (having some supporting industries, but still under foreign guidance) 
like Thailand and Malaysia.9 However, the real challenge facing Vietnam in the 
                                                 
9 See Ohno (2010) for more details about the five stages of catching-up industrialisation. 
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coming years is that it is not fully prepared to switch from labour-cost towards more 
knowledge-based advantages. As a result, the country appears to have reached the 
point where further process towards higher income is increasingly difficult. Similarly 
to Thailand and Malaysia, there is high probability that Vietnam will get stuck in the 
middle income trap10 due to failures in upgrading human capital and the inability in 
moving up the value chain and penetrating fast growing markets with knowledge- 
and innovation-based goods and services to achieve rapid growth. Therefore, 
Vietnam needs to radically change its public administration system, as well as 
changing the overall legal system in order to improve the quality of its industrial 
policy and escape from such trap (Ohno, 2010). 
2.4 Trade Policy 
2.4.1  The Open-Door Policy on Trade 
Prior to Doi Moi, Vietnam’s trade regime was semi-autarkic (or almost 
isolated). Vietnam only traded with countries within the council for mutual economic 
assistance (CMEA) bloc, including the Soviet Union, China and other socialist 
countries. Its exporting activities were strictly regulated by the CMEA’s agreement 
on trade licenses and quotas. Of course, the CMEA bloc was the only destination for 
Vietnam’s exported goods. In return, the country imported basic commodities from 
the CMEA bloc, such as petroleum products and fertilisers. 
In the early 1990s, the CMEA collapsed and so did the Soviet Union. In 
response to this external shock, Vietnam had to establish new trading relations with 
other non-CMEA partners and that its trade openness improved significantly.11 As 
illustrated in Figure 2.2, in the late 1980s, Vietnam’s average trade-to-GDP ratio was 
recorded at 30.2 per cent (10.1 per cent for exports-to-GDP and 20.1 per cent for 
imports-to-GDP). In the 2000s, this ratio increased remarkably to an average of 
139.1 per cent (65.8 per cent for exports-to-GDP and 73.3 per cent for imports-to-
GDP) and continued to increase to an average of 166.6 per cent (79.1 per cent for 
exports-to-GDP and 87.5 per cent for imports-to-GDP) during 2010-11. 
 
 
                                                 
10 This refers to the inability in breaking through the invisible ‘glass ceiling’ in manufacturing 
between the second and the third stage of industrialisation. 
11 One of the most commonly used indicators of trade openness is the trade-to-GDP ratio, which is 
measured by a vertical summation of the exports-to-GDP and imports-to-GDP ratios. 
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Source: World Bank (Various Issues). 
After opening up its domestic economy, Vietnam adopted an export-led 
growth model to boost manufactured exports. However, manufactured exports did 
not expand strongly enough to improve its trade balance, which has been in large 
deficits over time. During 1988-89, trade deficits was recorded at $US1.17 billion 
per year, which was increased dramatically to $US4.7 billion per year during 2005-
06 and $US13.14 billion per year during 2007-11 (Table 2.5). This was because the 
country’s trading activities likely followed a pattern of importing relatively high 
value-added products (such as processed material inputs, production technologies, 
machinery and equipment, and other capital-intensive manufactured goods, most of 
which could not be produced domestically), while exporting relatively low value-
added products (such as raw materials, unprocessed and semi-processed primary 
commodities and natural resources12, and other labour-intensive manufactured 
goods) (Le, 1999). As shown in Table 2.5, while food and live animals, mineral fuels 
and miscellaneous manufactured goods contributed positively to the Vietnamese 
trade balance, other remaining products (such as chemicals, basic manufactures, and 
machines and transport equipment) worsened it. This typical trade pattern is also 
                                                 
12 On average, exports of primary commodities and natural resources accounted for 57.5 per cent of 
total exports during 1995-99, which declined slightly to 50.5 per cent during 2000-04 and 45.1 per 
cent during 2005-09 (GSO, Various Issues). 
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discussed by Anwar and Nguyen (2011) with the same observation that imports have 
been consistently higher than exports and the gap has been widening in recent years. 
Therefore, Vietnam’s impressive growth in manufactured exports (based on a low 
initial manufacturing value added) has offered limited benefits due to a simultaneous 
increase in manufactured imports, leading to a pessimist conclusion that trade 
liberalisation has failed to stimulate a change in Vietnam’s manufactured export 
pattern and is not a sufficient factor in triggering Vietnam’s structural change (MoIT 
and UNIDO, 2011). 
Table 2.5- Vietnam’s Net Exports ($US million, Period Average), 1988-2011 
 1988-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-06 2007-11 
Trade Balance -1,169.2 -654.1 -2,268.3 -3,194.5 -4,689.5 -13,142.3 
Food & Live Animals  382.5 906.6 2,287.2 3,300.2 4,800.2 N/A 
Beverage & Tobacco  8.0 -35.6 -69.9 -40.5 -13.4 N/A 
Crude Materials (Excluding Fuels) 135.5 226.6 -47.3 -355.4 -316.5 N/A 
Mineral Fuels etc.  -435.5 137.6 586.7 1,658.4 3,001.2 N/A 
Animal, Vegetable Oil & Fats  8.5 -0.4 -48.4 -99.8 -202.7 N/A 
Chemicals  -400.5 -605.2 -1,759.7 -2,947.4 -5,149.4 N/A 
Basic Manufactures  -498.5 -555.8 -1,818.4 -4,361.5 -8,622.4 N/A 
Machines & Transport Equipment  -625.0 -970.1 -2,614.5 -4,725.0 -6,359.1 N/A 
Miscellaneous Manufactured Goods  266.5 251.6 1,225.1 4,527.0 9,515.4 N/A 
Unclassified Goods  -10.0 -9.4 -9.0 -150.6 -1,343.3 N/A 
Note: Data on the other remaining entries for the period 2007-11 are not available. 
Source: ADB (Various Issues). 
2.4.2 Trade Reform in the Period 1987-98
13
 
In the period 1987-98, Vietnam’s trade policy reform was mixed with 
positive and negative features. On the positive side, the Law on Foreign Investment 
was introduced in 1987 and was amended three times in 1990, 1992 and 1996, 
signalling the government’s open-door policy. In 1989, the government unified the 
foreign exchange rate system and removed export subsidies. Most notably, the 
government started to build up export processing zones (EPZs) in 1991 and offered 
duty exemptions for imported inputs used for producing exported goods. At the same 
time, private enterprises were authorised to engage in international trade, thereby 
increasing competition between the private sector and the SOE sector in the export 
market. In 1993, Vietnam offered a 90-day duty suspension scheme for inputs used 
                                                 
13 See Annex 4 for a summary of Vietnam’s trade reform in the period 1987-98. 
 23 
for producing exportables. In 1995, almost all export quotas were removed, except 
for rice. In 1997, the government authorised the private sector to export rice and, at 
the same time, rice could be traded freely in domestic markets. In 1998, domestic 
enterprises were authorised to export freely without trade licenses. With respect to 
external trading relations, Vietnam actively joined in international and regional 
organisations by (i) signing a trade agreement with the European Union (EU) in 
1992; (ii) gaining an observer status at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1994 and preparing an application to join the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO); and (iii) joining the Association of the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
in 1995 and signing the ASEAN free trade agreement (AFTA). 
On the negative side, Vietnam introduced a special sales tax, turnover tax and 
profit tax in 1990. At the same time, the government granted exporting rights for 
several commodities to a few enterprises and exporting associations. For instance, 
export quotas for rice, textiles and garments were strictly regulated by the Ministry 
of Trade (MoT) and were only allocated to a few SOEs. In 1995, the government 
increased export tax rates on 11 products. In May 1997, the government banned 
imports of sugar, and temporarily imposed prohibitions on imports of several 
consumer goods, such as writing and printing paper, construction steel bars and 
construction glass, cement, sugar, bicycles, electric fans, sweets, and beer and 
beverages. In so doing, the authorities asserted that they could dampen the increasing 
trade deficits, given a belief that domestic supplies of those commodities could 
equally satisfy domestic demands. In 1998, Vietnam introduced customs tariffs under 
the Law on Import and Export Duties and restricted imports of alcohol and other 
dangerous products, such as weapons, narcotics, cigarettes, toxic chemicals and 
firecrackers, for health and safety reasons. 
Tariff Policy in Vietnam 
According to Pham (2011), there are three sets of tariff rate in Vietnam: (i) 
most-favoured-nations (MFN) tariff rates (introduced in 1991 and amended in 2003) 
applied to countries that had bi-lateral trade agreements (BTAs) with Vietnam; (ii) 
common effective preferential tariff (CEPT) rates (introduced in 2001) applied to 
countries within the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Under the AFTA agreement, 
Vietnam committed to reducing tariffs on more than 6,000 product categories for 
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AFTA members to less than 5 per cent by 2006 and then eliminating tariffs on almost 
all commodities by 2015; and (iii) normal tariff rates applied in other circumstances.  
 From 1994 to 1998, the government issued numerous legislative amendments 
with respect to changes in tariff rates (Annex 5). These rapidly changing tariff rates 
somewhat reflected Vietnam’s commitment to liberalise its trade regime while, at the 
same time, trying to protect domestic import-substituting industries and promote 
export-oriented industries. In effect, there were lower cuts in tariffs on consumer 
goods than on intermediate and investment goods, indicating that Vietnam’s tariff 
policy was particularly aimed at limiting imports of consumer goods and promoting 
imports of intermediate inputs (Annex 6).  
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) in Vietnam 
In the process of trade liberalisation, the Vietnamese government was willing 
to loosen its controls over the economy, but was unwilling to completely remove 
such controls. This explains why so many NTBs were introduced to regulate trade. 
One of the most inefficient NTBs was the prohibition of imports of products that 
could be produced domestically. For instance, the government banned imports of 
cement, some kinds of steel, cigarettes, second-hand machinery and scrap steel. 
However, imports of intermediate inputs used for producing these goods were 
allowed (CIE, 1999b). Another type of NTB was foreign exchange control such that 
the government created easy access to foreign currency purchases in favour of the 
domestic industries, such as sugar, cement, steel pipes, fertilisers, motorcycles and 
cars (Annex 7). Other NTBs included customs surcharges and special sales taxes (or 
luxury taxes), all of which also served a revenue raising purpose. During economic 
hardship (such as the 2008 global financial crisis), NTBs were used extensively by 
the Vietnamese government in an attempt to moderate external shocks to the 
economy, including the prohibition of rice exports in June 2008 in response to rising 
food prices, stricter quality checks on some imports to prevent the crisis spread and 
the restriction of luxury commodities imports to reduce trade deficits (World Bank, 
2009). Clearly, these NTBs directly revealed the government’s intention to protect 
the domestic import-substituting industries and the export-oriented industries.  
The consequences of NTBs in Vietnam are numerous. First, NTBs might lead 
to policy inconsistencies and imports of some products encouraged by trade and 
industrial policies. For instance, there was a ban on imports of normal steel because 
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it could be produced domestically. However, imports of high-grade steel were 
allowed at low or even zero rates of duty because it could not be produced 
domestically. Therefore, most of the time the consumers preferred to import high-
grade steel instead of normal steel because the quality was higher but the prices were 
not significantly higher (CIE, 1999a).  
Second, NTBs might create a deadweight loss and reduce the consumer 
surplus because consumers were forced to use local products with lower quality but 
higher prices, compared to imported products. In other words, NTBs prevented 
consumers from consuming as many imported goods as they liked at lower world 
prices. When domestic supply could not satisfy domestic demand, NTBs often 
caused high price volatility which negatively affected the well-being of domestic 
consumers. Likewise, private enterprises were also worse off because most NTBs 
(such as quotas) were exclusively granted to SOEs. Worse still, the allocation of 
quota licences resulted in corruption and rent-seeking behaviour by government 
officials and licensees. 
Finally, import and export quotas resulted in misallocation of resources. This 
was because domestic prices were isolated from, or unaffected by, relative changes 
in world prices. Hence, even when domestic prices of the protected industries were 
higher than world prices, resources still concentrated in these industries. In addition, 
Vietnam’s open-door policy attracted large FDI inflows in the form of joint ventures 
(JVs). However, foreign investors preferred to form JVs within highly protected 
industries (such as cement, petroleum, motor vehicles, wearing apparel and plastics) 
to overcome high tariffs or NTBs. Likewise, they also preferred to do business with 
SOEs, which received favourable treatment from the government, as opposed to 
private enterprises (Auffret, 2003). Consequently, there were limited prospects for 
achieving high sustainable growth because the FDI resource was misallocated to, or 
over-invested in, those protected industries and SOEs, most of which had relatively 
low productivity and profitability (Leung, 2009). 
2.4.3  Trade Reform in the Period 1999-2009
14
 
In the period 1999-2009, Vietnam’s trade regime was liberalised with many 
dramatic changes. For instance, in 1999, the government extended the duty 
suspension period from 90 days to 275 days. The foreign exchange surrender 
                                                 
14 See Annex 8 for a summary of Vietnam’s trade reform in the period 1999-2009. 
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requirement was reduced from 80 to 50 per cent in the same year, and was further 
reduced to 40 per cent in 2001.  
Most notably, many significant changes were introduced in 2001. For 
instance, Vietnam signed a bilateral trade agreement with the U.S. (known as 
USBTA), opening up new opportunities to trade with the world’s largest market. In 
addition, all enterprises were authorised to export almost all legitimate goods without 
licenses. Moreover, some of the NTBs imposed on steel products, construction glass 
and vegetable oil were replaced by tariffs, which significantly removed distortions in 
resources allocation and other related consequences of NTBs. Besides, the 
government removed the dual pricing system previously applied to foreign investors, 
thus providing equal treatment of Vietnamese citizens and foreigners.  
In 2002, the foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) were authorised to export all 
legitimate commodities, including those not listed in their business licenses. In 2003, 
Vietnam announced its tariff schedule for the period 2003-06 in accordance with the 
ASEAN’s CEPT program. In 2004, to commit to the AFTA agreement and WTO 
membership negotiations, almost all import quotas were eliminated, except raw 
tobacco, salt, cotton, condensed and non-condensed milk, maize, seed and chicken 
eggs. In late 2005, to speed up its WTO membership negotiation process, Vietnam 
passed 29 new or amended Laws on Commerce and Trade aimed at creating a market 
economy, protecting free trade, ensuring legal transparency and harmonisation with 
international legal standards. In 2007, Vietnam officially became a member of the 
WTO, thereby improving its trading relations with about 150 WTO members. 
Accordingly, the effective rate of protection decreased from 59.5 per cent in 1997 to 
26.2 per cent in 2001 and further decreased to 20.43 per cent in 2006 and 16.93 per 
cent at the time of WTO accession (Pham, 2011).  
In March 2008, Vietnam (together with other ASEAN members) signed a less 
expansive free trade agreement (FTA) with Japan, which committed to eliminate 
tariffs on 93 per cent of goods exported from ASEAN. On the other hand, Vietnam 
signed a preferential trading deal with Laos People’s Democratic Republic focusing 
on import tariff reductions. In December 2008, Vietnam signed an Economic 
Partnership Agreement with Japan on trade, financial services, and migration. In 
February 2009, Vietnam and other ASEAN members signed a comprehensive free 
trade deal (implemented by the end of 2009) with Australia and New Zealand. In 
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August 2009, ASEAN also signed a FTA (implemented in January 1, 2010) with 
India (World Bank, 2009). 
2.4.4  Discussion on Vietnam’s Trade Policy 
Overall, Vietnam was said to have a dualistic trade regime reflecting a 
“legacy from the days of central planning” with many protection barriers (CIE, 1998, 
p. 73). This trade regime was established in an attempt to achieve two different 
objectives simultaneously: (i) developing the domestic import-substituting industries, 
and (ii) promoting the domestic export-oriented industries (Athukorala, 2006). As a 
result, there were high barriers on imports of some commodities such as prohibitions, 
taxes, quotas, trade licenses and regulatory controls. At the same time, the 
government provided export incentives, such as tax exemptions and EPZs, to 
promote exporting industries. Nevertheless, the persistent trade deficits imply that 
the domestic import-substituting industries were unable to fully replace the imported 
inputs, while the export-oriented industries were unable to lead the economy. These 
industries altogether failed to help the economy improve its trade balance as 
expected. 
On the other hand, Vietnam’s trade regime has been characterised as 
restrictive, protectionist and interventionist. The government was often said to take 
“two steps forward and one step back” when designing and implementing its policy 
changes (McCarty, 1999, p. 32). Over the past decades, its trade policy was changed 
through a learning-by-doing process. That is, policy makers implemented the trade 
reform, learned from past experiences and modified the policy to fit into current 
economic conditions. This practice resulted in many rapidly changing laws and 
regulations for fine-tuning purposes, creating confusion and policy uncertainty for 
the future (APEC, 2005).  
In this regard, Vietnam’s protectionist policy often created favourable 
treatment for SOEs, but discriminated against private enterprises. Therefore, many 
SOEs were profitable simply because of high walls of government protection from 
imports, as well as protection from competition with private enterprises (Perkins, 
2001). In principle, all firms were authorised to trade regardless of their ownership 
status. In practice, the government favoured SOEs by creating administrative barriers 
to prevent private enterprises from trading, as in the cases of rice exports and 
fertiliser imports. With generous government support, many industries did not even 
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have incentives to improve their performance (Auffret, 2003). According to Vanzetti 
(2006), most of the protected industries did not operate efficiently as expected. Some 
of the inefficient agricultural industries included sugar, cotton, tobacco, soybeans and 
pork, which had relatively low labour productivity. Other inefficient industries 
included seaports, airports, railways, power and telecommunication. 
Finally, Vietnam’s protectionist policy was aimed at building comparative 
advantages for medium- and high-tech export-oriented industries, such as electronics, 
automobiles, information technology, telecommunications and ship building. 
However, this objective could hardly be fulfilled because Vietnam’s existing 
comparative advantages were found only in primary commodities (such as coffee, 
rubber, seafood, coal, wood and crude oil) and in some labour-intensive 
manufactured goods (such as textiles, clothing, footwear and furniture) (Nguyen, 
2002). It means the government sometimes picked the wrong winners because these 
chosen winners were not suitable in the existing economic settings and they had 
limited capacities to deliver the expected performance.  
Boxes 2.1 and 2.2 provide two related examples of the government’s picking 
two wrong winners in the steel and cement industries. 
Box 2.1- Vietnam’s steel industry: an underdeveloped sector with high levels of government 
protection  
The Vietnamese steel market has been underdeveloped in terms of both quality and quantity 
while, at the same time, domestic enterprises have been weak and fragile. State enterprises, especially 
the Vietnam Steel Corporation (VSC), dominated the market due to high levels of government 
protection (Kawataba, 2007).  
 From 2000 onwards, more private steel companies, such as Hoa Phat Steel, Lotus Steel (or 
Hoa Sen Corporation), Sun Steel (or Sunsco), were authorised to supply steel to the domestic market. 
However, these firms possessed poor facilities and outdated technologies. Hence, they could only 
produce normal steel products while high-grade steel was largely imported because domestic steel 
producers were not able to supply such products. Even though the VSC lost some of its market share 
to private producers, its dominant position remained because it still had superior knowledge and 
experience in the steel business and still maintained a good relationship with the government.  
 There have been two types of government protection for the steel industry: (i) the 
government’s protection of normal steel products; and (ii) no protection of high-grade steel (CIE, 
1999a). This led to two unexpected outcomes. First, domestic producers had no incentives to improve 
their technology to be capable of producing high-grade steel. Second, there might have been a 
wasteful use of high-grade steel since domestic steel users preferred it to normal steel due to higher 
quality and insignificant price differences. 
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Box 2.2- Vietnam’s cement industry: high prices, poor quality, but no incentives to improve 
performance 
According to the CIE (1999a), there were about 70 cement plants operating in Vietnam by 
1999. The Vietnam Cement Corporation (VNCC) plants accounted for 55 per cent of total 
production, JVs 20-25 per cent, with the remaining produced by small-scale vertical shaft kilns. 
High-performance plants included Hoang Thach and Ha Tien I and II, while medium-performance 
plants were Hai Phong and Bim Son, and low-performance plants were the vertical shaft kiln plants.  
The domestic price of cement ($55 per tonne) was higher than those of Singapore, South 
Korea and Thailand ($38.8, $29.2 and $46, respectively). In addition, the quality of most 
domestically produced cement was lower, compared to foreign products, except for two private 
foreign companies (namely, Chin Fong and Sao Mai) whose products were said to be comparable 
with the Japanese cement. This explained why a majority of large-scale construction projects in 
Vietnam used cement supplied by Chin Fong. 
The CIE (1999a) concluded that, domestic cement plants were not able to compete 
successfully with foreign producers in the absence of government protection. Under government 
protection, domestic producers were so profitable that they had no incentives to improve their 
competitiveness in the cement market. 
 
2.5  Monetary Policy
15
 
2.5.1 History of Inflation in Vietnam (1986-2011) 
The history of inflation in Vietnam in the period 1986-2011 can be divided 
into four distinct phases: (i) during 1986-88, Vietnam experienced hyperinflation (or 
three-digit inflation), averaging 390.6 per cent per annum; (ii) during 1989-95, the 
inflation rate was reduced sharply to a two-digit number, averaging 38.3 per cent per 
annum; (iii) during 1996-2007, both the GDP deflator and the consumer price index 
(CPI) measures indicated that inflation remained stable and manageable at a single-
digit number; and (iv) during 2008-11, inflation increased to a two-digit number 
again (15.2 per cent for GDP delator measure and 14.4 per cent for CPI measure) 
(Table 2.6). 
The yearly data on CPI inflation (not reported in Table 2.6), shows that 
Vietnam experienced slight deflation in 2000 and 2001 (-1.7 and -0.4 per cent, 
respectively). However, in 2008, inflation started to rise again and increased up to 
23.1 per cent. According to the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS, 2008), in 
February 2008, Vietnam’s inflation rose to 15.8 per cent due to rising food and 
                                                 
15 To assist the discussion in this section, Annex 9 provides useful information about the development 
and characteristics of Vietnam’s banking sector. 
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energy prices, strong GDP growth rate (8.5 per cent) and increasing FDI inflows. 
More clearly, food prices in Vietnam increased dramatically from 7.4 per cent in 
2007 to 22 per cent in January 2008. Likewise, economic expansion in the real estate 
sector led to substantial price increases in the construction materials, transport and 
communication, and medical products and health care sectors (16.9, 7.2 and 7.5 per 
cent, respectively) (Auster and Rabinov, 2008). In 2011, inflation continued to 
increase to 18.7 per cent, similarly to the year 2008. 
Table 2.6- History of Inflation in Vietnam (%, Period Average), 1986-2011 
 1986-88 1989-95 1996-2007 2008-11 
GDP Deflator (% Change)* 390.6 38.3 6.5 15.2 
CPI (% Change)** N/A N/A 4.7 14.4 
Note: N/A = Not Available. 
Source: * from World Bank (Various Issues); and ** from IMF (Various Issues). 
2.5.2 Monetary Policy Stance 
From 1986 to the 1990s, Vietnam tightened its monetary policy to combat 
high levels of inflation, which was largely caused by changes in the exchange rate 
and excess money.16 From 1999 onwards, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) changed 
its monetary stance from tightening to prudential loosening (Nguyen, 2000). 
Nevertheless, Vietnam’s monetary policy was said to be very passive because the 
SBV did not have a strict inflation targeting regime (Nguyen, 1999). In other words, 
the SBV had little autonomy in controlling inflation because the inflation targets 
were often determined by the National Assembly (NA), but they were not prioritised 
over other development objectives such as rapid and sustainable growth (Le, 2009). 
2.5.3 Monetary Policy Instruments
17
 
The central bank had both direct and indirect monetary policy instruments. 
Direct instruments included interest rate control and credit ceilings. Indirect 
instruments included reserve requirements, refinancing and open market operations 
(OMOs). The SBV decided to target the money supply (M2) as an intermediate 
objective while its ultimate objectives were to stabilise domestic currency and the 
exchange rate, combat inflation and sustain economic growth (Table 2.7).   
                                                 
16 According to Goujon (2006), management of exchange rate movements, coupled with restrictive 
monetary policy, were necessary to fight inflation in a dollarised country like Vietnam. 
17 The discussion in this section is largely based on Nguyen (2000), with up-to-date financial data on 
reserve requirement ratios, interest rates and exchange rates.  
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Stabilise currency and 
foreign exchange market 
Interest rate control N/A N/A Economic growth 
Refinancing N/A N/A Inflation 
Exchange rate N/A N/A N/A 
Issuance of State Bank bills N/A N/A N/A 
Credit Ceiling N/A N/A N/A 
Note: N/A = Not Available.  
Source: Nguyen (2000, p. 187). 
Reserve Requirement 
In September 1992, Decision No.18/QD-NH5 was issued to apply a reserve 
requirement of 10 per cent on all deposits with credit institutions. These required 
reserves were held in separate accounts. In 1995, Decisions No.260/QD-NH1 and 
261/QD-NH1 were issued to adjust the requirement of reserve. Following these 
decisions, the required reserves were held in one account only. The reserve ratio 
remained at 10 per cent for deposits of less than one year, of which 70 per cent of 
required reserves was held at the SBV and 30 per cent held at credit institutions. In 
1999 the coverage of the reserve requirement was extended to include cooperative 
banks, people’s credit funds and credit cooperatives, and the required reserves must 
be held at the SBV.  
Currently, under Decisions No.74/QD-NHNN and 379/QD-NHNN, the 
reserve requirement ratios have been lowered with various rates applied to different 
types of banks, types of currency held at banks, and duration of deposits (Table 2.8). 
For instance, Group 1 banks, such as state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) 
excluding Agribank and urban joint-stock banks (JSBs), faced relatively-high reserve 
requirements: (i) 3 per cent for short-term deposits in domestic currency and 8 per 
cent for short-term deposits in foreign currency; and (ii) 1 per cent for long-term 
deposits in domestic currency and 6 per cent for long-term deposits in foreign 
currency. Groups 2 and 3 face the same relatively lower requirement ratios as a 
necessary condition to utilise a bank’s capital for developing the agricultural and 
rural sectors: (i) 1 per cent for short- and long-term deposits in domestic currency; 
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(ii) 7 per cent for short-term deposits in foreign currency; and (iii) 5 per cent for 
long-term deposits in foreign currency. Finally, there was no reserve requirement for 
Group 4 (including local credit funds and Vietnam Banks for Social Policies). 
Although this instrument helped reduce excess reserves and strengthen the SBV’s 
capability to control M1, excess reserves remained large and the SBV had limited 
ability to control M2.  
Table 2.8- Reserve Requirement Ratios (% Deposits) on 01 September, 2011 
 Deposit in Domestic Currency Deposit in Foreign Currency 
 < 12 Months > 12 Months < 12 Months > 12 Months 
Group 1 3.0 1.0 8.0 6.0 
Group 2 1.0 1.0 7.0 5.0 
Group 3 1.0 1.0 7.0 5.0 
Group 4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: Group 1 includes SOCBs (excluding Agribank) and urban JSBs (including foreign bank 
branches, JVBs, finance companies and financial leasing companies). 
Group 2 includes Agribank only. 
Group 3 includes rural JSBs, cooperative banks and central people’s credit funds. 
Group 4 includes credit institutions (with deposit balance subject to reserve requirement below 
$VN500 million), local credit funds and Vietnam Bank for Social Policies. 
Source: SBV (Various Issues). 
Refinancing Facility 
In November 1994, Decision No.285/QD-NH14 was issued to guide the 
conduct of refinance lending. In order to acquire refinancing loans, credit institutions 
must participate in the inter-bank market, make profits, comply with the SBV’s 
regulations and have sufficient required reserves. The refinancing rates were reduced 
sharply from 18.9 per cent in 1996 to 6.5 per cent in 2007. However, to deal with 
inflationary pressures in recent years, the rates were increased to 10.25 per cent in 
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Source: IMF (Various Issues). 
Credit Ceiling 
The credit ceiling instrument was adopted in the period 1994-97 in order to 
restrain total liquidity growth, improve credit quality and lower the inflation rates. 
Nevertheless, this direct instrument had two major limitations: (i) it was only applied 
to some commercial banks, thereby creating unequal competition among banks; and 
(ii) due to increasing demand for capital investment in Vietnam, a credit ceiling 
limited the supply of funds and the business activities of commercial banks. For 
these reasons, since 1998 the SBV has removed the credit ceiling and only used this 
instrument when it needed to restrain rapid credit growth.  
Regardless of the SBV’s credit control, credit continued to expand quickly 
and excessively. For instance, the credit level in Vietnam increased dramatically 
from $US1.55 billion in 1992 to $US149.39 billion in 2011 (Figure 2.4). The credit 
growth rate also exhibited an upward trend, increasing from 19.2 per cent in 1996 to 
38.8 per cent in 2009. In 2010 and 2011, the figure was reduced to 20.9 and 3.4 per 
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Note: The left-hand side vertical axis measures the credit level and the right-hand side vertical 
axis measures the credit growth rate. The credit level for 1994 was missing from the data 
series. Hence, the credit growth rates for 1994 and 1995 were also missing due to 
calculation problem. 
Source: IMF (Various Issues). 
Interest Rate Control 
In 1992, the SBV started to liberalise its management of interest rates, 
allowing nominal interest rates to increase such that real interest rates became 
positive, which in turn enabled banks to earn profits from their commercial banking 
services. In January 1996, the interest rate on deposits was liberalised and the lending 
rate was controlled by a maximum lending interest rate mechanism. This mechanism 
allowed commercial banks to earn a margin of 0.35 per cent per month including 
fees, taxes and interest. At that time, there were four sub-ceiling interest rates 
applicable to short-term and long-term loans, loans in urban and rural areas, and 
loans made by local people’s credit funds. In 1998 the SBV equalised lending rates 
between rural and urban areas and reduced the four sub-ceilings down to three sub-
ceilings.  
In August 2000, Decision No.241/2000/QD-NHNN1 was issued to change 
the SBV’s interest rate control regime. Particularly, the SBV changed from a ceiling 
interest rate to a basic interest rate on lending in domestic currency (VND) and a 
managed market interest rate on lending in foreign currencies. After that, credit 
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institutions determined their own lending rates based on the basic rate announced by 
the SBV, provided that the lending rates did not exceed the basic rate.  
Figure 2.5 illustrates the movement of interest rates in Vietnam from 1993 to 
2011. In 1993, both deposit and lending rates remained high (22 and 32.2 per cent, 
respectively). In 2009, the deposit and lending rates decreased sharply to 7.9 and 
10.1 per cent, respectively, but started to increase to 14 and 17 per cent, respectively, 
in 2011. Figure 2.5 also shows that bank’s annual profit margins (or interest rate 
spread), measured by the differences between annual deposit and lending rates, were 
suppressed from 10.1 per cent in 1993 to 3 per cent in 2011. These were equivalent 
to declines in monthly margins from 0.85 per cent in 1993 to 0.25 per cent in 2011.  
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Note: Deposit rates were missing for the period 1994-96, while lending rates were missing for the 
period 1994-95. 
Source: IMF (Various Issues). 
In general, Vietnam’s interest rate control had its own limitation, largely 
because of too many administrative interventions by the SBV. As a result, interest 
rates did not necessarily reflect the market forces of demand and supply. For 
instance, the basic interest rate was arbitrarily determined by the SBV based on the 
selected credit institutions rather than market demand and supply. Consequently, 
interest rate control is likely to have distorted the allocation of credit, thereby 
preventing Vietnam from developing to its full potential.  
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Open Market Operations (OMOs) 
The OMOs were officially put into operation in July 2000. Goods traded in 
the open market included Treasury bills (T-bills) and other short-term valuable 
papers. The SBV determined the volume of valuable papers for sale or purchase, 
interest rates and trading maturity, based on its liquidity forecast and monetary 
objectives. However, several problems remained in the open market including: (i) the 
SBV was weak in forecasting liquidity, making it difficult to conduct the OMOs; (ii) 
there were not many participants in the open market other than the SOCBs; and (iii) 
few financial instruments, such as T-bills and SBV’s bills, were available for sale or 
purchase. 
Exchange Rate Control 
Vietnam has long been controlling (or fixing) the foreign exchange rate in 
order to stimulate export and accumulate foreign currency reserves, thereby 
contributing positively to economic growth.18 The SBV announced the official 
exchange rate, which was based on the trading exchange rate in the inter-bank 
foreign exchange market, and managed the trading band of foreign exchange. In 
February 1999, the SBV changed its exchange rate control regime by unifying two 
types of exchange rates (the official rate and the real average trading rate in the inter-
bank foreign exchange market) into one exchange rate, which was determined daily 
by the average trading exchange rate in the inter-bank foreign exchange market 
(referred to as the reference rate). Over time, the SBV’s fixed (or crawling peg) 
exchange rate regime allows the VND to fluctuate within +/- 1 per cent of the 
reference rate against foreign currencies, especially against the USD (Nguyen, 2011). 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the movement in the Vietnamese exchange rate. In the 
late 1980s (the period of hyperinflation), the VND was depreciated substantially by 
244.2 per cent in 1987, 674.7 per cent in 1988 and 636 per cent in 1989. During 
1990-92, the VND continued to depreciate, but at a much lower rate (37.2 per cent, 
on average). Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, large capital outflows from 
Vietnam caused the VND to depreciate by 13.6 per cent in 1998. In this period 
(1997-98), Vietnam strategically devaluated its domestic currency, in order to 
promote exports, reduce imports, moderate the inflation level and achieve strong 
                                                 
18 Nevertheless, Vietnam needs to be cautious with such practice because many theoretical and 
empirical works pioneered by Mundell (1963) have shown that tight monetary policy would be less 
effective or even ineffective under a fixed (or crawling peg) exchange rate regime. 
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economic growth. During 1999-2009, the VND was slightly depreciated at an annual 
average rate of 2.3 per cent and continued to depreciate at an annual average rate of 
9.6 per cent during 2010-11. 














VND per USD, Average Period Depreciation Rates (%)
 
Note: The left-hand side vertical axis measures the exchange values. Because the exchange values 
in 1986 and 1987 were quite small (23 VND/USD and 78 VND/USD, respectively), they 
looked very close to zero (or the origin) on the graph. The right-hand side vertical axis 
measures the depreciation rates. 
Source: IMF (Various Issues). 
Other Administrative Measures 
The SBV’s weak institutional capacity has impeded the use of more incentive 
or market-friendly instruments to implement its monetary policy (Leung, 2009). 
Therefore, the SBV frequently uses ‘window guidance’ to communicate its 
objectives, concerns and motivations to other banks and financial institutions through 
the issuance of circulars and holding of meetings. This has been considered as the 
SBV’s most powerful monetary instrument in regulating banking activities in 
Vietnam, but the distortion effects of such practice on bankers’ decisions are 






 Vietnam’s economic performance has been very impressive since Doi Moi. 
The country experienced strong output growth, especially in the mid-1990s, and 
became more open to the rest of the world. High output growth translated into 
increasing labour incomes and high employment growth, which in turn reduced the 
unemployment rates to a favourably low level. However, Vietnam is still considered 
as a low-income country with considerable income gaps between urban and rural 
areas, and between rich and poor regions. Besides, there has been an improvement in 
the Vietnamese BOPs, but the country becomes more dependent on external debt, 
ODA funds, overseas remittances and FDI, to finance its industrialisation process. 
 In the period 1960-85, Vietnam implemented the heavy industry priority 
(HIP) strategy to develop heavy industry as a leading sector in Vietnam. This 
strategy was unsuccessful because of the inefficient allocation of investment 
resources to heavy industry and away from light industry and agriculture. Since 
1986, Vietnam has switched to developing light industry. Nevertheless, trade deficits 
continued to rise over time due to Vietnam’s over-reliance on imported material 
inputs to accelerate its industrialisation process. 
 After the collapse of the CMEA bloc in the early 1990s, Vietnam opened up 
its domestic economy to the rest of the world. The country adopted a dualistic trade 
regime in which it erected high walls of protection for both domestic import-
substituting and export-oriented industries. Although Vietnam’s trade regime has 
been more liberalised than before, it is still characterised as restrictive, protectionist 
and interventionist with favourable treatment given to domestic industries (especially 
domestic SOEs). Nevertheless, both domestic import-substituting and export-
oriented industries did not expand strongly enough to lead the economy nor could 
they help reduce the persistent trade deficits. 
Regarding the monetary policy, the SBV has been somewhat successful in 
controlling inflation due to its tight and/or prudential loosening monetary policy 
stance since Doi Moi. In effect, the inflation level was brought down from a three-
digit number during 1986-88 to less than 8 per cent in the 2000s (except for the year 
2008), but started to increase to a two-digit number again during 2010-11. Overall, 
the financial market as a whole has been hampered by too many administrative 
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interventions by the SBV such that the distortion effects of such practice on bankers’ 
decisions are significantly large. 
Vietnam’s protectionist policies were also reflected in high protective barriers 
favouring domestic producers, especially domestic SOEs. Regardless of being 
granted many privileges, these SOEs could not lead the economy as expected. 
Therefore, the next chapter discusses Vietnam’s microeconomic reform of domestic 
enterprises (including state and non-state enterprises). 
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Chapter 3 




As discussed in Chapter 2, in general Vietnam’s macroeconomic policies 
were seen to be restrictive, interventionist and protectionist. In principle, Vietnam 
always wished to progress towards a market economy. In practice, the influence from 
the central planning days slowed down this progress and even pushed it backwards. 
This was reflected in high protective barriers erected for domestic producers, 
especially domestic SOEs. Regardless of being granted many privileges, these SOEs 
could not lead the economy as expected. In this respect, this current chapter discusses 
Vietnam’s microeconomic reform of domestic enterprises to describe the overall 
SOE sector and its reform process since Doi Moi. To achieve greater reform 
outcomes, the private sector needs to be developed to its full potential. Ideally, the 
private sector should replace the SOE sector in leading the economy, creating more 
employment opportunities and sustaining growth in the future. 
This current chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses SOE 
reforms by briefly introducing the SOE sector, which has long been enjoying 
preferential treatment from the government, explaining the reasons for reforming this 
sector, and evaluating the overall SOE reform process over the past decades. In this 
respect, the equitisation program and the competition policy are important for 
promoting the economic efficiency and competitiveness of SOEs and other 
enterprises in Vietnam. Section 3.3 discusses the private sector development (PSD) 
policy, starting with a discussion on the private sector, which faces many ongoing 
obstacles. This section also discusses the benefits of developing the private sector 
and proposes ways to develop this sector as a leading economic force in Vietnam. 





3.2 Vietnam’s SOE Reforms 
3.2.1 The SOE Sector 
Over time, the state government has continued to maintain its expectation of 
the SOE sector as an engine of growth, thereby implementing policies to support and 
protect it. In effect, the SOE sector has become administratively dominant (in terms 
of influencing policy settings and access to funding and permit allocation) in the 
strategic and capital-intensive industries such as telecommunications, electronics, 
electrical engineering and cement. Other areas of SOE dominance include oil, gas 
and petroleum (OGP), steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals and fertilisers. During 
2003-05, there were 3,035 SOEs. Of this, the government determined to restructure 
2,075 SOEs through equitisation, merger and consolidation, and maintained full 
government control of the remaining 960 SOEs. These government-controlled SOEs 
are relatively large in size and located in large cities and provinces, especially in Ho 
Chi Minh City and Hanoi (Ishizuka, 2009). In 2007, there were 120 SOEs being 
nominated to the top 200 domestic enterprises. Almost all of these SOEs were 
members of general corporations (GCs) and economic conglomerates (Cheshier and 
Penrose, 2007). As mentioned in sub-section 2.3 of Chapter 2, the formation of many 
large GCs and economic conglomerates was primarily aimed at benefiting from scale 
economies and competing equally with MNCs.  
Preferential Treatment 
To maintain the SOE sector’s dominant role in the economy, preferential 
treatment in access to land, export quotas, credit and government procurement 
contracts including favourable tax rates, was granted. First, SOEs pay significantly 
lower profit tax rates, compared with other private firms: “profit tax rates on 
domestic private enterprises are twice as high as tax rates lived on foreign-invested 
projects and SOEs” (Hakkala et al., 2001, p. 29). Second, the process of acquiring 
land-use rights, especially long-term land-use rights in urban areas, has been 
streamlined particularly for SOEs while many private enterprises, including domestic 
and foreign firms, have difficulties in obtaining land-use rights certificates due to 
cumbersome procedures and problems associated with the valuation method of land-
use rights.  
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Third, SOEs have no difficulties in acquiring credit due to their long-standing 
relationships with the banking system.19 To some extent, the government’s 
announcement in 1997 explicitly exempts SOEs from the banks’ strict collateral 
requirements, usually in the form of land-use rights certificates. However, such 
requirements are still applied to private enterprises, thereby indirectly preventing 
them from acquiring banks’ credit. Indeed, private enterprises are more likely to be 
rejected than are SOEs when applying for both short- and long-term loans. Only 
large private enterprises, especially those that have close political contacts, can get 
bank loan approvals more easily. 
In principle, private enterprises can apply for export quotas, but getting 
approvals is rather difficult because the procedures are cumbersome and costly, 
similar to those for land and credit acquisition. For instance, foreign enterprises pay 
the highest quota fees (as a percentage of production cost), followed by domestic 
private enterprises and SOEs (5.6, 3.3 and 2.2 per cent, respectively). In practice, 
private enterprises can only obtain export quotas through informal channels, such as 
resale and transfer of export quotas from SOEs, even though such activities are 
prohibited (Knutsen and Nguyen, 2004).  
Finally, private enterprises can hardly win procurement contracts directly 
from the government since such contracts are implicitly saved for SOEs. The public 
bidding processes are structured in ways that implicitly prevent private enterprises 
from winning bids. Such practices may include (i) creating one big contract with 
bundled services to deter participation of small (private) firms; (ii) setting too short 
submission dates; (iii) asking private firms to provide sensitive information; and (iv) 
allowing the government or SOEs to adjust their bids after private firms have 
submitted theirs (Hakkala and Kokko, 2007).  
Consequences of Preferential Treatment 
The above preferential treatment indeed creates unfair competition, which 
impedes the growth of private enterprises.20 First, the formation of many large GCs 
administratively gives them monopoly power in the input and output markets. 
Therefore, SOEs’ pricing does not necessarily reflect the forces of supply and 
                                                 
19 See Annex 9 for more details about the close relationships between SOEs and the banking system. 
20 A study by Nguyen and Freeman (2009) confirms that SOEs are indeed crowding out other private 
enterprises due to the long-standing problem of lacking a level-playing field, which may lead to 
inefficient resources allocation and under-utilisation of Vietnam’s growth potential. 
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demand. Even though many SOEs are more profitable and have superior 
performance compared with private enterprises, this mostly comes from their secured 
monopoly positions rather than from efficiency gains (Kokko and Sojholm, 2000). 
Historically, profitable SOEs can take advantage of cheap credit to expand further 
while loss-making SOEs still survive at the expense of the private sector facing 
capital shortages and foregone business opportunities. Even though private 
enterprises have sufficient investment capital, they are extremely reluctant to 
undertake long-term investment projects due to Vietnam’s uncertain business 
environment caused by rapidly changing laws and regulations, as mentioned in sub-
section 2.4.4 of Chapter 2. 
Second, the SOE sector still accounts for a significantly large share in total 
investment, compared with the private sector. During 1997-99, SOEs absorbed 
approximately 2.2 per cent of GDP in various forms of subsidies (Hakkala et al., 
2001). Most notably, in November 2005, Vinashin− a ship building SOE− was 
subsidised through government bonds worth $US750 million such that no private 
firms were able to compete with this giant in the short and medium terms (Hakkala 
and Kokko, 2007). These scarce investment resources could have been directed 
towards other more productive areas which needed them the most.  
With respect to foreign investment, a majority of foreign investors reveal 
strong preferences towards forming JVs with SOEs chiefly because they can easily 
get government approvals and business licenses and have ready-to-use resources, 
especially land-use rights (Nguyen and Meyer, 2004). In addition, foreign investors 
can solve any disputes more easily with SOEs than with private enterprises: “if there 
is a problem, they would contact the ministry and the problem is solved… with the 
private companies, they would have to go to court, which is a long and difficult 
process” (Knutsen and Nguyen, 2004, p. 132). Consequently, private enterprises will 
have fewer opportunities to collaborate with foreign enterprises or learn and upgrade 
from foreign technologies. Worse still, foreign investment may be misallocated into 
inefficient sectors and away from productive ones (Leung, 2009). 
3.2.2 Reasons for Reforms 
SOEs Contributed Less to the Economy 
Over the past decades, the SOE sector was arbitrarily chosen to play a leading 
role in Vietnam, thereby absorbing a very large share in aggregate investment during 
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1995-2011. Ironically, its contribution to real GDP and aggregate employment was 
much lower than that of the private sector (including the non-state enterprises and 
foreign-invested enterprises) during the same period (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1- Ownership Shares in Real GDP, Aggregate Investment and 
Employment (%), 1995-2011 
  1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-11 
Investment State 50.9 58.1 46.8 44.5 
 Non-state (Domestic) 24.6 24.6 28.2 26.9 
 Foreign-invested (including JVs) 24.5 17.3 25.0 28.6 
      
Real GDP State 40.8 41.0 39.1 36.7 
 Non-State (Domestic) 50.8 48.0 47.9 49.6 
 Foreign-invested (including JVs) 8.4 11.1 13.0 13.6 
      
Employment State N/A 9.6 11.1 10.4 
 Non-state (Domestic) N/A 88.8 85.7 86.1 
 Foreign-invested (including JVs) N/A 1.6 3.2 3.4 
Note: These shares are expressed in period-average percentages.  
Source: GSO (Various Issues). 
In addition, the SOE sector’s leading role was not supported much by the fact 
that the total number of private enterprises far exceeded the total number of SOEs by 
the end of 2008 (202,402 and 3,287 enterprises, respectively). Of this, small and 
medium private enterprises outnumbered small and medium SOEs both in terms of 
number of employees and capitalisation. Likewise, large private enterprises also 
outnumbered large SOEs (Table 3.2). This partly explains the SOE sector’s smaller 
contribution to total government tax revenues in recent years, compared to the 
private sector. During 2000-02, the SOE sector accounted for more than half of total 
government tax revenues, but its share declined sharply to 34.3 per cent during 2006-
08. By contrast, the non-state enterprises (NSEs), including domestic enterprises and 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), accounted for 45.4 per cent of total government 
tax revenues during 2000-02 and increased considerably to 65.7 per cent during 
2006-08 (Table 3.3). In general, it can be said that the SOE sector was less efficient 
than the private sector in utilising investment capital for output and employment 
expansion such that, in recent years, its dominant position has been replaced by the 
increasing importance of the private sector. 
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Table 3.2- Firm Size by Number of Employees and Capitalisation (31 December, 
2008)  
  Number of Employees Capitalisation ($VN billion) 
 Total 1- 999 1000- 5000 1- 199 200- 500 
Total 205,689 204,642 1,047 202,794 2,895 
SOEs 3,287 2,951 336 2,469 818 
NSEs 202,402 201,691 711 200,325 2,077 
Domestic 196,776 196,448 328 195,488 1,288 
Foreign 5,626 5,243 383 4,837 789 
Note: Small and medium enterprises are those operating with less than 1,000 employees or less than 
$VN200 billion. By contrast, large enterprises are those operating with more than 1,000 
employees or more than $VN200 billion. 
Source: GSO (Various Issues). 
Table 3.3- Ownership Shares in Government Tax Revenues (%), 2000-08 
 2000-02 2003-05 2006-08 
SOEs 54.6 43.3 34.3 
NSEs 45.4 56.7 65.7 
Domestic enterprises 9.8 16.5 25.2 
Foreign-invested enterprises 35.6 40.2 40.6 
Note: These numbers are expressed in period-average percentages. 
Source: GSO (Various Issues). 
SOEs Operated Inefficiently 
Over time, a majority of SOEs operated inefficiently. First, there existed 
many problems associated with the formation of GCs in Vietnam, such as conflicting 
interests among GC members and inflexibility in decision making. Member 
enterprises were often forced to join GCs without a clear knowledge of their roles 
and benefits. They were required to follow a common business plan and were 
restrained from signing independent business contracts or pursuing their own 
investment strategies. Worse still, profitable members were usually forced to rescue 
other inefficient, loss-making members instead of shutting them down (refer to the 
case study in Box 3.2). This type of cross-subsidisation was often not economically 
viable and often created tensions among member enterprises (Malesky et al., 1998).  
Second, most SOEs operated wastefully, with more than 30 per cent of the 
capital stock being under-utilised (Kokko and Sjoholm, 2000). Besides, most SOEs 
were over-staffed and, if they were to operate at an optimal employment level, more 
than half of their workforce would become redundant (Mekong Economics, 2002).  
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Third, SOEs captured a larger share in investment capital but generated less 
output than private enterprises, as mentioned previously. However, SOEs were not 
penalised seriously for their failures nor were they following market disciplines 
(Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). Hence, they did not really care much for their successes 
or failures. This was manifested by the fact that most SOEs were given monopoly 
power, soft budget constraint and preferential treatment.  
Fourth, most SOEs lacked essential managerial skills largely because of the 
state’s managerial appointment practice. More clearly, SOE managers were often 
appointed based on their party membership status instead of educational 
qualifications. Sometimes, they were transferred to other SOEs (either promoted or 
demoted) suddenly at the government’s discretion. The problem was, these SOE 
managers often had lower skills and received lower salaries than private managers. 
Under state policies, they had little autonomy in deciding on their business activities 
and other related issues. Thus, SOE managers were either lacking incentives or 
unable to perform well (Fforde, 2004).  
Finally, SOEs operated inefficiently because they often pursued multiple 
conflicting objectives, in order to fulfil various interests of the state and other SOE 
stakeholders (including the board of management and employees). In reality, profit 
maximisation was not necessarily an ultimate goal of SOEs. Instead, job security for 
workers appeared to be their most important objective. As a result, most SOEs were 
obliged to operate in their core businesses in order to secure jobs, even though many 
core businesses were not profitable (Cheshier and Penrose, 2007).  
The case study in Box 3.1 discusses the economic efficiency of the SOE 
sector in Vietnam in late 2008. Similarly, the case study in Box 3.2 provides the most 
recent example of failure in an industrial ship building SOE known as Vinashin− one 









Box 3.1- Many GCs and economic conglomerates in Vietnam failed to utilise their advantages to 
perform better 
 According to Song Linh (2009), GCs and economic conglomerates in Vietnam were 
characterised as a giant standing on his bare feet. These agents have had many advantages over other 
private enterprises. By 2008, their investment capital amounted to $VN1,241,000 billion (or $US60 
billion), accounting for nearly half of aggregate investment capital. In addition, their land usage 
amounted to 366,000 hectare, most of which were highly valued in the property market. In some 
areas, monopoly power has given these GCs great advantages in competing with other firms.  
 However, these agents have not fully utilised their valuable resources. Instead, they even 
wasted such resources, leading to poor economic performance, losses of investment capital and 
erosion of state assets. By 31 December 2008, nearly half of the total number of GCs operated 
inefficiently for three reasons. First, these inefficient GCs often had total debt-to-asset ratios 
exceeding 10:1, indicating that debt was more than 10 times the level of assets. These GCs were the 
Transportation Construction GCs No.1 and No.4 (21.6:1 and 14:1, respectively), Mechanical 
Installation GC (17.4:1), Industrial Construction GC (12.9:1) and Industrial Ship Building GC 
(Vinashin, 10.9:1).  
 Second, they often incurred huge debt, including overdue debt. The total debt of seven 
Vietnamese conglomerates, including Petroleum and Gas, Coal and Minerals, Rubber, Textile and 
Clothing, Ship Building, Electricity, and Post and Telecommunication, amounted to $VN128,786 
billion (or $US6.5 billion) in 2008, having increased by 20.54 per cent from 2007. The overdue debt 
of these conglomerates amounted to $VN4,168 billion (or $US208 million), accounting for 3.24 per 
cent of all conglomerates’ total outstanding debt.  
 Finally, those inefficient GCs often got involved in cross-industry investments in areas with 
low (or even negative) rates of return. Ironically, they were racing to make cross-industry investments 
even though they seriously lacked funds to invest in their core businesses. There were 47 GCs and 
conglomerates making cross-industry investments in such areas as banking, the stock exchange, 
insurance, and investment funds. Total investment in these areas amounted to $VN6,400 billion (or 
$US320 million) by the end of 2006, increasing dramatically to $VN16,200 billion (or $US810 
million) by 2007 and $VN21,164 billion (or $US1.06 billion) by 2008. However, returns on 
investment in such areas were very low, compared to investment returns in their core businesses. In 
2008, the stock exchange market and investment funds industry contracted, leading almost all GCs 
and conglomerates to make losses (Hong Anh, 2009a).  
Note: This article was archived from Vietnam’s well known online news website 







Box 3.2- Failed Vinashin was rescued by the government through restructuring 
 After a series of investigation, it was concluded that Vinashin failed to report its financial 
difficulties to the government. Due to its ambition to expand business quickly, Vinashin established 
about 200 child (or smaller) companies, which were managed loosely and incapable of continuing 
their operations. Vinashin also made cross-industry investments in areas with low (or even negative) 
rates of return and bought too many old ships, creating heavy burdens on the government budget 
(Hong Anh and Hoang Lan, 2010). For these reasons, Vinashin is now on the brink of bankruptcy. 
Almost all key members of the board of management, especially chairman Thanh Binh Pham, were 
arrested and faced charges for ruining the largest ship building conglomerate of the nation (Viet Anh 
et al., 2010).  
 Vinashin’s current total assets are worth $VN90,000 billion (or $US4.5 billion) and working 
capital worth $VN9,000 billion (or $US450 million). However, its total outstanding debt amounted to 
$VN80,000 billion (or $US4 billion). Part of the debt came from the government’s international 
securities worth $US750 million in November, 2005 (Hoang Lan, 2010). Due to its huge debt level 
and incapability of continuing operation, Vinashin needed to be restructured immediately.  
 According to the restructuring plan, the Petroleum and Gas conglomerate (PVN) and the 
Marine GC (Vinalines) were assigned to undertake Vinashin’s ongoing investment projects, but they 
had to bear part of the debt burdens left by Vinashin ($VN20,000 billion or $US1 billion, 
approximately). The government announced that the restructuring of Vinashin was not aimed at 
reducing its debt level, but fulfilling four main objectives: (i) to continue and develop the ship 
building and repairing industry; (ii) to use resources more efficiently for developing this industry; (iii) 
to not adversely affect the operations of other credit institutions; and (iv) to provide job security for 
workers in this industry. The government continued to subsidise Vinashin to resolve its debt and 
acquire new funds to finance its operations. In so doing, the SBV was directed to negotiate with other 
credit institutions to provide new loans for Vinashin and re-examine its debt structure.  
Note: This article was archived from Vietnam’s well known online news website 
(http://vnexpress.net/GL/Home/) and was translated into English by the author. 
 
3.2.3 Reforms of SOEs 
In 1989, the government started to reform the SOE sector, aiming at 
dissolving unprofitable SOEs and improving their competitiveness. In effect, the 
number of SOEs declined remarkably from 6,545 in 1992 to 3,324 in the period 
2009-10 (Table 3.4). The yearly data (unreported in Table 3.4) shows that there were 





Table 3.4- Number of SOEs and NSEs in Vietnam (Period Average), 1992-2010 
 1992 1992-98 2000-02 2003-05 2006-08 2009-10 
Total N/A N/A 52,292 92,239 164,259 270,752 
SOEs 6,545 5,873 5,492 4,509 3,496 3,324 
NSEs (including FIEs) N/A N/A 46,800 87,730 160,764 267,428 
Note: N/A = Not Available. 
Source: Data for 1992-98 is sourced from Vu (2005, p. 8) and data for 2000-10 is sourced from the 
GSO (Various Issues). 
Regardless of the reduced number of SOEs, the SOE reform process has been 
slow and incomplete. First, SOE managers and even labourers are resistant to the 
reform process, regardless of its social benefits, in order to protect their status quo 
(Hakkala et al., 2001). Second, weak governmental management of SOEs also 
explains the slow SOE reform process: “there are many weaknesses and bottlenecks 
in the state administration of SOEs” (Mekong Economics, 2002, p. 33). Most 
notably, the government’s reluctance to reform large SOEs is the main contributor to 
slow down the entire reform process. Understandably, because most SOEs are over-
staffed, SOE reforms would cause massive job losses. Hence, the government prefers 
slow reforms in order to minimise this employment shock and secure jobs. Overall, 
the Vietnamese SOE reforms have been best characterised as “keeping the big and 
releasing the small” (UNDP, 2006, p. 23). It means the government takes dramatic 
steps in freeing up loss-making SOEs of small and medium size, while retaining full 
control over strategic and profitable SOEs of larger size. Such a reform approach is 
problematic because not all large SOEs are efficient, as previously illustrated in 
Boxes 3.1 and 3.2. 
The Equitisation Program 
Equitisation has been one of the most commonly used methods of reform in 
Vietnam. According to Vu (2006), the government classifies three groups of SOEs: 
(i) Group 1 consists of strategic SOEs which are kept by the state; (ii) Group 2 
consists of medium SOEs which will be equitised partially; and (iii) Group 3 consists 
of small and unprofitable SOEs which are ready for either partial or full equitisation. 
More specifically, there are 19 sectors21 in which existing SOEs will remain 100 per 
                                                 
21 Such as (i) explosives, toxic chemicals, weapons and ammunition; (ii) electricity transmission and 
large-scale electricity production with special social-economic importance; (iii) management and 
operation of national and urban railways, airports and large-scale seaports; (iv) radio, television, 
publishing and press; and (v) credit institutions serving socio-economic development. 
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cent state-owned and 27 sectors22 in which the state will continue to hold more than 
50 per cent of ownership share (UNCTAD, 2008). Obviously, SOEs in the strategic 
(or very important) industries are not in the equitisation agenda because they 
represent the images of the state such that the equitisation program is only applied to 
small and medium SOEs, aiming at improving their efficiency and competitiveness.23  
In the initial stage (1992-96), there were only five equitised SOEs in the pilot 
program, which involved significantly large insider buyouts. These equitised SOEs 
were of small and medium size with market capitalisation under $US1 million, 
operating in the transportation, shoes, machinery and food processing industries. The 
government’s shares in these enterprises were reduced to 18-30 per cent. Outsiders’ 
shares were between 5 and 35 per cent with employees accounting for the lion’s 
share of between 35 and 77 per cent (Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5- The Pilot Equitisation Program, 1992-96 
  Ownership Structure (%) 
Firm Name Capital 
($US) 
State Employees Outsiders 
Transportation Service Co 394,603 18.0 77.0 5.0 
Refrigeration & Electrical Engineering Co 1,018,330 30.0 50.0 20.0 
Hiep An Shoes Co 305,053 30.0 35.2 34.8 
Animal Food Processing Co 503,564 30.0 50.0 20.0 
Longan Export Product Processing Co 225,305 30.2 48.6 21.2 
Note:  Capital was primarily expressed in VND, which was then converted into $US by the author. 
Source: Truong et al. (2006, p. 352). 
Among different reform measures, SOE reforms have been done largely 
through equitisation, followed by merger or consolidation and assignment of sales. 
For instance, the accumulated number of reformed SOEs was 4,091 in the period 
1992-2008. Of this, 3,279 SOEs were equitised, 362 merged or consolidated and 185 
assigned of sales (Table 3.6).  
                                                 
22 Such as (i) maintenance of the national railway system; (ii) management and operations of seaports 
(other than large-scale); (iii) electricity production with output capacity of 100 megawatts (MW) or 
more; (iv) mining of various minerals, petroleum and natural gas; (v) supply of information, 
communication and technology (ICT) network infrastructure; (vi) wholesale of food; (vii) currency 
trading; and (viii) insurance. 
23 Over time, equitising only small to medium SOEs has offered limited benefits. By contrast, 
equitising large SOEs is believed to maximise the potential benefits for Vietnam in terms of 
improvements in productivity and export performance (Anwar and Nguyen, 2011). 
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With respect to equitisation, the number of equitised SOEs increased steadily 
from 1992 to 2008. More specifically, equitisation was accelerated to 123 cases 
during 1992-98 and continued to accelerate to 833 cases during 1999-2002 (Table 
3.6). During 2003-05, equitisation was accelerated most rapidly to a record high of 
2,009 cases (or 669 cases per year, on average). However, the process suddenly 
slowed down to 314 cases during 2006-08 (or 104 cases per year, on average).  
Table 3.6- Vietnam’s SOE Reform Measures, 1992-2008 
 1992-98 1999-2002 2003-05 2006-08 Accumulated 
Total cases 123 1,145 2,509 314 4,091 
Equitisation 123 833 2,009 314 3,279 
Assignment of sales N/A 99 86 N/A 185 
Contract or lease N/A 9 5 N/A 14 
Merger or consolidation N/A 127 235 N/A 362 
Divesture N/A 29 73 N/A 102 
Bankruptcy N/A 0 0 N/A 0 
Other Measures N/A 48 101 N/A 149 
Note: Data for the equitisation entry (from 1992 to 2008) is sourced from Nguyen (2010, p. 70). Data 
for other remaining entries is sourced from Vu (2005, p. 8). N/A = Not Available. 
Current Equitisation Issues 
As the government continues equitising SOEs, there are at least three 
worrying issues worth considering. First, regardless of the increasing number of 
equitised SOEs, the overall equitisation process has been seen to be slow and 
incomplete, similar to the overall SOE reform process. The government is reluctant 
to equitise SOEs more aggressively because of many concerns such as job losses, 
SOE asset valuation and conflicting ownership claims against SOE assets 
(O’Connor, 1996).24 Therefore, equitisation has been implemented in a lengthy and 
cumbersome procedure. Initially, it took three years to equitise a single firm. The 
equitisation process was then reduced to 13 months by 2006 and was further reduced 
to nine months in compliance with Decree 109 in 2007 (ADB, 2009).  
Second, the equitisation process is not transparent and only benefits the 
political elites, indicating that private participants do not benefit much from the 
equitisation process. In some cases, private investors simply have no interest in small 
and unprofitable SOEs because it is not economically viable for them to participate. 
                                                 
24 To some extent, most government authorities are often reluctant to promote equitisation for fear of 
receiving criticism for deviating from socialism and/or communism (Altenburg, 2011).  
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In other cases, private investors are just too small to buy shares (Vu, 2005). This 
gives rise to the next and last issue regarding the ownership structure of equitised 
SOEs.  
Finally, equitisation cannot completely solve the ownership issues. One legal 
entity could buy up to 20 per cent of shares, for individuals 10 per cent and for 
foreign investors 30 per cent, in a particular equitised SOE. The remaining shares 
belong to the state, managers and employees (Tran and CIEM, 2002). As a result, 
there are virtually no major changes in the ownership structure of the equitised 
enterprises (Table 3.7). The labourers’ shares accounted for 43.5 per cent, but there 
were too many labourers in the equitised enterprises. Hence, each individual labourer 
had little influence on such enterprises. Instead, the power is concentrated in a small 
group of managers even though they only accounted for 18.6 per cent of the total 
share. Other government agencies, including central and provincial governments, 
state GCs and other SOEs, altogether accounted for 28.1 per cent of shares. They 
also had great influence on the equitised SOEs. By contrast, the private participants, 
including the Vietnamese individuals, enterprises and organisations, and foreigners, 
had little role in the equitisation process, altogether accounting for less than 10 per 
cent of shares. 
Table 3.7- Ownership Structure of Equitised Enterprises (%), 2004 






Total 100.0 100.0  
1. Managers 17.2 18.6 1.4 
2. Labourers 44.6 43.5 -1.1 
3. Central government 2.2 2.0 -0.2 
4. Provincial governments 14.5 12.4 -2.1 
5. State GCs 11.0 10.7 -0.3 
6. Other SOEs 2.5 3.0 0.5 
7. Other Vietnamese individuals 6.4 7.9 1.5 
8. Vietnamese enterprises & organisations 1.5 1.6 0.1 
9. Foreigners 0.1 0.3 0.2 
Source: Tran et al. (2007, p. 48). 
 53 
 Over time, insiders’ shares in the equitised enterprises declined slightly and 
those of outsiders increased since the introduction of Decree 187 in 2004 requiring 
shares to be auctioned off publicly (ADB, 2009). In effect, shares retained by 
managers and employees were reduced sharply from 26 per cent in late 2005 to 12 
per cent in mid 2008 (Table 3.8). By contrast, outside investors’ shares increased 
considerably from 25 per cent in late 2005 to 38 per cent in mid 2008. Yet, the 
government still retained half of the total shares, indicating that its influence on 
equitised SOEs remained significantly large.  
Table 3.8- Ownership Structure (%) during 2005-08 
Shareholders End 2005 Mid 2008 Changes 
Total capital shares 100.0 100.0  
1. Managers & employees 26.0 12.0 -14.0 
2. Outside investors 25.0 38.0 13.0 
3. State shares 49.0 50.0 1.0 




Overall, the long-standing problem of unfair competition among SOEs, 
equitised SOEs and private enterprises, has never been solved. In practice, SOEs and 
equitised SOEs still have close political contacts with the government. Therefore, 
they can go through “the maze of regulations” and obtain permits and licenses more 
easily than private enterprises (Griffin, 1998, p. 44). In recent years, the military has 
been authorised to engage in profit-making businesses, putting private enterprises at 
a competitive disadvantage (EAAU, 1997). As mentioned previously, most SOEs 
have either monopoly or oligopoly powers, making it difficult for private enterprises 
to compete with them equally. For these reasons, Vu (2006, p. 3) strongly argued that 
“merely counting the number of SOEs subject to privatisation… do[es] not tell us 
much about the effectiveness of privatisation and competition policies. The methods 
used and the context in which these policies are implemented matter greatly”.  
Therefore, it can be said that while equitisation does enhance the efficiency of 
SOEs, it is not sufficient to ensure all SOEs become efficient and competitive. 
Hence, equitisation must be complemented by a competition law, aiming at creating 
                                                 
25 ‘Competition policy’ is used interchangeably with ‘anti-trust policy’. 
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fair and equal competition among all types of enterprises. According to Rey (1997), 
fair and equal competition has favourable impacts on research and development 
(R&D) because it induces firms to become more innovative, in order to maximise 
profits and survive. Hence, an effective competition policy will help promote and 
protect the competition process, which in turn promotes innovation and growth (Le et 
al., 2003).  
On 3 December 2004, the National Assembly (NA) passed the Competition 
Law (No. 27/2004/QH11), which came into effect on 1 July, 2005. The law was 
written in six Chapters with 123 Articles and was applied to two major groups: (i) 
business organisations and (ii) individuals (including all types of enterprises). 
Essentially, the law prohibits three competition-restrictive acts, including 
competition-restriction agreement, abuse of dominant position and economic 
concentration. It also prohibits 10 unfair-competition acts, such as misleading 
indications, infringement upon business secrets, constraint in business and 
discrediting other enterprises. By January 2007, the government had introduced six 
implementation guidelines to enforce the law effectively. Among these, two 
important Decrees (namely, Decrees No.05/2006/ND-CP and No.06/2006/ND-CP) 
were introduced to establish the Competition Council (VCC) and the Competition 
Administration Department (VCAD), respectively, to handle disputes related to 
unhealthy competition (VCAD, Various Issues).  
To date, there is very limited information about the implementation of the 
2004 Competition Law and its effects on the economy. As argued by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 77), 
“insufficient time has elapsed to assess the impact of the law and the effectiveness of 
the institutional mechanism established to enforce it”. 
3.3 Private Sector Development
26
 
3.3.1 The Private Sector 
It is important to note that the author considers the private sector to consist of 
private domestic enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and joint ventures 
(JVs). Generally, these economic agents do not enjoy preferential treatment as much 
as SOEs do. Among these, private domestic enterprises are the most vulnerable 
                                                 
26 The term ‘private sector’ is used interchangeably with ‘NSE sector’.   
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group of enterprises in Vietnam. Therefore, the discussion in this sub-section largely 
refers to private domestic enterprises rather than FIEs and JVs.  
 It can be said that the Vietnamese private sector as a whole has been 
constrained with many administrative barriers. As a result, many private enterprises, 
especially private domestic enterprises, remain small and vulnerable. Normally, these 
enterprises are of small and medium size, operating in non-strategic industries and 
producing relatively low value-added goods and services such as retail trade, 
garments and footwear. Similarly, they are concentrated in a few locations, 
especially in the Southern regions and large cities. According to Webster and Taussig 
(1999), most private domestic enterprises are small to medium because: (i) they have 
low resource endowment; (ii) they operate in a high-risk environment; and (iii) they 
lack investment capital. In addition, many private small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) do not have large-scale operations because they lack adequate skills, and 
because they are crowded-out by SOEs. Worse still, there are a vast number of 
micro-sized enterprises, most of which have low productivity and engage in labour-
intensive industries (ADB, 2005). These micro-enterprises produce and sell even 
lower value-added goods and services to local markets such as small-scale 
manufacturing, construction, repairing, retail trade, garments and footwear, and 
handicrafts. 
Due to its fragile structure, the private sector has the highest level of business 
informality.27 Several factors contributing to such informality include excessive laws 
and regulations, cumbersome administrative procedures, discretionary behaviour of 
government officials, and Vietnam being a largely cash economy where transactions 
cannot be properly monitored. Yet, the consequences of informality are ambiguous 
since it may be either good or bad. For instance, informality gives unfair competitive 
advantage to noncompliant firms and distorts resource allocation. However, 
informality can be viewed as a defensive, socially-efficient response by 
disadvantaged firms to excessive regulations and an uneven playing field (Tenev et 
al., 2003).  
                                                 
27 ‘Business informality’ is defined by the GSO as informal activities including: (i) household 
production in rural areas; (ii) unregistered business activities in urban areas; (iii) not reporting income 
so as to evade taxes; (iv) domestic service; (v) smuggling; (vi) renting of houses or furniture; (vii) 
secondary and unreported activities of administrative offices, army offices, prisons, re-education 
camps, and orphanages; and (viii) operations of non-profit institutions, charitable associations, and the 
Red Cross (Tenev et al., 2003). 
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3.3.2 Benefits of Private Sector Development (PSD) 
Many advocates of PSD argue that the state sector can no longer be an engine 
of growth in the future because it will no longer be able to generate enough jobs for 
the rapidly growing labour force. According to Webster (1999), there are about 1 
million people entering the labour force each year, but there are not many job 
opportunities available to them. At the same time, the ongoing SOE reforms 
inevitably lead to labour redundancies. These twin pressures on employment have 
been the most challenging issue facing the government.  
This employment problem can be solved by promoting the non-state 
enterprise (NSE) sector while gradually reducing the SOE sector (Wright and 
Nguyen, 2000). If implemented effectively, Vietnam will be able to establish a 
balanced dual growth engine in the future (Figure 3.1). The term ‘balanced’ used in 
this context does not literally mean equal contribution to economic growth by both 
sectors. Instead, it refers to a sound competitive environment, which enables both 
sectors to compete fairly and equally with each other.  
Basically, developing the private sector offers three main benefits. First, an 
expanding NSE sector will absorb any labour redundancies from the SOE sector. The 
available evidence shows that the transition between jobs in Vietnam has been 
smooth and that relatively few SOE employees have suffered from prolonged 
unemployment (O’Connor, 1996). Second, because most private enterprises in 
Vietnam are labour-intensive, promoting the NSE sector would create more job 
opportunities28, which would reduce poverty, especially poverty in rural areas 
(Hansen et al., 2004). Finally, the NSE sector has been proven to be more efficient 
than the SOE sector (referred to sub-section 3.2.2 of this chapter). Hence, developing 
the NSE sector would lead to greater productivity improvement, which in turn would 






                                                 
28 To some extent, because PSD creates more jobs and raises the aggregate income level, an 
expanding private sector will create more buyers and increase the overall purchasing power for the 
economy.    
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Figure 3.1- An Illustration of Vietnam’s Balanced Dual Growth Engine 
 
Note: Author’s illustration. PSD will provide a good source of job creation. With the PSD policy 
alongside SOE reforms, Vietnam can establish a balanced dual engine of growth in the future.  
3.3.3 Obstacles to Private Sector Development 
From 2000 to 2008, the PSD policy produced some quantity effects in 
increasing the number of private enterprises. As seen in Table 3.4 of sub-section 
3.2.3 of this chapter, the average number of NSEs (including FIEs) increased rapidly 
and sharply from 46,800 during 2000-02 to 267,428 during 2009-10. Nevertheless, 
the PSD policy lacked some quality effects in not promoting these newly established 
NSEs to grow to their full potential.  
































Overall, the private sector has not been officially recognised by the 
government to lead the economy since many obstacles (including administrative 
barriers) still remain. First, most private domestic SMEs are dispersed across the 
country with obsolete technology and a low-quality workforce. Second, almost all 
private enterprises have limited access to scarce resources, such as land, credit and 
information on market opportunities, since these are implicitly saved for SOEs. 
Consequently, many private domestic enterprises, especially micro-enterprises, must 
obtain credit from informal channels including family and friends. Most notably, the 
private sector’s growth potential remains underdeveloped since a majority of micro-
sized enterprises still operate in informal or shadow economy, which accounts for 16 
to 50 per cent of formal economy. This restricts their ability to sign business 
contracts with foreign firms and obtain credit from formal banking channels (ADB, 
2005). Finally, the current business environment is not supportive of PSD, including 
bureaucracy and red tape, unequal competition, imperfect market regulation and 
unclear property rights. 
3.3.4 Proposals for Private Sector Development (PSD) 
According to Webster (1999), the traditional growth strategy, in which the 
state leads the economy, will become inappropriate in the future. Instead, a new 
growth strategy should be adopted, in which the government should free up and 
support the private sector to sustain high quality jobs, as well as high economic 
growth rates. Although the benefits of PSD are well recognised, there have been few 
legal frameworks and/or proposals for promoting the private sector more effectively. 
To date, the Sakai-Takada proposals represent one of the most comprehensive 
frameworks for PSD (Sakai and Takada, 2000). They called for a sound legal 
framework and suggested the emphasis should be to build up supportive agencies 
that help private enterprises in vocational training and promoting export. In addition, 
the government should build up effective supporting infrastructure, such as financial 
transparency, contract law and elimination of burdensome regulations (Wright and 
Nguyen, 2000). Further, because 90 per cent of the poor in Vietnam live in rural 
areas, policy proposals should be directed towards developing labour-intensive and 
export-oriented manufacturing, in order to eliminate rural poverty and create more 
urban employment opportunities (Livingstone, 2000). Equally important is the need 
to reduce informality and to make rules binding as a top priority for PSD (Tenev et 
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al., 2003). At present, most private domestic enterprises in Vietnam are still in their 
infancy stages, facing many barriers and obstacles. Hence, it is urgent to introduce 
non-discriminatory policies that treat all types of companies equally regardless of 
their ownership structures. In the longer term, institutional changes are seen as an 
essential condition for private enterprises to grow and for competitive markets to 
function properly (Schaumburg-Muller, 2005).  
So far, PSD in Vietnam has been implemented with limited successes 
because it has been directed towards increasing the number of SMEs rather than 
improving their performance and competitiveness. Therefore, the government should 
place more emphasis on improving the quality of PSD rather than on quantity 
(Nguyen et al., 2008). On the other hand, Vietnam needs to ensure an effective 
implementation of the 2004 Competition Law. To do this, the country needs to 
develop the new legal framework with strong, impartial and competent regulatory 
institutions, placing high priority on building capacity at the VCC and VCAD, 
establishing their credibility as independent regulators, and educating the public, 
particularly SOEs and private companies. More specifically, Vietnam should 
consider making the VCAD a fully independent competition authority with its own 
enforcement powers, similarly to the approach adopted by most OECD countries, in 
order to put the private sector on a level competitive field with the public sector and 
to achieve the government’s vision of a private sector-led economy with sound, well-
governed and efficient SOEs in strategic sectors (UNCTAD, 2008).  
In general, to achieve greater economic growth in the future, the government 
must officially confirm the important role of the private sector as the leading force of 
production and investment (Ohno, 2010). Then, the government should have 
meaningful actions to promote this sector, starting with the strengthening of 
Vietnam’s current legal environment (Pham, 2012). This enables private enterprises 
to compete equally with SOEs and have equal opportunities in acquiring necessary 
resources (such as credit and land) for business expansion. 
The case study in Box 3.3 provides a recent example of a failure in Indochina 
Airlines (IA)− a privately-owned airline. Unlike Vinashin, which was rescued by the 
government and continued to receive government subsidies, the infant IA was not 
adequately supported by the government, thereby facing many difficulties in gaining 
access to the aviation industry, and ceasing to exist in less than two years.  
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Box 3.3- Indochina Airlines− a privately-owned airline with short survival duration 
 By 2008, Vietnam had six airlines companies including Vietnam Airlines, Jetstar Pacific 
Airlines, Vasco, Vietjet Air, Mekong Air and IA. IA was among a few privately-owned airlines 
operating in Vietnam. It was previously named Air Speed Up, which was granted a business license in 
May 2007, after satisfying all of the strict financial and safety conditions set by the government. The 
owner of IA− Ha Dung, a famous music composer− was said to be trying to fulfil his dream of 
owning and operating an airline. 
 IA’s business plan appeared to be very well prepared. The airline rented all of its aircraft, 
cabin crew (with experienced foreign captain pilots) and customer service personnel needed for 
operation. It also had supplementary aircraft to reduce the number of delayed or cancelled flights. In 
the initial stage, IA had only two aircrafts to make four flights per day. It had two main routes 
between HCMC and Hanoi, and between HCMC and Da Nang. Tickets were sold via two channels: a 
company website and retail outlets across the nation. Punctuality and competitive prices were two top-
priority objectives of IA.  
 On 25 November 2008, IA’s first flight carried all of its management board members from 
HCMC to Hanoi. Interestingly, IA was the first privately-owned airlines to officially operate 
passenger flights in Vietnam. On the same day, all flights were fully occupied. As part of its 
promotion, free tickets were granted to some travel companies, restaurants and hotels (Hong Anh, 
2008).  
 However, after less than seven months of operation, IA cut costs by returning one of its 
aircraft. After that, it had only one aircraft left to fly. In early September 2009, IA stopped operating 
the route between HCMC and Da Nang, and focused on the remaining route between HCMC and 
Hanoi. By early 2010, IA had no aircraft to fly at all.  
 One of the factors contributing to IA’s failure was timing. The airline started its operation in 
the context of a deep global financial crisis, which caused stagnation in almost all industries including 
aviation. A lack of working capital largely explained IA’s closure. More clearly, IA’s shareholders did 
not contribute $VN400 billion (or $US20 million) to finance its operation as promised, due to 
pessimism about IA’s future and the future of the overall Vietnamese aviation industry (Hong Anh, 
2009b). Consequently, on 26 January 2010, IA was banned from making any passenger flights (Kien 
Cuong, 2010). Since then, IA has been incapable of paying salaries to employees and repaying debt to 
its suppliers. Its accumulated debt was recorded at $VN60 billion (or $US3 million). The government 
authorities said a decision to terminate IA’s business license would be announced some time in 
December, 2010 (Nhu Quynh, 2010).  
Note: This article was retrieved from Vietnam’s well known online news website 
(http://vnexpress.net/GL/Home/) and was translated into English by the author. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The SOE sector has long been receiving government preferential treatment in 
access to land, credit, export quotas and government procurement contracts. This 
resulted in unfair competition such that the SOE sector seriously crowded-out the 
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NSE sector. Evidence suggested that investment capital has been inefficiently 
allocated to the SOE sector and away from the NSE sector. Surprisingly, the SOE 
sector had lower contribution to aggregate output and employment, compared with 
the private sector. Likewise, a majority of SOEs operated inefficiently because: (i) 
they did not follow market disciplines and were not seriously penalised for their 
failures; (ii) they were guided by multiple conflicting objectives which prioritised job 
security over profit maximisation. Overall, these SOEs were inefficient in both 
managerial and productive areas. Therefore, the government decided to reform the 
SOE sector largely through equitisation aimed at improving SOEs’ efficiency and 
competitiveness. However, regardless of the reduced number of SOEs, the overall 
SOE reform and equitisation processes have been seen to be slow and incomplete.  
 On the other hand, the NSE sector has not been adequately promoted by the 
government’s policy settings. In fact, this sector is generally more efficient than the 
SOE sector. Therefore, developing the private sector, alongside SOE reforms, will be 
of particular importance in the future. This strategy offers three main benefits 
including (i) job creation; (ii) productivity improvement, which in turn increases 
labour incomes and reduces poverty, especially poverty in rural areas; and (iii) 
absorption of labour redundancies resulting from SOE reforms. There are many 
proposals for an effective implementation of the PSD policy. However, the PSD 
process has been slow because many obstacles still remain, especially the 
unfavourable government treatment of this sector. 
It is important to note that, evaluating the impacts of Vietnam’s 
microeconomic reform, particularly focussed on the privatisation program and the 
PSD policy, is one of the main objectives in this thesis. Therefore, the next chapter 
reviews all relevant theoretical and empirical literature of privatisation in Vietnam 
and in other countries since Vietnam’s equitisation program, which is commonly 








Chapter 3 showed that reforming the SOE sector and developing the private 
sector are essential if Vietnam wishes to sustain greater economic growth in the 
future. If these reform programs are implemented effectively, the domestic 
enterprises across all industries should be able to improve their competitiveness and 
efficiency as expected. Unarguably, Vietnam’s equitisation program, which is 
commonly known as privatisation internationally, is an integral part of SOE reforms. 
Therefore, this chapter reviews all relevant theoretical and empirical literature of 
privatisation in Vietnam and in other countries.  
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, the theory of 
privatisation is discussed, including a brief definition of privatisation, the types of 
privatisation, and the objectives and benefits of privatisation. Soft budget constraints 
and multiple conflicting objectives largely explain why most SOEs are inefficient, 
compared with private enterprises. Hence, privatisation of SOEs is believed to 
improve their efficiency and profitability. Section 4.3 analyses several empirical 
studies, both internationally and domestically, regarding the economic impacts of 
privatisation at the micro and macro levels. Due to differences in research 
methodologies, sample sizes and study periods, there are mixed results found in the 
empirical literature of privatisation. This section also provides criticism on some of 
the reviewed studies, followed by the concluding Section 4.4.  
4.2 The Theory of Privatisation
29
 
According to Boycko et al. (1996, p. 310), privatisation is referred to as “a 
combination of the reallocation of control rights over employment from politicians to 
managers and the increase in cash flow ownership of managers and private 
investors”. In general, privatisation of SOEs has four main objectives: (i) to achieve 
higher allocative and productive efficiency; (ii) to strengthen the role of the private 
sector in the economy; (iii) to improve the public sector’s financial health; and (iv) to 
                                                 
29 As a reminder, ‘privatisation’ is used interchangeably with ‘equitisation’ throughout this thesis. 
 63 
free resources for allocation in other important areas of government activity 
(Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 2003). There are many types of privatisation such as 
(i) selling off public assets; (ii) outsourcing services; and (iii) privatising public 
enterprises (Wood, 2004). Many other types of privatisation may include outright 
sale of government’s entire stake, partial sale, concessions, leases and management 
contracts, hiving off and sale of non-core business activities, and the opening of 
previously restricted sectors to new private entrants and competitors: “each of these 
approaches has been carried out in a variety of ways; the forms of privatisation are 
numerous” (Nellis, 2007, p. 4). Since the 1990s, privatisation worldwide has gained 
its momentum, with several thousands of SOEs being privatised in Central Eastern 
Europe, India, Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. From 1990 to 2003, the 
volume or total number of privatisations worldwide amounted to nearly 9,000 cases, 
with total proceeds exceeding $US410 billion (Nellis, 2007).  
Given its popularity, one may ask why privatisation has been commonly used 
as a means to reform SOEs. Basically, governments privatise SOEs because of their 
well-documented poor performance (or inefficiency). As argued by Boycko et al. 
(1996), SOEs are inefficient because they usually serve the politicians’ interests 
(such as job creation and job protection) rather than maximising efficiency, leading 
to excess employment in SOEs. Besides, soft budget constraints (together with the 
incentive and contracting problems) are the major causes of inefficiency of SOEs. In 
this regard, bankruptcy is not a credible threat to public managers because it is the 
central government’s interest to bail them out by taxpayers’ money in case of 
financial distress: “as long as the political cost incurred by the central government by 
closing the firm is higher than the cost of giving a subsidy and bail it out, the 
manager will always make the investment, regardless of the probability of failure” 
(Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 2003, p. 435). In addition, it is widely accepted that 
private firms are more efficient than SOEs. In the presence of market failure, it is 
good to have public ownership, but in relatively competitive markets private 
ownership may be more desirable, indicating that switching to the private ownership 
structure may improve firms’ efficiency (Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 2003). 
Finally, SOEs need to be privatised largely because most SOEs create large financial 
burdens on government budgets, and because they have multiple, ambiguous and 
conflicting objectives: “the mixing of social and political with economic objectives 
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weakened managerial autonomy, commercial performance, and efficiency” (Nellis, 
2007, p. 6).  
Accordingly, privatising SOEs offer three main benefits. First, privatisation 
injects new value into public assets and increases the private capital base of a 
country. Second, privatisation is also a means of achieving economic efficiency 
gains, improving the fiscal position, and developing domestic capital markets. 
Finally, in most cases, privatisation can lead to greater factor productivity, which in 
turn leads to higher economic growth. Evidence from Argentina and China shows 
that privatisation indeed reduces the financial burden to the government (Wood, 
2004). However, it is important to note that, although privatisation is believed to 
generate positive benefits for society, some groups of people like it and some do not. 
One of the reasons why privatisation has been disliked is that privatisation’s benefits 
are dispersed (benefits are shared among a vast number of recipients) while its costs 
are concentrated (costs are imposed on a small number of people) (Nellis, 2007). 
On theoretical grounds, privatisation has been proved beneficial in many 
studies. For instance, Boycko et al. (1996) develop a model of privatisation, which 
explains the relative inefficiency of SOEs and efficiency improvements after 
privatisation. The authors conclude that, with a tight monetary policy, which makes 
subsidies costly to politicians, privatisation may be the best available strategy for 
reducing inefficiency of SOEs and stimulating the restructuring of SOEs. Their 
findings imply that the restructuring of SOEs is unlikely to happen if shareholders 
have similar preferences with politicians (for instance, having the same employment 
objective) indicating that worker control is bad for restructuring. Instead, control by 
large outside investors may deliver better performance because they care more about 
maximising profits rather than employment. Further, political influence may be 
detrimental to the restructuring process if large shareholders are politicised in ways 
that bring their objectives in line with those of politicians. 
Schusselbauer (1999) concludes that privatisation is Pareto-improving 
through efficiency-enhancing ownership transformation. The Pareto-improving 
privatisation process may promote either static efficiency gains (as a result of a more 
productive use of production resources) or dynamic efficiency gains (due to the 
application of more effective means of organisation and the invention and 
introduction of new products and processes through technological progress over 
time) or both. The author draws the production possibility frontier (PPF), with public 
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production on the horizontal axis and private production on the vertical axis, to 
illustrate the inefficiency of SOEs (such as capital wasting and labour hoarding) and 
the efficiency improvements after privatisation. Initially, SOEs are assumed to 
operate at some suboptimal points on the horizontal axis, which are far below the 
efficient points on the PPF. At these points, SOEs’ production is characterised by 
non-cost-minimising employment of factors and a suboptimal supply of goods and 
services. Privatisation of SOEs will lead the economy to increase private production 
and reduce public production until it reaches the optimal level of production on the 
PPF. The author argues that there are trade-offs between efficiency gains through 
radical adjustment and social costs of transformation. For instance, a full reform 
(big-bang approach) provides faster and higher allocative efficiency gains, but also 
higher transformation costs. By contrast, a partial reform (gradualist approach) will 
lead to moderate efficiency gains and lower transformation costs because financial 
compensation through the state budget will be lower. In some circumstances, a 
gradualist approach is more desirable since a big-bang approach involves high 
financial risks for a government.  
Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (2003) draw a similar conclusion that 
privatisation increases profitability and efficiency in both competitive and 
monopolistic sectors. Further, full privatisation is said to generate greater impact than 
partial privatisation. At the macro level, privatisation will lead to lower budget 
deficits as the government can raise funds in the short term and eliminate subsidies to 
SOEs. If the proceeds from privatisation are used to reduce public debt, the effect 
will be lower interest rates which foster investment, growth and lower inflation. 
Another important macroeconomic impact of privatisation, through public offerings 
and mixed sales, is the increase in the level of stock market capitalisation and the 
overall development of the financial sector because privatisation mobilises resources 
in the financial sector and reallocates credit to more productive uses. Further, 
privatisation may lead to short-run unemployment due to the elimination of worker 
redundancy in SOEs, but in the long run unemployment may decrease due to positive 
growth as a result of the efficiency gains at the micro level and the increasing 
stability at the macro level. 
Wood (2004) also shares the same view that well managed privatisation leads 
to efficiency improvement in competitive environments, but the case for natural 
monopolies is ambiguous. At the macro level, the impact of privatisation on GDP is 
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either neutral in some cases or positive in other cases. Such impact differs 
significantly according to the project and the method by which it is privatised. In 
addition, privatisation can increase government revenue through the initial sale of 
public assets and the subsequent revenue possibly earned from taxing the same 
entity. Ideally, the government should spend privatisation proceeds on growth 
sectors. Further, privatisation can lead to nearly immediate job losses as the new 
owner improves the efficiency of the production process, but aggregate 
unemployment decreases in the long term following privatisation.  
It is widely accepted that efficiency gains can be realised only under perfectly 
competitive environments, but not under non-competitive environments. Fraja (1991) 
develops the slack-ridden imperfect competition model to analyse the impact of 
privatisation on firm efficiency in imperfectly competitive environments. The author 
refers to the case of oligopolistic competition and concludes that privatisation of 
public enterprises reduces rather than increases efficiency. She explains that a 
privatised oligopolistic firm will pursue the goal of profit maximisation, leading to an 
improvement in its efficiency and a reduction in its output. The output reduction then 
reduces the competitive pressure on the managers of private firms, resulting in 
inefficiency in these firms. The net effect of the privatisation is a reduction of the 
total efficiency in that industry and of social welfare. Nellis (2007) also believes that 
privatisation does not work well especially in non-competitive environments and in 
developing countries. For instance, privatisation does not work well in developing 
countries because these countries lack competition and the regulation of competition. 
It appears that the role of economic institutions (such as well defined and protected 
property rights, contract enforcement and commercial dispute settlement, and 
functioning bankruptcy regimes) is important for markets to function in an efficient, 
productive and socially acceptable manner. 
From these studies, several policy implications and/or suggestions are drawn 
in order to achieve better privatisation outcomes. For instance, Schusselbauer (1999) 
suggests many ways to speed up the privatisation process including: (i) strengthening 
the legal and institutional framework, and reducing the government intervention; (ii) 
tightening the budget constraints and promoting a competitive environment; (iii) 
establishing government credibility and commitment to its privatisation programs; 
(iv) ensuring the transparency and consistency of privatisation objectives; and (v) 
speeding up the structural reform in banking and financial markets to eliminate the 
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non-performing loan (NPL) problem. Likewise, Wood (2004) suggests some 
enabling conditions for achieving economic gains including: (i) unitary rights being 
granted to privatised firms; (ii) privatised firms facing budget constraints; (iii) 
strengthening the judicial system and transparency, and promoting competition; (iv) 
providing transitional schemes for laid-off workers including training and 
development opportunities; and (v) improving corporate governance in privatised 
firms. 
4.3 The Empirical Evidence of Privatisation 
There are indeed numerous empirical studies on the impacts of privatisation 
on firms’ performance. Some studies are country-specific (focusing on one country), 
some are industry-specific (focusing on one industry), and some are cross-sectional 
(dealing with multiple industries in multiple countries). As shown in the following 
sub-sections, privatisation produces mixed results mainly because the reviewed 
studies adopt different research methods (each has certain methodological 
limitations) and choose different study periods and sample sizes, as well as different 
degrees and types of privatisation (for instance, partial and/or mass privatisations). 
Likewise, data constraints and the potential selection bias also lead to mixed results 
among these studies, some of which cannot be generalised to represent the whole 
economy. 
4.3.1 International Empirical Studies 
This sub-section provides more insights into the international empirical 
investigation of the impacts of privatisation at both micro and macro levels. It is 
therefore categorised into two broad groups: one group deals with the 
microeconomic impacts of privatisation (on firms’ performance), and the other deals 
with the macroeconomic impacts of privatisation (such as on employment and GDP 
growth). 
Microeconomic Impacts of Privatisation 
First, studies showing positive effects of privatisation on firms’ performance 
include the followings: D’Souza and Megginson (1999) compare the pre- and post-
privatisation financial and operating performance of 85 enterprises from 28 
countries, which were privatised during 1990-1996. They conclude that privatisation 
yields significant performance improvements in terms of increases in profitability, 
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output, operating efficiency, dividend payments, and significant decreases in 
leverage ratios.30  
Pollitt and Smith (2002) conduct a social cost-benefit analysis to assess 
whether the British rail privatisation during 1999-2000 has produced operating cost 
reductions. The authors find that privatisation of the British rail industry has led to 
significant operating efficiency improvements and lower prices, which benefited 
consumers considerably: (i) industry outputs have risen sharply, ranging from 13 to 
21 per cent, while operating costs have been reduced by 6 per cent after privatisation; 
(ii) the rail industry has achieved efficiency savings of 13 per cent since 
privatisation. In monetary terms, the total savings (after restructuring costs) over 15 
years rise to £1.1 billion; (iii) the benefits to consumers through lower prices are 
equivalent to £1.2 billion, implying that producers and government together lose 
£100 million (with the government losing £300 million and producers gaining £200 
million); and (iv) the quality of output is found to be better than before privatisation. 
This study, however, has one major limitation of selecting a very short study period 
(1999-2000), casting doubt on the accuracy and reliability of such results. 
Brainerd (2002) investigates the impact of privatisation on the wage 
distribution in Russia during 1993-98. She finds that, in some phases of the 
privatisation program, workers in privatised enterprises earned higher wages than 
SOEs’ workers. This wage differential was associated with the rent sharing within 
insider-owned firms in which workers were paid to collude with managers to 
maximise their own benefits. 
Ho et al. (2002) examine the impacts of privatisation on the wage structure of 
rural industries by surveying 45 rural enterprises (privatised in the 1990s) in Jiangsu 
and Shandong provinces. The authors find that privatisation is associated with 
increased wage and earnings inequality. These results, however, cannot be 
generalised for the whole Chinese economy due to small sample size and the 
potential selection bias.  
Wei et al. (2003) also examine the pre- and post-privatisation financial and 
operating performance of 208 Chinese firms privatised during 1990-97. They find 
significant improvements in real output, real assets, and sales efficiency, and 
significant declines in leverage after privatisation, but no significant change in 
                                                 
30 These leverage ratios refer to the total debt to total assets ratios.   
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profitability. In addition, privatised firms experience significant improvements in 
profitability compared with SOEs’ profitability in the same period. Liu et al. (2007) 
continues investigating the impacts of privatisation on the performance of 1,184 
Chinese firms during 1997-2004, using a panel data technique. They find significant 
performance improvements in privatised Chinese firms, with the most influencing 
factor on their performance being the political regime and context. Such finding is 
consistent with the conventional view internationally that privatisation stimulates 
firms’ performance. 
Monteiro (2003) uses a longitudinal individual-level data set and employs a 
difference-in-differences estimator to evaluate the impact of privatisation on wages 
in the Portuguese banking industry during 1989-97. She finds in privatised firms a U-
shaped relationship between wage variation and time period of restructuring. It 
means the sample groups experienced wage losses after one or two years of 
privatisation, but wage increases from the third year onwards. These results are also 
confirmed in her recent study in 2010 using a different econometric technique, that 
is, the propensity matching estimators (Monteiro, 2010). 
Qudah (2011) conducts a panel data analysis to examine the impact of 
privatisation on 23 privatised Jordanian firms during 1992-2005, which accounted 
for about 70 per cent of the total privatisation proceeds. It is found that privatisation 
has a positive and significant impact on privatised firms’ operating efficiency and 
performance as measured by market value ratios. The results in this study may be 
subject to selection bias such that 23 sample firms are not fully representative of the 
whole economy. Worse still, the unbalanced panel data used in this study may lead to 
potential errors in the outcomes. 
Second, studies showing negative effects of privatisation on firms’ 
performance include the followings: Perevalov et al. (2000) conduct econometric 
estimates of several firm-level performance indicators, using a panel data from 189 
industrial enterprises during 1992-96. They find that, on average, privatisation 
produces little improvement in the performance of Russian enterprises. Such finding 
is largely based on the assumption that privatisation is exogenous, which is likely 
endogenous in reality. The selection bias problem likely exists because the sample 
firms came from only one region (Sverdlovsk). Hence, the results could not be 
generalised for the whole Russian economy. 
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Villalonga (2000) examines the political, organisational, and transitional 
effects of privatisation on efficiency using data from 24 Spanish firms privatised 
during 1985-93. Three hypotheses are to be tested including: (i) privatisation 
increases firm efficiency; (ii) the observed effect of privatisation on efficiency is 
influenced by political and organisational factors; and (iii) the observed effect of 
privatisation on efficiency is contingent upon the time period considered. The first 
hypothesis is rejected, while the other two hypotheses are supported. It means there 
are factors (such as political, organisational and transitional factors) other than the 
private-public ownership factor, influencing the estimated effects of privatisation on 
efficiency. However, this study also faces the common problems of data constraints 
and selection bias, as mentioned previously.  
Harper (2002) examines the impact of privatisation on firm performance 
using data from about 450 firms in the first and second waves of Czech voucher 
privatisation. The author finds that the overall effects from privatisation are positive, 
but such effects vary by privatisation wave, size and industry. In particular, firms 
privatised in the first wave had poorer performance than firms privatised in the 
second wave. This finding is consistent with a hypothesis that economic and political 
structure surrounding the privatisation waves is important for privatisation to 
succeed. It is also consistent with a hypothesis that firms with a longer preparation 
period for privatisation improve performance after privatisation. Nevertheless, some 
of these findings are not necessarily consistent with existing findings in the literature 
mainly because most studies in the literature often examine small-scale privatisations 
while Harper examines the Czech’s large-scale (or mass) privatisations over a short 
period of time (1992-94).31 The lack of post-privatisation data prevents the author 
from taking a more in-depth analysis of the Czech voucher privatisation program in 
the sample period. 
Omran (2004) examines the performance of 54 newly-privatised Egyptian 
firms against a matching number of SOEs during 1994-98. He finds that privatised 
firms do not exhibit significant improvement in their performance changes relative to 
SOEs. There are two main factors attributing to this abnormal finding: (i) the sample 
size is small and the study period is quite short; and (ii) the author’s unusual 
approach (comparing the performance of privatised firms with that of SOEs of the 
                                                 
31 Small-scale privatisations involve a small number of privatised firms, while large-scale 
privatisations involve a larger number of firms. 
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same size in the same industry) may be problematic. Data limitations indeed prevent 
him from pursuing a traditional approach, which focuses on the sample firms and 
compares their pre- with post-privatisation performance. 
Bachiller (2009) conducts the data envelopment analysis and Tobit analysis 
to analyse the impact of privatisation on the efficiency of five of the biggest Spanish 
SOEs in such sectors as energy, telecommunications and air transport during the 
1990s. She finds that the improvements in efficiency are not related to the Spanish 
privatisation program, indicating that a change of ownership per se is not sufficient 
to bring about the effects forecasted by privatisation advocators. Data constraints and 
the small number of sample firms are the main weaknesses of this study such that the 
results are not sufficient in reflecting the overall Spanish privatisation experience. 
Macroeconomic Impacts of Privatisation
32
 
First, studies showing positive macroeconomic impacts of privatisation 
include the followings: Boubakri and Cosset (1998) examine the change in the 
financial and operating performance of 79 companies from 21 developing countries 
privatised fully or partially during 1980-1992. They find significant increases in 
efficiency and capital investment after privatisation, which in turn result in higher 
output and employment growth rates. 
Chisari et al. (1999) develop a general equilibrium model of Argentina to 
assess both the efficiency and distributional impacts of privatisations of SOEs in 
such industries as electricity, gas, water and sanitation, and telecommunications 
services.33 They find that privatisations in Argentina generated some significant 
gains for the economy and for all income groups such that most sectors are better off 
with greater involvement of private operators. In monetary terms, these gains are 
estimated to be $US2.3 billion (equivalent to 0.9 per cent of GDP). This study is 
limited for using the Cobb-Douglas functional forms. To produce better results, it 
should have used the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) functional forms, 
which are more generalised than the Cobb-Douglas ones. 
Barnett (2000) investigates the relationship between privatisation and 
measures of fiscal and macroeconomic performance in 18 countries (data was 
                                                 
32 Scale of privatisation, structural adjustment and macroeconomic policy settings are critical for 
having any macro level effect. 
33 Their model consists of 21 sectors, three primary factors (labour, physical capital and financial 
capital) and five income groups, using the 1993 social accounting matrix (SAM) to compare the 
Argentine economy in 1993 with that in 1995. 
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adopted from another study).34 He finds that privatisation proceeds transferred to the 
budget are saved and mostly used to reduce domestic financing. In addition, 
privatisation improves most countries’ macroeconomic performance in terms of 
higher real GDP growth and lower unemployment. However, the unbalanced, 
inconsistent panel data in this study may reduce the accuracy of the results and their 
interpretation. 
Belke et al. (2005) empirically investigate the differences in the motives of 
raising privatisation proceeds (due to differences in the unemployment rate, 
government financial balance and the degree of integration) among 14 EU countries 
during 1990-2000, using the Feasible Generalised Least Squares technique with a 
heteroskedastically consistent covariance matrix. They find a positive relationship 
between unemployment and privatisation proceeds, which means privatisation raised 
privatisation proceeds at the expense of increased unemployment. Likewise, GDP 
growth is also positively related to privatisation proceeds, indicating that higher 
privatisation proceeds contributed positively to higher GDP growth. 
Kilicaslan et al. (2008) examine the impacts of privatisation on labour 
productivity in such sectors as electricity and gas, post and telecommunication, 
inland transport, and health and social work from six countries including Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the UK during 1970-2004. Their 
econometric estimates show that all sample industries experience increases in labour 
productivity, but at the expense of increased unemployment. In addition, high 
capital-intensive industries experience greater productivity growth than low and 
medium capital-intensive industries. 
Broadman et al. (2009) conduct a cost-benefit analysis to estimate the welfare 
gains from the privatisation of Canadian National Railway (CN) in November 1995. 
They estimate that CN’s privatisation generated welfare gains of 4-5 billion 
Canadian dollars (at 1992 prices). Half of these gains were distributed to the 
government while CN shareholders captured the remaining gains. While it is 
commonly accepted that privatisation leads to welfare improvements under 
competitive environments, the evidence of such gains under non-competitive 
environments is mixed. 
                                                 
34 These countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Cote d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Uganda, Ukraine 
and Vietnam. 
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Boubakri et al. (2009) examine whether privatisation has an impact on 
economic growth, using the generalised method of moments estimation technique 
and data from 56 developed and developing countries during 1980-2004. The authors 
find that privatisation has a robust systematic positive effect on economic growth. 
The method of privatisation is also positively related to economic growth, indicating 
that it is beneficial to divest SOEs via the stock market channel. 
Second, there exist a number of studies having opposite conclusions, 
including the followings: Tansel (1998) examines the impact of privatisation on 
1,248 dismissed workers in the Turkish cement and petrochemicals sectors privatised 
in 1995. The author finds that dismissed workers suffered significant earnings and 
welfare losses upon re-employment, averaging at 66 per cent of their state earnings, 
due to public sector rents and the poor quality of jobs in the informal sector.35 
Katsoulakos and Likoyanni (2002) examine the impacts of privatisation on 
public deficit, public debt and other macroeconomic variables such as unemployment 
and growth, using data from 23 OECD countries during 1990-2000. The authors find 
that privatisation proceeds have a statistically insignificant relationship with budget 
deficit and GDP growth, but are negatively related to public debt. In addition, current 
privatisation proceeds have a negative effect on the current unemployment rate, but a 
positive effect on the previous period’s unemployment rate.36  
Cook and Uchida (2003) investigate the relation between privatisation and 
economic growth, based on a regression analysis and data for 63 developing 
countries during 1988-97. The authors find that privatisation has contributed 
negatively to economic growth due to lacking of competition and weak regulation of 
competition. They argue that the ownership changes alone are not sufficient to 
improve firms’ efficiency. To create a positive impact on economic growth, 
privatisation needs to be complemented by an effective competition and regulation of 
competition regulation. 
Gong et al. (2006) adopt a propensity score matching and difference-in-
differences techniques to investigate the impacts of domestic privatisation and 
foreign acquisition of Chinese SOEs on employment growth during 1999-2003. The 
                                                 
35 Due to lacking of formal arrangements and social benefits, most of the laid-off workers tended to 
work in the informal sector, with relatively poor job quality and/or working conditions. 
36 When privatisation is announced, restructuring pressures firms to operate more efficiently, causing 
temporary job losses and hence higher unemployment rate. Eventually, new firm entries occur, 
increasing the demand for labour and hence decreasing the unemployment rate. 
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authors find that domestic privatisation leads to contemporaneous reductions in 
employment growth due to an increased efficiency of labour usage right after 
privatisation. By contrast, foreign acquisitions result in higher employment growth 
because: (i) foreign-acquired firms anticipate an increase in output and hence 
demand for more labour; (ii) there may be some binding agreements on the 
workforce level prior to the acquisitions; and (iii) foreign investment results in 
technology transfer, contributing to employment growth. Therefore, privatisation to 
foreign owners may lead to significantly fewer layoffs as compared with state firms. 
Stuckler and King (2007) empirically test the welfare implications of 
privatisation policies in 25 transition countries during 1989-2002, using cross-
national panel mortality data as an indicator of social costs. The authors find that 
rapid privatisation results in life expectancy losses and, if privatisation policies are 
reversed, life expectancy may improve. This study contains several methodological 
limitations because: (i) the comparative privatisation rate data is unavailable; (ii) the 
potential bias exists due to time-varying surveillance changes within countries; and 
(iii) there is potential ecologic fallacy; and (iv) using mortality data as an indicator of 
social costs may not always be the best strategy, making such finding less convincing 
or hardly acceptable. 
Moshiri and Abdou (2008) investigate the impacts of privatisation, 
competition and regulation on economic growth based on the two-stage least squares 
and ordinary least squares techniques and data for 117 developing and transition 
economies during 1988-2003. They find that privatisation has a neutral effect on 
economic growth, while a competitive regulatory environment has a positive effect 
on growth, indicating that improving the regulatory environment is more important 
than facilitating the dominance of private ownership structure. 
4.3.2 Vietnamese Empirical Studies 
While international studies provide mixed results regarding the impacts of 
privatisation (either positive, negative or neutral) at the micro and macro levels, most 
of the Vietnamese empirical studies, which are largely conducted at the micro level, 
show positive effects of privatisation on firms’ performance. For instance, Webster 
and Amin (1998) survey 17 equitised enterprises to measure their performance, and 
to evaluate the equitisation process. They find that all enterprises were profitable at 
the time of equitisation and also experienced high growth in revenues and profits in 
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subsequent periods. On average, the labour force in these enterprises increased by 39 
per cent after equitisation. In addition, it took an average of 13 months to equitise a 
single firm, and the state ownership and insider ownership remained large in the 
post-equitisation period. 
Vu (2002) analyses the impacts of SOE reforms on the industrial SOEs’ 
performance by using the Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions to 
estimate the change in TFP growth during 1976-1998. He finds that the reform 
measures result in significant improvements in the productivity of industrial SOEs in 
Vietnam. The pre-reform TFP growth rate was negative (-1.97 per cent), but the 
partial-reform and full-reform TFP growth rates were significantly higher (6.08 and 
5.37 per cent, respectively). 
CIEM (2003) conducts a survey of 877 enterprises in 2001 to examine their 
post-equitisation performance. Two observations are reported. First, the direct impact 
of equitisation was negligible. Second, the indirect impact was substantial for three 
reasons: (i) equitisation of unprofitable SOEs helped reduce the government fiscal 
burden; (ii) equitisation promoted the private sector; and (iii) equitisation created 
more jobs and investment activities. 
Truong et al. (2006) measure the impacts of equitisation on firms’ 
performance by comparing pre- and post-equitisation financial and operating results 
of 121 SOEs during 1993-2002. They find significant increases in profitability, sales 
revenues, efficiency, and employee income. Truong et al. (2007) use the same 
approach to continue investigating the effects of privatisation on the financial and 
operating performance of 147 equitised firms and 92 SOEs completely equitised 
during 2000-01. They also find that these firms experience increases in sales and 
profitability and decreases in leverage (measured by the total debt/total asset ratios). 
These studies, however, have several limitations, including: (i) it less convincing to 
conclude on the effects of privatisation by comparing the performance of the same 
firms before and after equitisation. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
equitisation program, it is more meaningful to compare the performance of equitised 
firms with that of fully private firms; (ii) there is biased selection of the sample data 
because firms are not chosen randomly (bad firms are not considered and only good 
firms are chosen, most of which come from the South of Vietnam); and (iii) these 
studies do not incorporate such factors as inside ownership, ownership concentration, 
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foreign investors’ participation in equitised firms and management turnover, which 
also have significant impacts on firms’ performance. 
Ha (2007) examines the effects of private ownership and competition on the 
productive efficiency of 1,117 firms with various ownership structures during 2000-
05. He finds that SOEs were less efficient than NSEs in terms of having relatively 
higher capital intensity, but lower labour productivity and technical efficiency. The 
results suggest that competition and private ownership would contribute positively to 
the efficiency improvement of SOEs. 
Recently, Pham and Mohnen (2012) develop a general equilibrium model 
featuring the closed economy of Vietnam to examine the impacts of privatisation on 
economic growth and poverty alleviation in Vietnam.37 The authors find that 
privatisation does not contribute to job creation and welfare improvement. This study 
focuses on the short run such that the long-run analysis of the impacts of 
privatisation on GDP and employment growth is lacking. In addition, the authors do 
not explain how the model is closed and simulated and/or how welfare is measured, 
making it difficult to understand the results. Worse still, the simulation results are 
somewhat biased due to the weird model specification assuming the closed 
Vietnamese economy, which is a small open economy in reality. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Privatisation has been a common practice aimed at improving firms’ 
efficiency and profitability. During 1990-2003, about 9,000 privatisations worldwide 
were recorded, with total proceeds exceeding $US410 billion. The types of 
privatisations are numerous (each has been implemented in many different ways). 
Governments around the world privatise SOEs because of their poor performance (or 
inefficiency). Overall, SOEs are less inefficient than private enterprises because they 
often pursue multiple conflicting objectives and face soft budget constraints. One of 
the main benefits offered by privatisation is to achieve efficiency gains. This 
argument has been supported by many theoretical works. However, it is noticed that 
efficiency gains can be achieved under competitive, but not under non-competitive, 
environments. Besides, privatisation and unemployment is said to have a U-shaped 
                                                 
37 This model consists of 69 sectors/commodities, four groups of labour, and five types of ownership 
of capital and labour. 
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relationship38 as privatisation increases unemployment in the short run, but decreases 
it in the medium and long runs. Likewise, optimistic theorists believe that 
privatisation contributes to greater GDP growth, through productivity improvements. 
The literature review above has shown that privatisation produces mixed 
results due to differences in research methods (each has certain methodological 
limitations), study periods, sample sizes, and degrees and types of privatisation (for 
instance, partial and/or mass privatisations). Likewise, data constraints and the 
potential selection bias partly explain why some results cannot be generalised for the 
economies under examination. 
Based on the balance of evidence, the impacts of privatisation on such 
macroeconomic variables as the trade balance and consumption have not been 
investigated seriously. In addition, there have been many CGE models being applied 
to Vietnam to investigate many issues related to trade liberalisation, tax reform, 
poverty, labour mobility and economic growth (see Annex 10). However, research 
into SOE reforms, particularly focused on the equitisation program and the PSD 
policy in Vietnam at the macro level remains underdone. These reasons provide the 
basis for this thesis to develop VNGEM, which is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. 
 
                                                 








Chapter 4 reviewed several theoretical and empirical studies on privatisation 
and its impacts at the micro and macro levels. On theoretical grounds, privatisation is 
believed to result in efficiency gains to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as 
privatised enterprises. However, the empirical literature on the impacts of 
privatisation on firms’ performance and on other macroeconomic variables such as 
unemployment and GDP growth, shows mixed results due to differences in research 
methodologies, study periods, sample sizes, and degrees and types of privatisation. 
Despite such controversies, based on the balance of evidence, this thesis adopts an 
optimistic view regarding the positive impacts of privatisation on the Vietnamese 
economy at the micro and macro levels. As discussed in Chapter 3, SOE reforms and 
the private sector development (PSD) policy were said to contribute greatly to 
Vietnam’s economic growth in the future. If these reform programs are implemented 
effectively, the domestic Vietnamese enterprises across all industries should be able 
to improve their competitiveness and efficiency as expected. Therefore, this current 
chapter is built upon this productivity improvement issue to examine the likely 
impacts of those continuing policies on Vietnam’s national economic outcomes and 
industries. The objective of this current chapter is to discuss the methodology and 
data used to generate simulation results. 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the 
detailed specification of the computable general equilibrium model developed for 
Vietnam (referred to as VNGEM), which is a comparative-static model, used to 
quantify the economy-wide impacts of SOE reforms and the PSD policy on 
Vietnam’s national outcomes and industries. Section 5.3 describes the model 
database, especially the schematic input-output (I-O) table, sources of data and data 
treatment. Section 5.4 briefly explains the model equations, model closures and 
simulation design, which altogether are very important for generating simulation 
results, and Section 5.5 provides a brief summary of key findings and arguments. 
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5.2 Model Specification 
The key objective of this thesis is to develop a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of Vietnam (known as VNGEM) to assess the likely 
effects of SOE reforms and the PSD policy on Vietnam’s national economic 
outcomes and industries. VNGEM is a comparative-static model, largely based on 
ORANI-G (Horridge, 2000) and ORANI (Dixon et al., 1982). In essence, VNGEM 
represents the Vietnamese economy with twenty four industries producing twenty 
four commodities, which can be produced domestically or imported from abroad. 
There are four margin commodities, six labour groups by educational qualifications 
and one representative household.  
More specifically, the six labour qualifications include university degree 
(UniDegree), college degree (CollegeDeg), professional secondary (ProfSecond), 
vocational training (VocTraining), elementary (Elementary) and unskilled (NoSkill), 
which are ranked from highest to lowest skilled, respectively. There are certain 
differences among these qualifications. For instance, on average, it takes 4-5 years to 
complete a university degree (UniDegree) and 2-3 years to complete a college degree 
(CollegeDeg) in Vietnam. To study these courses, students are required to have 
completed high school at least, and those already have a CollegeDeg are allowed to 
upgrade to a UniDegree. The teaching curricula designed for UniDegree are more 
advanced than those for CollegeDeg. Hence, graduates with a UniDegree tend to 
have relatively higher skills than those with a CollegeDeg. In addition, workers with 
ProfSecond qualifications are those who may have completed high school and are 
professionally trained to perform some specific and/or complex tasks. By contrast, 
workers with VocTraining qualifications are those who may have completed 
secondary school and acquired basic vocational training. Likewise, workers with 
Elementary and NoSkill qualifications are those who have not received much 
education or training and often work as general labourers (known as Lao Dong Pho 
Thong) who perform very basic and easy tasks. 
Both short-run and long-run simulations are conducted by hypothetically 
increasing the across-the-board primary factor productivity by 5 per cent. In so 
doing, this thesis provides a framework for investigating the direct and indirect 
effects, as well as identifying the winners and losers from these reform programs. 
Accordingly, this thesis attempts to answer the following research questions: 
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i. How does Vietnam’s microeconomic reform contribute to the national 
output and employment growth? 
ii. How does such reform affect different industry groups across the 
nation? 
iii. What is the effect on the labour market in both short and long run? 
iv. Does the reform generate any positive welfare effects? How? 
v. What can be done to further improve the reform outcomes? 
Overall, this thesis (using VNGEM) attempts to close the current literature 
gaps and contribute to the following five areas. First, this thesis contributes to the 
literature of privatisation in a context of a transition economy like Vietnam, which 
has not been investigated at the macro level in any great detail. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, most studies are conducted at the micro level to examine the relation 
between privatisation and firms’ performance. These studies have limited scope of 
analysis because they largely adopt firm-level survey methods, which tend to 
generate biased results due to low response rates and unreliable information reported 
by interviewees. Hence, some results cannot be generalised for the economies under 
examination due to data constraints and the potential selection bias. 
Second, although some studies are conducted at the macro level to examine 
the impacts of privatisation on unemployment and GDP growth, they have neglected 
investigating the impacts on such macroeconomic variables as the trade balance, 
exports, imports and consumption. This thesis extends the current literature by 
investigating the impacts of Vietnam’s reform programs not only on GDP growth 
and employment, but also on many other macroeconomic variables mentioned above 
in a general equilibrium context. 
Third, while previous studies investigate whether or not privatisation, as part 
of the reform packages, generates positive, negative, or neutral effects on 
productivity, this thesis deliberately assumes the positive impacts of Vietnam’s 
reform programs not only on firms’ efficiency, but also on industries’ efficiency. It 
then investigates the likely impacts of these efficiency gains on industries, and on the 
macro-economy of Vietnam. 
Fourth, although there are many CGE models applied to Vietnam (see Annex 
10), research into SOE reforms, particularly focused on the equitisation program and 
the PSD policy in Vietnam at the macro level remains underdone. This thesis extends 
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the work of Chisari et al. (1999) by using more generalised CES (constant elasticity 
of substitution) functional forms in replacement of the Cobb-Douglas ones. It also 
extends the work of Pham and Mohnen (2012) by adopting a more realistic 
assumption of a small open economy of Vietnam. 
Finally, the use of VNGEM could generate simulation results for both short-
run and long-run effects of SOE reforms on the Vietnamese economy. In addition, 
VNGEM identifies winners and losers from such reforms, and quantifies the general 
welfare effects on the overall Vietnamese economy. The decomposition technique in 
VNGEM provides detailed expositions of the sources of output growth such as an 
output expansion through the export channel, or the local market and domestic share 
channels. 
5.2.1 The Production Technology 
In VNGEM, producers within each industry are assumed to be competitive 
and efficient. They are price takers in both input and output markets. Producers 
choose input and output levels in ways that minimise costs and maximise revenues, 
respectively. On the other hand, each industry can produce several commodities and 
one commodity can be produced by several industries. The input-output production 
specification is kept manageable by a number of separability assumptions (Figure 
5.1). First, the input-activity function exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) and is 
of three-level nested form. At the top level, the effective inputs are combined in fixed 
proportion, implying that there are no substitution possibilities among effective 
intermediate inputs and primary factors. At the second level, there are CES functions 
describing substitution possibilities between imported and domestic intermediate 
inputs. Similarly, substitution is allowed among primary factors such as labour, 
capital and land. At the third level, the CES function is applied to labour input, 
allowing for substitution among labour of different skill groups, which are reflected 
by different educational qualifications. Note that no transition is allowed for one still 
category to another through trainings and development opportunities. Second, the 
output-activity function also exhibits CRS and is of two-level nested form. At the top 
level, the CET (constant elasticity of transformation) function describes 
transformation possibilities among composite commodities. At the second level, the 
composite commodities can be sold in the domestic market or export market. 
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Figure 5.1- Structure of Production 
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5.2.2 Household Utility and Investment Functions 
The representative household is assumed to consume goods and services in 
ways that maximise its utility, subject to an aggregate budget constraint. In this case, 
the structure of household demand has a two-level nested form (Figure 5.2). At the 
first level, the composite commodities are aggregated by a Klein-Rubin utility 
function39, leading to a linear expenditure system (LES). At the second level, the 
CES functions allow these composite commodities to be substitutable between 
domestic and imported sources, in response to changes in relative prices.  
Finally, the nested structure of investment follows a pattern similar to Figure 
5.2, except that the Klein-Rubin nest is replaced by a Leontief function. 
Figure 5.2- Structure of Consumer Demand 
 
Source: Horridge (2000). 
                                                 

















5.3 Model Database 
5.3.1 The Input-Output Database 
VNGEM generates simulation results based on an input-output (I-O) 
database. This I-O database represents the basic structure of VNGEM. From this, 
various sales and costs shares are calculated which are then used in the model.  
Table 5.1 illustrates a schematic I-O database. The absorption matrix consists 
of six columns representing different uses including: 
 (1) = current production with I industries.  
 (2) = capital creation (or investment) with I industries.  
 (3) = household consumption. 
 (4) = export demands (or foreign purchasers). 
 (5) = government demands. 
 (6) = inventories.  
The data flows in the first row, from VBAS(1) to VBAS(6), represent the basic 
values of commodities C from source S assigned to different user groups. For 
example, VBAS(1) represents the basic value of commodities C that are used in current 
production. Commodities C can be obtained either from domestic or imported 
sources. The same explanation can be applied to the remaining entries in the first 
row, except for VBAS(4) which does not have an import source. By assumption, only 
domestically-produced goods can be exported, indicating that there is no re-export of 
imported goods.  
In the second row, there are M commodities that can be used as margin 
services, such as wholesale trade, retail trade and transport. These M commodities 
are assumed to be domestically-produced, and are used to transfer commodities from 
their sources to their final users. For instance, VMAR(1) represents the basic value of 
commodities M used as margins for facilitating the flow of commodities C from 
source S into current production. In this case, M can be considered as a subset of C. 
The entries in the third row represent the commodity taxes payable on the 
purchases. For example, VTAX(1) represents the commodity taxes levied on the 
purchase of commodities C from source S used by industries I for current production. 
Industries use not only intermediate inputs but also primary factors (namely, 
capital, labour and land) for current production. It must be noticed that labour input 
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can be divided into O skill groups. By assumption, only current production requires 
the use of primary factors. Other user groups, such as investment, exports, 
government demands and inventories, do not involve any use of primary factors at 
all. The industries must pay the production taxes (VPTX(1)), which include output 
taxes or subsidies that are not user-specific. Similarly, the ‘other costs’ entry 
(VOCT(1)) represents miscellaneous taxes on firms, such as municipal taxes or charges.  
At the bottom-left of Table 5.1, the MAKE matrix shows the value of output 
for each commodity produced by each industry. Finally, the tariffs on imports are 
assumed to be levied at rates which vary by commodity, but not by user. The 
corresponding import duty revenue is represented by the tariff vector (VTAR(0)) at the 
bottom-right of Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1- The Schematic I-O Database 
  Absorption Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Producers Investors Household Export Other Change in Inventories 
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Source: Horridge (2000). 
5.3.2 Sources of Data 
The Vietnamese I-O database used in this thesis is the 2005 I-O table. A 
number of behavioural parameters including intermediate substitution elasticities, 
household substitution elasticities, household expenditure elasticities and investment 
elasticities, were obtained from the GTAP database version 7.0 (Badri-Nareyanan 
and Walmsley, 2008) and ORANI-G (Horridge, 2000).  
Some of the key data entries and parameters extracted from VNGEM’s 2005 
base-year database are reported in Annex 11. This sub-section provides a brief 
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discussion on the Vietnamese industrial structure based on the 2005 I-O database as 
follows. First, the top five aggregated industries in Vietnam account for 
approximately 45 per cent of total industrial production. Among these, textile, 
clothing and footwear (TCF), construction (Construct) and services (Services) are the 
three largest industries in Vietnam (accounting for 9.88, 9.46 and 9.05 per cent of 
total industrial production, respectively).  
 Second, exports and consumption capture the largest shares in GDP on the 
expenditure side, followed by investment (62.56 and 60.35 and 31.88 per cent, 
respectively). Most notably, trade deficits in Vietnam remain high and are equivalent 
to 7.55 per cent of GDP. Regarding Vietnam’s GDP on the income side, labour 
receipts and payments to capital are two largest components of GDP (44.42 and 
33.61 per cent of GDP, respectively), followed by indirect taxes and payments to 
land (13.23 and 8.74 per cent, respectively). 
 Third, Vietnam’s import tariff accounts for approximately 17 per cent of total 
indirect tax revenue. More than 80 per cent of the tariff revenue is collected from 
five industries including TCF, machinery (Machinery), chemicals (Chemicals), other 
manufacturing (OtherManuf) and electricals (Electrical), indicating that these 
industries are the major importers of material inputs used in the current production. 
 Finally, the overall industrial sector in Vietnam is relatively labour intensive 
(with labour accounting for 51.2 per cent of total primary factor costs, while capital 
accounting for 38.7 per cent). Especially, only six aggregated industries have access 
to land and use it as a primary factor input. These industries include rice and paddy 
(RicePad), agriculture (Agriculture), forestry (Forest), fishery (Fish), mining 
(Mining) and oil, gas and petroleum (OGP), which altogether account for 10.1 per 
cent of total primary factor costs. 
5.3.3 Data Treatment 
The original I-O database contains 113 industries and 113 commodities, 
which were aggregated to 24 industries and 24 commodities (Annex 12). In addition, 
there are three types of commodity taxes and nine types of production taxes in the 
original I-O database. Because VNGEM does not deal with taxation issues, these 
taxes were aggregated into one commodity tax and one production tax for simplicity 
purpose. 
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5.4 Model Equations, Closure and Simulation 
5.4.1 Model Equations 
A complete set of equations in VNGEM and the technical details of the 
model are found in Annex 13. In essence, VNGEM’s equations are expressed largely 
in percentage changes, which are derived from optimisation problems facing 
different users (or economic agents) in the Vietnamese economy.40 Basically, 
VNGEM has nine main groups of equations describing: 
 demands for intermediate and primary inputs into current production; 
 supply of commodities; 
 demands for input into capital creation; 
 household demands; 
 export demands; 
 government demands;  
 price equations; 
 market clearing equations for commodities and primary factors; and 
 miscellaneous equations defining various macroeconomic variables. 
5.4.2 Condensation of Model 
In most CGE models, the number of variables and equations is very large. 
Some large-size models have millions of variables and equations. Other medium- 
and small-size models, like VNGEM, have thousands of variables and equations. For 
instance, the uncondensed VNGEM has 38,904 variables and 24,987 equations. As 
shown in Table 5.2, this requires 13,919 variables to be exogenous (38,904 – 24,987 
= 13,917). In practice, such a model is unattractive for running simulations. For this 
reason, condensation has been a common practice to reduce the model to a 
manageable size, which in turn helps reduce the computing time and cost 
significantly. This can be done through a series of condensation instructions, such as 
omitting, back-solving and substituting variables and equations. In effect, the 
condensed VNGEM has 2,202 variables and 1,683 equations, and only requires 519 
exogenous variables to be solved (2,202 – 1,683 = 519) (Table 5.2). 
 
                                                 
40 The solutions to those optimisation problems in both levels and percentage changes are fully 
documented in Dixon et al. (1982). 
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Table 5.2- Model Size (of VNGEM) Before and After Condensation 
  Before Condensation After 
Total Variables 38,904 -36,702 2,202 
Total Equations 24,987 -23,304 1,683 
Exogenous Variables 13,917 -13,398 519 
Note: Author’s estimates. 
5.4.3 Model Closures 
Model closures involve setting up the list of exogenous and endogenous 
variables. Basically, closing the model is equivalent to choosing an environment in 
which an economy operates. Although VNGEM offers flexibilities in choosing 
between the exogenous and endogenous variables, not all options are validated 
without plausible assumptions. To provide a complete projection of the economy-
wide impacts of the Vietnamese reforms, VNGEM adopts two different closures: (i) 
a short-run DPSV41 closure, and (ii) a long-run closure.  
 First, the short-run closure will generate simulation results, which show the 
likely effects of the reforms in a short period of time (for instance, in 2-3 years). A 
short run is defined to be sufficiently short enough for: 
 current capital stock and land to remain unchanged because it takes time for 
capital to be installed or removed and because land has fixed supply.  
 real wages to be fixed or sticky because workers cannot negotiate on wages 
until the current labour contracts expire, but they can change 
jobs/employment. Therefore, land and capital rental rates and aggregate 
employment are determined endogenously. 
Additional assumptions in the short-run closure include: 
 Rate of technical change terms, shift variables, foreign currency import prices 
and power of taxes are set exogenously, as are the exchange rate, the number 
of households and changes in taste. 
 Real gross national expenditure (GNE) is fixed, implying fixed real 
household consumption, real aggregate investment and real aggregate 
government demand. Hence, any short-run changes in real GDP on the 
expenditure side can be explained by movements in the real trade balance.  
                                                 
41 DPSV stands for Dixon, Parmenter, Sutton and Vincent, the authors of ORANI (Dixon et al., 1982). 
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Second, SOE reforms and the PSD policy are still ongoing, requiring 
substantial legal and institutional changes that govern the economic activities of 
SOEs and NSEs across the nation. Likewise, market participants need time to adapt 
to the newly-regulated environment. Most notably, the Vietnamese government 
prefers to take a gradualist approach to reform, dividing an entire reform program 
into many phases. It means, the implementation of these reform programs will 
probably take a long time to be completed (for instance, 5-10 years or more). 
Therefore, it is necessary to have a long-run projection of the likely effects of 
reforms. A long-run is defined to be sufficiently long enough for: 
 capital stocks in each industry to adjust such that rates of return on industry 
capital stocks remain unchanged; and 
 for the economy-wide real wage to adjust to achieve full employment. 
Additional assumptions in the long-run closure include: 
 Because in the long-run a trade deficit is undesirable, the rest of the world 
will be reluctant to fund any increased trade deficit. Therefore, Vietnam’s real 
balance of trade is assumed to be fixed, with real private consumption 
expenditure determined endogenously.  
 The percentage changes in real investment and government consumption 
expenditures are indexed to that of real private consumption expenditure, in 
order to accommodate the balance of trade constraint. 
 Aggregate investment follows aggregate capital stock. 
5.4.4 Simulation Design 
In VNGEM, there are three exogenous public utility industries including 
electricity and gas (ElecGas), water (Water), and public administration (PubAdmin), 
whose investment will be exogenous and hence unaffected by the short-run 
simulation. The choice of variable to shock is based on the fact that, the 
implementation of SOE reforms and the PSD policy is aimed at improving efficiency 
and promote competitiveness across all industries. Hence, it is expected that most of 
the gains from these reform programs will be realised as improvements in primary 
factor productivity. For this reason, VNGEM is used to hypothetically simulate a 5 
per cent across-the-board primary factor productivity improvement and examine its 
impact on Vietnam’s economy.  
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It is important to note that, this thesis does not suggest that Vietnam’s reform 
programs will lead to an exact 5 per cent improvement in the primary factor 
productivity.42 Instead, it provides a numerical benchmark for investigating the direct 
and indirect effects, as well as identifying the winners and losers from these reform 
programs. In addition, the short-run and long-run simulation results are expressed 
largely in percentage changes, which should be interpreted in terms of their impact 
on the Vietnamese economy relative to the basecase results of no policy 
implementation. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The key objective of this thesis is to develop a CGE model of Vietnam 
(known as VNGEM) to assess the likely effects of the SOE reforms and the PSD 
policy on Vietnam’s national economic outcomes and industries. VNGEM is a 
comparative-static model, largely based on ORANI-G and ORANI. In essence, 
VNGEM represents the Vietnamese economy with twenty four industries producing 
twenty four commodities, which can be produced domestically or imported from 
abroad. There are four margin commodities, six labour groups by educational 
qualifications and one representative household. Both short-run and long-run 
projections are conducted, based on a hypothetical 5 per cent across-the-board 
primary factor productivity improvement.  
The next chapter reports the simulation results and discusses their 
implications for the macro-economy and industries of Vietnam. 
                                                 
42 An additional assumption relating to the period during which the 5 per cent primary factor 
productivity will be realised. Essentially, the one-off increase in productivity is amounted to occurring 
in the first few years, covering both the short-run and long-run period. In reality, one would assume a 
dynamic efficiency gain in the long-run, making the total productivity gain greater than what can be 
achieved in the short-run. 
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Chapter 6 




The objective of this chapter is to interpret the short- and long-run results 
from the simulation, starting with the overall macroeconomic results and then 
examining industry results. Section 6.2 analyses several important short- and long-
run macroeconomic results, such as the percentage changes in real GDP, aggregate 
employment, price indices, the trade balance and real devaluation. Section 6.3 
analyses the short-run and long-run industry results with respect to industry output, 
employment, exports, imports and investment. From this, some main winning and 
losing industries are identified, and the employment by occupations and (long-run) 
welfare effects of efficiency gains on household consumption are examined. In 
Section 6.4, two sensitivity tests are conducted to see how the dependent variables 
respond to changes in the model’s key parameters as well as changes in the simulated 
value of the across-the-board primary factor productivity, and Section 6.5 concludes 
this chapter.  
6.2 Macroeconomic Results 
Both short-run and long-run macroeconomic results are selectively reported 
in Table 6.1. Recall that the results are largely expressed in percentage changes. 
Hence, they should be interpreted as percentage deviations in variables with policy 
implementation, compared to what they would have been with no policy 
implementation (baseline). For instance, aggregate employment in the short-run is 
projected to increase by 2.97 per cent, compared to what it would have been without 
policy implementation. However, aggregate employment in the long run takes the 
zero value. It does not mean that aggregate employment will become literally zero in 
the long run. Instead, it means aggregate employment will be unchanged or 





Table 6.1- Short-run and Long-run Macroeconomic Effects of Efficiency 
Increase (in Percentage Changes from the baseline) 
 Description Short-run Long-run 
1 Real GDP 6.34 7.89 
2 Aggregate employment 2.97 0.00 
3 Aggregate capital stock 0.00 6.83 
4 Real household consumption 0.00 7.49 
5 Real investment 0.00 7.49 
6 Real government consumption 0.00 7.49 
7 Exports (volume) 14.48 7.97 
8 Imports (volume) 3.97 7.06 
9 Real wage 0.00 6.45 
10 Consumer price index -3.36 -1.48 
11 GDP price index -5.14 -2.20 
12 Real trade balance 6.34 0.00 
13 Real devaluation 5.41 2.25 
Source: VNGEM simulation results. 
6.2.1 Short-run Macroeconomic Results 
Real GDP at market prices is projected to increase by 6.34 per cent. This 
increase results from three sources. First, primary factor improvement translates into 
an improvement in the economy’s overall endowment of effective primary factor 
inputs. From the I-O database, total primary factor inputs account for 86.8 per cent of 
GDP at factor cost. Hence, the improvement in primary factor productivity increases 
real GDP at market prices by 4.34 per cent (0.868 x 5.0 = 4.34). Second, real wage is 
assumed to be fixed and that aggregate employment is projected to increase by 2.97 
per cent. From the I-O database, the share of labour income in GDP at factor cost is 
44.4 per cent. Hence, the increase in employment contributes to real GDP increase 
by 1.32 per cent (0.444 x 2.97 = 1.32). This employment increase comes from 
relatively high output growth in some labour-intensive industries in Vietnam. 
Finally, the remaining GDP increase of 0.68 per cent is contributed by indirect taxes 
collected from expanding short-run economic activities.  
 Because real GNE (gross national expenditure) is held fixed, the increase in 
real GDP of 6.34 per cent is chiefly caused by improvements in the real trade 
balance. Due to the overall economic expansion, the volume of imports is projected 
to increase by 3.97 per cent. This requires the volume of exports to increase at a 
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faster rate (14.48 per cent) than the volume of imports. Strong export growth can be 
achieved through short-run reductions in the consumer price index and GDP price 
deflator (-3.36 and -5.14 per cent, respectively). The reduction in the GDP price 
deflator implies a real devaluation of 5.41 per cent in the exchange rate. In the short 
run, this will improve the competitiveness of domestic producers as domestic goods 
and services become relatively cheaper. 
6.2.2 Long-run Macroeconomic Results 
Real GDP at market prices is projected to increase by 7.89 per cent. This 
increase also results from three sources. First, the improvement in primary factor 
productivity increases real GDP at market prices by 4.34 per cent (0.868 x 5.0 = 
4.34), similar to its short-run contribution. Second, aggregate capital stock is 
projected to increase by 6.83 per cent. From the I-O database, the share of aggregate 
capital rentals in GDP at factor cost is 33.6 per cent. Hence, the increase in aggregate 
capital stock contributes 2.29 per cent (0.336 x 6.83 = 2.29) to the real GDP increase. 
This aggregate capital stock increase comes from relatively high output growth in 
some capital-intensive industries in Vietnam. Finally, the remaining GDP increase of 
1.26 per cent is contributed by indirect taxes collected from expanding long-run 
economic activities.  
The overall economic expansion in Vietnam will drive up demand for labour. 
However, due to the fixed aggregate employment assumption, the real wage will rise 
at a projected rate of 6.45 per cent in the long run. Likewise, the volume of imports is 
projected to increase by 7.06 per cent. To ensure that the real trade balance is held 
fixed in the long run, it requires the volume of exports to increase at a slightly faster 
rate (7.97 per cent) than the volume of imports. Strong export growth can be 
achieved through long-run reductions in the CPI and GDP price deflator (-4.48 and   
-2.2 per cent, respectively). The reduction in the GDP price deflator implies a real 
devaluation of 2.25 per cent in the exchange rate. It means, in the long run, domestic 
producers will also improve their competitiveness in the export markets as prices of 
domestic goods and services become relatively cheaper. 
 Three components of real GNE (namely, real household consumption, real 
investment and real government consumption) are projected to increase at the same 
rate of 7.49 per cent. This is a reflection of the long-run closure, which indexed real 
investment and government consumption to real household consumption. In other 
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words, real investment and government consumption are assumed to change by the 
same amount as changes in real household consumption (7.49 per cent). On the 
expenditure side, these GNE components chiefly explain the long-run increase in real 
GDP of 7.89 per cent. More specifically, from the I-O database, household 
consumption accounts for 60.6 per cent of GDP, so it contributes 4.54 per cent to the 
above GDP increase (0.606 x 7.49 = 4.54). By the same reasoning, real investment 
contributes 2.4 per cent (0.32 x 7.49 = 2.4) while real government consumption 
contributes 0.96 per cent (0.128 x 7.49 = 0.96).  
6.3 Industry Results 
6.3.1 Short-run Industry Results 
Table 6.2 reports the short-run impacts of Vietnam’s reform programs on 
industry output, employment, exports, imports and investment. Interestingly, the 
productivity improvement results in short-run output increases in almost all 
industries, except for Construct. Because the model produces a vast number of 
results, interpreting all of them is an overwhelming task. Therefore, this sub-section 
strategically focuses on some important and interesting results for the three best 
performing (or most favourably affected) industries, two worst performing (or least 
favourably affected) industries in terms of output and employment growth, and the 
three largest industries in Vietnam (in terms of percentage of total industrial 















Table 6.2- Short-run Industry Effects of a 5% Efficiency Increase (in 
Percentage Changes from the baseline) 
  Price
43
 Output Employment Exports Imports Investment 
1 RicePad -2.26 7.97 4.71 25.41 -2.05 5.78 
2 Agriculture -2.54 6.94 2.95 15.93 1.27 5.62 
3 Forest -0.30 8.65 5.14 2.11 8.54 13.53 
4 Fish -5.35 5.31 0.10 14.73 1.24 -3.53 
5 Mining -1.69 5.99 2.32 5.60 3.75 4.88 
6 OGP -0.97 5.88 2.25 5.85 6.17 4.75 
7 FoodBev -3.67 8.47 5.59 19.24 -1.01 -0.26 
8 ConsMat -3.70 5.77 1.60 25.00 -4.07 -2.74 
9 OtherManuf -1.46 11.45 12.98 14.06 4.60 3.12 
10 Services -5.73 6.03 2.22 32.22 -2.55 -1.08 
11 Machinery -1.95 12.41 12.54 18.24 2.08 2.78 
12 Electrical -1.31 13.95 16.29 16.70 7.94 4.20 
13 Steel -2.19 14.50 16.62 16.82 4.74 4.68 
14 TCF -1.21 12.84 15.59 12.56 9.15 4.51 
15 Chemicals -2.20 10.75 9.49 16.90 5.43 1.15 
16 ElecGas -4.66 7.79 4.98 30.60 -4.99 0.00 
17 Water -5.16 7.92 5.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 Construct -4.52 0.20 -9.40 0.00 0.00 -7.93 
19 Trade -5.40 6.49 2.14 23.49 -2.99 -2.06 
20 RdWtrTrans -4.75 7.29 3.81 20.30 0.23 -1.73 
21 RailAirTrans -4.08 7.06 3.29 17.16 -1.55 -2.23 
22 PostTelecom -4.90 7.45 4.89 21.05 -2.13 0.15 
23 FinInsur -4.94 10.08 8.12 21.24 -0.21 1.29 
24 PubAdmin -6.01 4.20 -1.26 26.58 -1.04 0.00 
Source: VNGEM simulation results. 
Three Best Performing Industries 
Steel (best performer) 
The industry that is most favourably affected by the primary productivity 
improvement is Steel. Its short-run output is projected to increase by 14.5 per cent in 
response to an output price reduction of 2.19 per cent. Employment in this industry is 
projected to increase by 16.62 per cent. 
                                                 
43 This refers to the general output price of locally produced commodity. 
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 According to the I-O database, the Steel industry is highly export-oriented, 
with approximately 79.6 per cent of its output being exported. The export price of 
Steel falls by 2.29 per cent, leading Steel exports to increase by 16.82 per cent. 
Hence, the increase in Steel exports alone contributes 13.38 per cent to its output 
increase (0.796 x 16.82 = 13.38).  
 The overall economic expansion in Vietnam will stimulate domestic demand 
for Steel, thereby contributing 0.98 per cent to the above increase in Steel output. 
The remaining Steel output increase (0.14 per cent) is contributed by the substitution 
of domestically-produced Steel for imported Steel. Because the domestic price of 
Steel now becomes relatively cheaper, coupled with high Armington substitution 
elasticity, Steel products will be easily substituted away from imported sources 
towards domestic sources. 
Electricals (second best performer) 
The short-run output of the electricals (Electrical) industry is projected to 
increase by 13.95 per cent in response to an output price reduction of 2.19 per cent, 
which is comparable to the output increase of Steel. Employment in this industry is 
projected to increase by 16.29 per cent.  
 The Electrical industry is less export-oriented than the Steel industry because 
only 46.2 per cent of its output is exported. The export price of Electrical falls by 
1.74 per cent, leading Electrical exports to increase by 16.7 per cent. Hence, the 
increase in Electrical exports alone contributes 7.72 per cent to its output increase 
(0.462 x 16.7 = 7.72).  
 The expansion in industries that use Electrical as an intermediate input 
explains the remaining increase (6.23 per cent) in Electrical output. Three major 
intermediate input users of Electrical output include Machinery, Electrical and 
Construct industries. They account for 70.9 per cent of total intermediate usage of 
Electrical output.  
Textile, Clothing and Footwear (third best performer) 
The textile, clothing and footwear (TCF) industry is the third best performer. 
It is also the largest industry in Vietnam in terms of industrial output. From the I-O 
database, the TCF industry accounts for the largest share of total industrial output 
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(9.9 per cent). Its output is projected to increase by 12.84 per cent. Employment in 
this industry is projected to increase by 15.59 per cent. 
 Similar to Steel, the TCF industry is also export-oriented, with 74 per cent of 
its output being sold to foreign markets. The export price of TCF falls by 1.54 per 
cent, leading TCF exports to increase by 12.56 per cent. Hence, the increase in TCF 
exports alone contributes 9.3 per cent to its output increase (0.74 x 12.56 = 9.3). 
 The overall economic expansion in Vietnam will stimulate domestic demand 
for TCF, thereby contributing 2.85 per cent to the above increase in TCF output. The 
remaining TCF output increase (0.69 per cent) is contributed by the substitution of 
domestically-produced TCF for imported TCF. Similar to Steel, TCF products will 
be easily substituted away from imported sources towards domestic sources. 
Two Worst Performing (least favourably affected) Industries 
Construction (worst affected industry in terms of employment) 
The construction (Construct) industry is the worst affected industry. It is also 
the second largest industry in Vietnam, which accounts for the second largest share 
of total industrial output (9.5 per cent). Its output increases slightly by 0.2 per cent, 
which mainly results from increased sales to aggregate investment and intermediate 
production (0.14 and 0.06 per cent, respectively). The volumes of exports and 
imports are unchanged chiefly because Construct is a non-traded commodity. 
 Employment in the Construct industry is projected to fall by 9.4 per cent. 
This is because wage rate falls by 3.36 per cent, but rental rates fall at a faster rate 
(9.94 per cent). Hence, capital will become relatively cheaper than labour. As a 
result, the Construct industry will substitute capital for labour, thereby increasing its 
capital-to-labour ratio (or conversely, reducing its labour-to-capital ratio). Likewise, 
investment in the Construct industry falls at a projected rate of 7.93 per cent for two 
reasons: (i) slow output growth; and (ii) the rate of return in this industry falls by 7.9 
per cent. 
Public Administration (second least favourably affected industry) 
The public administration (PubAdmin) industry is the most labour-intensive 
industry, in which labour accounts for approximately 82.6 per cent of factor costs. 
Output in this industry is projected to increase moderately by 4.2 per cent.  
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 The export price of PubAdmin falls by 6.01 per cent, leading PubAdmin 
exports to increase considerably by 26.58 per cent. However, the PubAdmin industry 
is not export-oriented, exporting about 13.4 per cent of its output to foreign markets. 
Hence, the increase in PubAdmin exports alone contributes 3.56 per cent to its output 
increase (0.134 x 26.58 = 3.56). The remaining increase in PubAdmin output (0.64 
per cent) is due to an overall expansion in the economy, which increases the 
domestic usage of PubAdmin output in intermediate production and household 
consumption (0.5 and 0.14 per cent, respectively).   
 Employment in the PubAdmin industry is projected to fall slightly by 1.26 
per cent. This is because the wage rate falls by 3.36 per cent, but rental rates fall at a 
faster rate (4.32 per cent). Hence, capital such as machinery and equipment will 
become relatively cheaper than labour. As a result, the PubAdmin industry will also 
substitute capital for labour, thereby increasing its capital-to-labour ratio (or 
conversely, reducing its labour-to-capital ratio). Recall that investment in the 
PubAdmin industry is exogenous (refer to sub-section 5.4.4 of Chapter 5). Therefore, 
it will be unaffected or unchanged by the across-the-board primary productivity 
improvement. 
Three Largest Industries in Vietnam 
The three largest industries in Vietnam include TCF, Construct and Services, 
which altogether account for nearly one-third of total industrial output, according to 
the 2005 I-O database. Hence, the performance of these industries is worth 
considering due to their significant contribution to the Vietnamese economy. 
Because the short-run performance of the largest and second largest industries 
(namely, TCF and Construct, respectively) has already been discussed, this sub-
section merely focuses on the short-run performance of the third largest industry 
(namely, Services).  
Services (third largest industry) 
The Services industry consists of 11 sub-industries such as irrigation services 
(IrrigServ), paper product (PaperProd), printing (Printing), publishing (Publishing), 
lottery (Lottery), property service (PropertyServ), other business service 
(OthBusServ), culture and sports (CultureSport), association (Association), dwellings 
(Dwellings) and other servces (OthServ) (see Annex 12). From the I-O database, this 
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industry accounts for the third largest share of total industrial output (9 per cent). The 
Services output is projected to increase by 6.03 per cent and employment in this 
industry is projected to increase slightly by 2.22 per cent. 
 The export price of Services falls by 5.73 per cent, leading Services exports 
to increase sharply by 32.22 per cent. Similar to PubAdmin, the Services industry is 
very inward-oriented, with only 5.1 per cent of its output being sold to foreign 
markets. Hence, the increase in Services exports alone contributes 1.64 per cent to its 
output increase (0.051 x 32.22 = 1.64). 
 The remaining increase in Services output (4.39 per cent) is due to an overall 
expansion in the economy, which increases the domestic usage of Services output in 
intermediate production and household consumption (3.47 and 0.92 per cent, 
respectively). 
6.3.2 Long-run Industry Results 
Table 6.3 reports the long-run impact of Vietnam's reform programs on 
various industries. In particular, output increases are found in all industries, 
indicating that all industries benefit from the efficiency improvement in the long run. 
Price reductions in the long run are lower than those in the short run. The long-run 
trade balance is reflected in an overall increase in imports volume while the overall 
exports volume tends to fall, relative to their short-run changes. Likewise, industry 
employment does not change much due to the long-run full employment assumption. 
By contrast, industry investment activities tend to be higher in the long run than in 













Table 6.3- Long-run Industry Effects of a 5% Efficiency Increase (in Percentage 
Changes from the baseline) 
  Price
44
 Output Employment Exports Imports Investment 
1 RicePad -0.89 5.56 0.12 9.35 1.78 2.65 
2 Agriculture -0.88 6.10 0.68 5.32 5.32 2.56 
3 Forest -0.95 8.44 2.89 5.04 7.46 4.57 
4 Fish -0.58 6.32 1.01 1.55 5.82 2.71 
5 Mining -0.81 6.55 1.08 2.62 7.01 2.80 
6 OGP -1.00 5.94 0.51 5.87 7.58 2.29 
7 FoodBev -1.36 6.65 -1.49 6.73 5.00 5.48 
8 ConsMat -1.63 8.41 -0.70 10.20 4.43 7.07 
9 OtherManuf -1.21 10.88 1.38 10.76 7.89 9.50 
10 Services -3.41 10.84 0.45 17.80 5.01 9.08 
11 Machinery -1.16 10.08 1.33 9.77 6.69 9.36 
12 Electrical -0.95 11.09 2.11 10.07 8.71 9.98 
13 Steel -1.48 10.95 2.80 10.67 7.95 10.94 
14 TCF -0.99 9.71 0.46 8.70 7.81 8.59 
15 Chemicals -1.15 9.46 0.83 8.30 7.15 8.74 
16 ElecGas -2.46 8.62 -0.68 14.95 1.86 7.49 
17 Water -3.01 8.42 -0.68 0.00 0.00 7.49 
18 Construct -1.43 7.66 -1.64 0.00 0.00 6.98 
19 Trade -2.27 8.26 -1.71 9.11 6.72 9.11 
20 RdWtrTrans -2.13 7.82 -2.47 8.51 5.95 8.15 
21 RailAirTrans -1.83 8.28 -1.70 7.27 6.11 8.53 
22 PostTelecom -2.92 9.45 -0.45 11.90 4.51 8.03 
23 FinInsur -2.57 10.75 1.75 10.38 6.88 10.39 
24 PubAdmin -1.37 7.37 0.55 5.38 7.31 7.49 
Source: VNGEM simulation results. 
Three Best Performing Industries (in terms of output growth) 
Electricals (best performer) 
The electricals (Electrical) industry is most favourably affected by the 
primary productivity improvement in the long run. Its long-run output is projected to 
increase by 11.09 per cent. Employment in this industry is projected to increase by 
2.11 per cent. 
                                                 
44 This refers to the general output price of locally produced commodity. 
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 According to the I-O database, the Electrical industry is not relatively inward-
oriented because only 46.2 per cent of its output is exported. The export price of 
Electrical falls by 1.08 per cent, leading Electrical exports to increase by 10.07 per 
cent. Hence, the increase in Electrical exports alone contributes 4.65 per cent to its 
output increase (0.462 x 10.07 = 4.65).  
 The expansion in industries that use Electrical as an intermediate input 
contributes 5.85 per cent to the above Electrical output increase. Three major 
intermediate input users of Electrical output include Machinery, Electrical and 
Construct industries. They account for 70.9 per cent of total intermediate usage of 
Electrical output. The remaining Electrical output increase (0.59 per cent) is 
contributed by increased sales to household consumption and aggregate investment 
(0.44 and 0.15 per cent, respectively). 
Steel (second best performer) 
In the long run, the Steel industry’s output is projected to increase by 10.95 
per cent, which is pretty close to the Electrical output increase. Employment in this 
industry is projected to increase by 2.8 per cent. 
 Unlike Electrical, the Steel industry is highly export-oriented, with 
approximately 79.6 per cent of its output being exported. The export price of Steel 
falls by 1.5 per cent, leading Steel exports to increase by 10.67 per cent. Hence, the 
increase in Steel exports alone contributes 8.5 per cent to its output increase (0.796 x 
10.67 = 8.5).  
 The overall economic expansion in Vietnam will stimulate domestic demand 
for Steel, thereby contributing 1.7 per cent to the above increase in Steel output. The 
remaining Steel output increase (0.75 per cent) is contributed by the substitution of 
domestically produced Steel for imported Steel. Because the domestic price of Steel 
now becomes relatively cheaper, coupled with high Armington substitution elasticity, 
Steel products will be easily substituted away from imported sources towards 
domestic sources. 
Other Manufacturing (third best performer) 
The other manufacturing (OtherManuf) industry consists of bakery and 
confectionery (BakeryConf), wood products (WoodProd) and non-ferrous metal 
(NonFeMetal) (see Annex 12). This industry is third most favourably affected by the 
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primary productivity improvement in the long run. Its long-run output is projected to 
increase by 10.88 per cent in response to a price reduction of 1.21 per cent. 
Employment in this industry is projected to increase by 1.38 per cent.  
 According to the I-O database, the OtherManuf industry is export-oriented, 
with 63.6 per cent of its output being exported to foreign markets. The export price 
of OtherManuf falls by 1.25 per cent, leading OtherManuf exports to increase by 
10.76 per cent. Hence, the increase in OtherManuf exports alone contributes 6.84 per 
cent to its output increase (0.636 x 10.76 = 6.84).  
 The expansion in industries that use OtherManuf as an intermediate input 
contributes 2.86 per cent to the above OtherManuf output increase. Three major 
intermediate input users of OtherManuf output include Construct, OtherManuf and 
Machinery industries. They account for 70 per cent of total intermediate usage of 
OtherManuf output. The remaining OtherManuf output increase (1.18 per cent) is 
contributed by increased sales to household consumption and aggregate investment 
(0.88 and 0.3 per cent, respectively). 
Two Worst Performing Industries 
Rice and Paddy (least favourably affected industry) 
Recall that the Construct industry is the least favourably affected industry in 
the short run. However, in the long run, the rice and paddy (RicePad) industry 
becomes the least favourably affected industry instead of Construct. This industry is 
relatively labour-intensive, with labour accounting for 55.84 per cent of factor costs. 
The long-run price of RicePad decreases slightly by 0.89 per cent, explaining for its 
moderate long-run output increase of 5.56 per cent. At the same time, this industry 
experiences a rising production cost of 1 per cent. This production cost increase is 
caused by a rising primary factor cost of 4.41 per cent, which in turn is caused by 
two factors: (i) an increasing wage rate (4.87 per cent) which implies a rising labour 
cost; and (ii) an increasing land rental rate (5.25 per cent). Put simply, the RicePad 
industry experiences a cost-price squeeze in the long-run, which largely explains its 
moderate long-run output increase.  
 However, there is no significant change in this industry’s employment (0.12 
per cent). The substitution of capital for labour is inelastic (0.34), which means even 
though capital is relatively cheaper than labour, there will be insignificant 
substitution of capital for labour in the long run.  
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 The export price of RicePad falls by 0.94 per cent, leading RicePad exports to 
increase by 9.35 per cent. However, the RicePad industry is not export-oriented, 
exporting about 15.5 per cent of its output to foreign markets. Hence, the increase in 
RicePad exports alone contributes 1.45 per cent to its output increase (0.155 x 9.35 = 
1.45).  
 The remaining increase in RicePad output (4.11 per cent) is due to an overall 
expansion in the economy, which increases the domestic usage of RicePad output in 
intermediate production and household consumption (2.95 and 1.16 per cent, 
respectively). First, three major intermediate input users of RicePad output include 
RicePad itself, Agriculture and FoodBev. They account for 98.3 per cent of total 
intermediate usage of RicePad output. Second, rising labour income translates into an 
increase in household consumption of RicePad by 3.93 per cent. 
Oil, Gas and Petroleum (second least favourably affected industry) 
Recall that the PubAdmin industry is the second least favourably affected 
industry in the short run. However, in the long run the oil, gas and petroleum (OGP) 
industry becomes the least favourably affected industry instead of PubAdmin. The 
OGP industry is relatively capital- and land-intensive, with capital and land together 
accounting for 72.9 per cent of factor costs. The long-run price of OGP decreases 
slightly by 1 per cent, explaining for its moderate long-run output increase of 5.94 
per cent. This industry experiences a rising production cost (2.54 per cent). This 
production cost increase is caused by a rising primary factor cost of 4.17 per cent, 
which in turn is caused by two factors: (i) an increasing wage rate (4.87 per cent) 
which implies a rising labour cost; and (ii) an increasing land rental rate (7.48 per 
cent). Similar to the RicePad, the OGP industry also experiences a cost-price squeeze 
in the long-run, which largely explains its moderate long-run output increase.  
 However, there is also no significant change in this industry’s employment 
(0.54 per cent). The substitution of capital for labour is also inelastic (0.21), which 
means that even though capital is relatively cheaper than labour, there will be 
insignificant substitution of capital for labour in the long run.  
 The export price of OGP falls by 1.01 per cent, leading OGP exports to 
increase by 5.87 per cent. OGP is the most export-oriented industry in Vietnam, 
exporting about 98.3 per cent of its output to foreign markets. Hence, the increase in 
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OGP exports alone contributes 5.77 per cent to its output increase (0.983 x 5.87 = 
5.77).  
 The remaining increase in OGP output (0.17 per cent) is due to an overall 
expansion in the economy, which increases the domestic usage of OGP output in 
intermediate production. OGP output is sold to all industries in Vietnam, with the top 
10 domestic users accounting for 76.9 per cent of total usage of OGP input. 
Three Largest Industries 
Textile, Clothing and Footwear (largest industry) 
Recall that the TCF industry accounts for the highest share of total industrial 
output (9.9 per cent). In the long run, this industry loses its third favourable position 
to the OtherManuf industry. Its long-run output is projected to increase by 9.71 per 
cent. Employment in this industry is projected to increase slightly by 0.46 per cent. 
 Similar to Steel, the TCF industry is also export-oriented, with 74 per cent of 
its output being sold to foreign markets. The export price of TCF falls by 1.09 per 
cent, leading TCF exports to increase by 8.7 per cent. Hence, the increase in TCF 
exports alone contributes 6.44 per cent to its output increase (0.74 x 8.7 = 6.44). 
 The overall economic expansion in Vietnam will stimulate domestic demand 
for TCF, thereby contributing 2.53 per cent to the above increase in TCF output. The 
remaining TCF output increase (0.74 per cent) is contributed by the substitution of 
domestically-produced TCF for imported TCF. Similar to Steel, TCF products will 
be easily substituted away from imported sources towards domestic sources. 
Construction (second largest industry) 
As a reminder, the Construct industry accounts for the second largest share of 
total industrial output (9.5 per cent). Its long-run performance improves significantly, 
compared to short-run performance. In effect, the long-run output of this industry is 
projected to increase by 7.66 per cent, which is mainly contributed by increased sales 
to aggregate investment, government consumption and intermediate production 
(7.42, 0.14 and 0.1 per cent, respectively). The volumes of exports and imports are 
unchanged chiefly because Construct is a non-traded commodity. 
 Employment in the Construct industry is projected to fall by 1.64 per cent. 
This is because the wage rate increases by 4.87 per cent while rental rates fall by 
0.87 per cent. Hence, capital will become relatively cheaper than labour. As a result, 
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the Construct industry will substitute capital for labour, thereby increasing its capital-
to-labour ratio (or conversely, reducing its labour-to-capital ratio). By contrast, 
investment in the Construct industry increases at a projected rate of 6.98 per cent in 
response to the overall economic expansion in Vietnam. 
Services (third largest industry) 
From the I-O database, the Services industry accounts for the third largest 
share of total industrial output (9 per cent). Demand for Services output is relatively 
price elastic. Hence, a reduction in its price (-3.41 per cent) will favourably stimulate 
its output and employment. Indeed, the Services output is projected to increase by 
10.84 per cent and its employment is projected to increase slightly by 0.45 per cent. 
 The export price of Services falls by 3.4 per cent, leading Services exports to 
increase sharply by 17.8 per cent. However, the Services industry is very inward-
oriented, with only 5.1 per cent of its output being sold to foreign markets. Hence, 
the increase in Services exports alone contributes only 0.91 per cent to its output 
increase (0.051 x 17.8 = 0.91). 
 The remaining increase in Services output (9.93 per cent) is contributed by an 
overall expansion in the economy, which increases the domestic usage of Services 
output into household consumption, intermediate production and government 
consumption (6, 3.62 and 0.31 per cent, respectively). Among these, household 
consumption of Services increases dramatically by 10.59 per cent, making it the 
largest contributor to the industry’s output increase. 
6.3.3 Employment by Educational Qualifications 
In the short run, the real wage is assumed to be fixed, but nominal labour cost 
decreases at a uniform rate of 3.36 per cent (same rate as the CPI reduction as 
nominal wage is indexed with the CPI) due to efficiency gains (Table 6.4). This 
stimulates higher demand for both low- and high-skilled workers in the short run. 
However, the short-run demand for VocTraining, Elementary and NoSkill 
qualifications is projected to increase at a faster rate than that for UniDegree, 
CollegeDeg and ProfSecond qualifications. Understandably, a majority of workers in 
Vietnam possess low and medium skills, as reflected in their educational 
qualifications. According to the I-O database, workers with VocTraining, Elementary 
and NoSkill qualifications account for 70 per cent of the total wage bill. They usually 
work in the agriculture and light manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, workers 
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with UniDegree, CollegeDeg and ProfSecond qualifications account for the 
remaining 30 per cent of the total wage bill. They usually work in such sectors as 
OGP, ElecGas, Water, PostTelecom and PubAdmin. Therefore, the short-run 
changes in employment are quite consistent with the current labour market 
conditions in Vietnam. 
 Nevertheless, the real wage will increase in the long run and nominal wages 
will also increase at a uniform rate of 4.87 per cent adjusted for the reduction in the 
CPI (Table 6.4). Although the economy is assumed to reach its full employment 
level, there will be some changes in the composition of occupations in the long run. 
In particular, there will be reductions in demand for low-skilled workers (-0.1 per 
cent for NoSkill and -0.07 per cent for Elementary). The skill mix will then be 
allocated towards medium- and high-skilled workers, especially towards CollegeDeg 
and ProfSecond qualifications (0.28 and 0.24 per cent, respectively). This is because 
the expanding industries, especially capital-intensive industries, will also expand 
their investment activities in accumulating more capital, machinery and equipment in 
the long run. To work with these newly-invested technologies, machinery and 
equipment, the economy needs to acquire more medium- and high-skilled workers in 
the long run.  
Table 6.4- Employment by Educational Qualifications (in Percentage Changes 
from the baseline) 
  Short run Long-run 
 Qualifications Wages Employment Wages Employment 
1 UniDegree -3.36 2.35 4.87 0.19 
2 CollegeDeg -3.36 1.33 4.87 0.28 
3 ProfSecond -3.36 1.89 4.87 0.24 
4 VocTraining -3.36 3.83 4.87 0.06 
5 Elementary -3.36 4.59 4.87 -0.07 
6 NoSkill -3.36 3.25 4.87 -0.10 
Source: VNGEM simulation results. 
6.3.4 Welfare Effects of Efficiency Gains 
According to Fane and Ahammad (2003), there have been two different 
concepts of equivalent variation (EV) being used to measure the welfare effects of 
policy changes. The first one is derived from the balance of trade function (referred 
to as EVBOT), which can be defined as an increase in foreign exchange received from 
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abroad resulting in the same utility change as the policy change. The second one is 
derived from the money metric utility function (referred to as EVMMU), which can be 
defined as an extra amount of income allowing consumers to reach the utility that 
they actually reach as a result of the policy change (assuming prices faced by 
consumers are unchanged). This EVMMU is used in VNGEM to estimate changes in 
household consumption as an indicator of welfare changes.45 
In the short run, aggregate household consumption is assumed to be 
unchanged. Therefore, efficiency gains appear to have little short-run welfare impact 
on the economy. Nevertheless, in the short run, there are some changes in the 
composition of commodities consumption in response to changes in their relative 
prices. As mentioned previously, the short-run nominal wages will decline at a 
uniform rate of 3.36 per cent (negative income effect). However, the short-run 
consumer prices of commodities Fish, Services, ElecGas, Water, Trade, PostTelecom 
and PubAdmin in Table 6.5, decline at faster rates than nominal wages (positive 
substitution effect). In this case, the positive substitution effect dominates the 
negative income effect and the net effect is positive, thereby explaining the 
increments in short-run household consumption of these commodities. By contrast, 
the consumer price reductions for other remaining commodities are lower than the 
nominal wage reductions. In this case, the negative income effect dominates the 
positive substitution effect and the net effect is negative, causing consumption of 
such items to decline. 
 In the long run, efficiency gains will generate positive welfare effects on the 
economy since the aggregate long-run household consumption is projected to 
increase by 7.49 per cent. This is reflected in the increase in consumption of all 
commodities in the long run. As mentioned previously, the long-run nominal wages 
will increase at a uniform rate of 4.87 per cent (positive income effect). In addition, 
the long-run consumer prices of almost all commodities will decline (positive 
substitution effect), except for the price of Construct which remains unchanged. It 
means the consumers will enjoy their relative income increases and also enjoy 
relatively cheaper goods and services. In this case, the net effect is positive, thereby 
explaining the long-run increases in household consumption. In Vietnam, there are 
                                                 
45 Despite notable differences between the two measures, decomposing each measure has certain 
weaknesses such that neither is definitely superior to the other (see Martin (1997) and Fane and 
Ahammad (2003) for more details). Note that VNGEM does not decompose the measure of welfare 
changes since it is not the primary objective of this thesis. 
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eight main consumer goods including commodities RicePad, Agriculture, Fish, 
FoodBev, Services, TCF, Chemicals and Trade, which altogether account for 83.7 
per cent of total household consumption, according to the I-O database.46  
Table 6.5- Welfare Effects of Efficiency Gains on Household Consumption (in 
Percentage Changes from the baseline) 










1 RicePad -2.40 -0.34 -0.96 3.93 
2 Agriculture -2.51 -0.48 -0.91 5.97 
3 Forest -0.81 -1.54 -1.06 7.35 
4 Fish -5.32 1.03 -0.66 6.75 
5 Mining -1.74 -1.03 -0.82 7.28 
6 OGP -0.73 -1.62 -0.33 7.05 
7 FoodBev -3.11 -0.21 -1.17 6.50 
8 ConsMat -3.09 -0.25 -1.34 7.53 
9 OtherManuf -1.38 -1.22 -0.82 7.19 
10 Services -5.27 1.27 -3.12 10.59 
11 Machinery -1.30 -1.26 -0.62 7.06 
12 Electrical -0.85 -1.51 -0.48 6.97 
13 Steel -1.28 -1.27 -0.63 7.07 
14 TCF -1.53 -1.11 -0.84 7.06 
15 Chemicals -2.78 -0.42 -1.26 7.47 
16 ElecGas -4.61 0.66 -2.43 8.34 
17 Water -5.16 0.99 -3.01 8.73 
18 Construct 0.00 -2.00 0.00 6.75 
19 Trade -4.44 0.64 -1.86 9.19 
20 RdWtrTrans -2.94 -0.34 -1.31 7.69 
21 RailAirTrans -2.43 -0.64 -1.09 7.55 
22 PostTelecom -4.23 0.44 -2.51 8.50 
23 FinInsur -2.27 -0.94 -1.17 9.78 
24 PubAdmin -4.70 0.82 -1.07 8.59 
Note: VNGEM simulation results. 
                                                 
46 The results are driven by hypothetical closure rules. In reality, the welfare and other economic 
affects would lie somewhere in between the time set of results: short-run and long-run. 
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6.4 Sensitivity Analyses 
The simulation results above have been generated based on the I-O database 
and a number of behavioural parameters listed in Annexes 11 and 13. Obviously, any 
changes in one or all of these parameters, as well as changes in the simulated value 
of the primary factor productivity, may alter the values of the dependent variables in 
VNGEM. To test for the robustness of the model’s macroeconomic results, two 
sensitivity analyses are conducted as follows.  
The first sensitivity analysis is conducted by doubling and halving each of the 
following three important parameters: (i) Armington substitution elasticities between 
domestic and imported sources (ϭ(1)(c)); (ii) transformation elasticities of output 
(ϭO(1)(i)); and (iii) individual export demand elasticities (γ(c)). The results of the first 
sensitivity test are reported in Table 6.6, which indicates that the macroeconomic 
results are sufficiently robust to withstand changes in the above parameters. The 
welfare effects of changes in ϭO(1)(i) and ϭ(1)(c) on long-run household consumption 
are relatively small. For instance, halving the value of ϭO(1)(i) will lower long-run 
household consumption by 0.01 per cent compared to the normal case (7.49 - 7.48 = 
0.01). Conversely, doubling its value will increase long-run household consumption 
by 0.01 per cent (7.5 - 7.49 = 0.01). From the I-O database, household consumption 
accounted for $US33.8 billion.47 This reduction (increase) is equivalent to a loss 
(increase) in long-run household consumption of $US3.38 million ($US33.8 billion x 
0.0001 = $US3.38 million).  
Likewise, halving the values of ϭ(1)(c) will result in a loss in long-run 
household consumption of $US27 million ($US33.8 billion x (7.49 - 7.41)/100 = 
$US27 million). Conversely, doubling its value will result in an increase in long-run 
household consumption of $US50.7 million ($US33.8 billion x (7.64 - 7.49)/100 = 
$US50.7 million).  
However, the welfare effects of changes in γ(c) on long-run household 
consumption are relatively large. Using the same reasoning, halving the value of γ(c) 
will result in a loss in long-run household consumption of $US233.2 million 
($US33.8 billion x (7.49 - 6.8)/100 = $US233.2 million). Conversely, doubling its 
value will result in an increase in long-run household consumption of $US219.7 
                                                 
47 In Vietnamese currency, household consumption is $VN536,066 billion. Using the IMF’s 2005 
exchange rate (1 USD = 15,859 VND), this is equivalent to $US33.8 billion.  
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million ($US 33.8 x (8.14 - 7.49)/100 = $US219.7 million). Understandably, changes 
in γ(c) will result in significant changes in the volume of exports, leading to 
significant changes in real output and household consumption since exports represent 
the main channel for output growth. 




(i) and γ(c) 
 Description Short-run Long-run 
 ϭ(1)(c) Half Normal Double Half Normal Double 
1  Real GDP 6.27  6.34  6.46  7.81  7.89  8.05  
2  Aggregate employment 2.79  2.97  3.28  0.00  0.00  0.00  
3  Aggregate capital stock 0.00  0.00  0.00  6.57  6.83  7.29  
4  Real household consumption 0.00  0.00  0.00  7.41  7.49  7.64  
5  Real investment 0.00  0.00  0.00  7.41  7.49  7.64  
6  Real government consumption 0.00  0.00  0.00  7.41  7.49  7.64  
7  Exports (volume) 15.10  14.48  13.46  8.32  7.97  7.35  
8  Imports (volume)  4.65  4.00  2.92  7.38  7.06  6.51  
9  Real wage 0.00  0.00  0.00  6.29  6.45  6.74  
10  Consumer price index -3.50  -3.36  -3.12  -1.55  -1.48  -1.36  
11  GDP price index -5.33  -5.14  -4.82  -2.30  -2.20  -2.01  
12  Real trade balance 6.27  6.34  6.46  0.00  0.00  0.00  
13  Real devaluation 5.62  5.41  5.07  2.36  2.25  2.05  
 
 Description Short-run Long-run 
 ϭO
(1)
(i) Half Normal Double Half Normal Double 
1  Real GDP 6.34  6.34  6.35  7.89  7.89  7.91  
2  Aggregate employment 2.96  2.97  2.98  0.00  0.00  0.00  
3  Aggregate capital stock 0.00  0.00  0.00  6.82  6.83  6.86  
4  Real household consumption 0.00  0.00  0.00  7.48  7.49  7.50  
5  Real investment 0.00  0.00  0.00  7.48  7.49  7.50  
6  Real government consumption 0.00  0.00  0.00  7.48  7.49  7.50  
7  Exports (volume) 14.48  14.48  14.49  7.97  7.97  7.96  
8  Imports (volume)  4.01  4.00  3.99  7.07  7.06  7.06  
9  Real wage 0.00  0.00  0.00  6.45  6.45  6.46  
10  Consumer price index -3.37  -3.36  -3.34  -1.48  -1.48  -1.48  
11  GDP price index -5.14  -5.14  -5.12  -2.20  -2.20  -2.19  
12  Real trade balance 6.34  6.34  6.35  0.00  0.00  0.00  




 Description Short-run Long-run 
 γ(c) Half Normal Double Half Normal Double 
1  Real GDP 5.50  6.34  7.22  7.19  7.89  8.57  
2  Aggregate employment 1.30  2.97  4.75  0.00  0.00  0.00  
3  Aggregate capital stock 0.00  0.00  0.00  5.07  6.83  8.52  
4  Real household consumption 0.00  0.00  0.00  6.80  7.49  8.14  
5  Real investment 0.00  0.00  0.00  6.80  7.49  8.14  
6  Real government consumption 0.00  0.00  0.00  6.80  7.49  8.14  
7  Exports (volume) 11.11  14.48  17.64  6.27  7.97  9.66  
8  Imports (volume)  2.18  3.97  5.52  5.54  7.06  8.59  
9  Real wage 0.00  0.00  0.00  5.23  6.45  7.58  
10  Consumer price index -4.74  -3.36  -2.22  -2.23  -1.48  -0.94  
11  GDP price index -7.06  -5.14  -3.59  -3.38  -2.20  -1.33  
12  Real trade balance 5.50  6.34  7.22  0.00  0.00  0.00  
13  Real devaluation 7.59  5.41  3.72  3.49  2.25  1.35  
Note: ϭ(1)(c) = Armington substitution elasticities between domestic and imported sources; ϭO
(1)
(i) = 
transformation elasticities of output; and γ(c) = individual export demand elasticities. 
Source: VNGEM simulation results, which are expressed in percentage changes. 
The second sensitivity analysis is conducted by doubling and halving the 
simulated value the across-the-board primary factor productivity (aPR(1)(i)). The 
results of the second sensitivity test are reported in Table 6.7. It can be observed that 
almost all macroeconomic variables have nearly one-to-one (or symmetric) responses 
to changes in aPR(1)(i). For instance, halving the value of aPR(1)(i) will cut both short-run 
and long-run real GDP growth rates by half while doubling its value will increase 
such growth rates by twice, similarly for other macroeconomic variables reported in 
Table 6.7. Therefore, the macroeconomic results are sufficiently robust to withstand 
changes in aPR(1)(i). 
In monetary terms, the welfare effects of changes in aPR(1)(i) on long-run 
household consumption are significantly large. As mentioned previously, household 
consumption accounted for $US33.8 billion according to the I-O database. Hence, 
halving the value of aPR(1)(i) will result in a loss in long-run household consumption 
of $US1.3 billion ($US33.8 billion x (7.49 - 3.63)/100 = $US1.3 billion) while 
doubling its value will result in an increase in long-run household consumption of 
$US2.86 billion ($US 33.8 x (15.94 - 7.49)/100 = $US2.86 billion). Intuitively, the 
greater the primary factor productivity improvements, the better the results, and vice 
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versa. This is one of the main policy implications discussed in sub-section 7.3.2 of 
Chapter 7. 
Table 6.7- Sensitivity Test for Changes in aPR
(1)
(i) 
















1  Real GDP 3.06  6.34  13.63  3.82  7.89  16.88  
2  Aggregate employment 1.41  2.97  6.54  0.00  0.00  0.00  
3  Aggregate capital stock 0.00  0.00  0.00  3.32  6.83  14.52  
4  Real household consumption 0.00  0.00  0.00  3.63  7.49  15.94  
5  Real investment 0.00  0.00  0.00  3.63  7.49  15.94  
6  Real government consumption 0.00  0.00  0.00  3.63  7.49  15.94  
7  Exports (volume) 7.00  14.48  31.06  3.85  7.97  17.08  
8  Imports (volume)  1.90  3.97  8.65  3.43  7.06  15.05  
9  Real wage 0.00  0.00  0.00  3.14  6.45  13.65  
10  Consumer price index -1.71  -3.36  -6.48  -0.73  -1.48  -3.03  
11  GDP price index -2.62  -5.14  -9.88  -1.09  -2.20  -4.49  
12  Real trade balance 3.06 6.34  13.63  0.00  0.00  0.00  
13  Real devaluation 2.69  5.41  10.96  1.10  2.25  4.70  
Note: aPR
(1)
(i) = all factor-augmenting technical change (referred to as primary factor productivity). 
Source: VNGEM simulation results, which are expressed in percentage changes. 
Overall, the results from VNGEM are relatively consistent with some 
reviewed studies in Chapter 4, regardless of differences in methodologies and scope 
of analysis. First, Vu (2002) and Ha (2007) both find that privatisation leads to 
efficiency gains of SOEs. This validates the assumption adopted in this thesis of the 
5 per cent increase in the primary productivity variables. In addition, CIEM (2003) 
finds that equitisation creates more jobs and investment activities, while Truong et al. 
(2006) find there are increases in employee income after equitisation. These are 
relatively consistent with VNGEM’s results, which suggest that the increases in 
investment activities and labour income mostly occur in the long run, not in the short 
run. Second, VNGEM’s results suggest that Vietnam’s reform programs are pro-
growth as reflected in the increases in real GDP in both short and long runs. This is 
consistent with the findings of Barnett (2000), Belke et al. (2005) and Boubakri et al. 
(2009), although these studies do not clearly specify whether such GDP increases are 
for the short or long runs.  
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Nevertheless, the findings from the following studies appear to be related to 
those from VNGEM, but they cannot be comparable directly.48 For instance, 
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) find that privatisation increases firms’ output and 
employment. In VNGEM, these increases are referred to as increases in industries’ 
output and employment growth. In addition, Brainerd (2002) and Ho et al. (2002) 
find wage increases in privatised SOEs. Wage increases found in VNGEM are 
referred to as aggregate real wages rather than wages in privatised SOEs alone. 
Further, Monteiro (2003) finds a U-shaped relationship between wage variation and 
time period of restructuring. In VNGEM, wages are unchanged in the short run 
(perhaps due to fixed labour contracts), but increase in the long run (due to the long-
run full employment assumption). Under this specification, such relationship does 
not always need to be U-shaped. Similarly, Kikicaslan et al. (2008) find that 
privatisation results in increased unemployment. VNGEM’s results suggest that this 
is only a short-run phenomenon because in the long run, employment in the private 
sector increases, offsetting the decreases in employment of SOEs and restoring to the 
full employment level. In terms of welfare changes, Broadman et al. (2009) find that 
privatisation leads to welfare improvements in competitive environments, similar to 
VNGEM’s findings, but the authors do not specify the measurement of and duration 
of welfare. 
On the other hand, the results from VNGEM are in contrast with some other 
reviewed studies in Chapter 4. Differences in methodologies and scope of analysis 
largely explain these discrepancies. First, VNGEM’s results are based on the 
assumption that Vietnam’s reform programs are pro-growth, but Cook and Uchida 
(2003) find that privatisation has contributed negatively to economic growth. The 
authors argue that the lack of competition and weak regulation of competition 
explains their finding. Such argument may be misleading because, based on their 
reasoning, the causes of negative output growth are the lack of competition and weak 
regulation of competition rather than privatisation. Similarly, Katsoulakos and 
Likoyanni (2002) find that privatisation is not related to GDP growth, while Moshiri 
and Abdou (2008) find a neutral effect of privatisation on economic growth. Second, 
Gong et al. (2006) find some temporary reductions in employment growth in 
privatised firms compared with non-privatised firms. VNGEM’s results suggest that 
                                                 
48 First and foremost, this analysis is based on an assumed 5 per cent across-the-board increase in the 
primary factory productivity, which may or may not occur in reality. 
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this may be true only in the short run, but not in the long run due to the full 
employment assumption in the model.  
Third, in terms of wages and/or earnings, Tansel (1998) find that privatisation 
results in earnings losses and welfare reductions partly due to poor quality of jobs in 
the private sector. His reasoning is not quite convincing because the criteria defining 
the term ‘quality jobs’ are unclear, and because a large body of empirical evidence 
shows that private enterprises are more efficient than SOEs. Hence, it is not always 
true that the private sector offers low quality jobs relative to the SOE sector.  
 Finally, in terms of welfare changes, Stuckler and King (2007) find that 
privatisation results in welfare reductions (measured by life expectancy losses), while 
Pham and Mohnen (2012) find that privatisation does not contribute to welfare 
improvement. These are in contrast with VNGEM’s finding of welfare gains resulted 
from Vietnam’s reform programs. Understandably, Stuckler and King (2007) use 
data on mortality and/or life expectancy as an indicator of welfare, while the 
measurement of welfare in VNGEM is household consumption. Besides, the authors 
do not specify the duration of these welfare losses, while VNGEM shows that 
Vietnam’s reform programs results in welfare gains in the long run as the aggregate 
household consumption increases. Likewise, Pham and Mohnen (2012) do not 
explain how welfare is measured and seriously lack a long-run analysis of the 
welfare impacts of privatisation. Most notably, their biased conclusion is mainly due 
to the unrealistic assumption of the closed, rather than open, economy of Vietnam. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The across-the-board productivity improvement translates into relatively 
lower prices of domestic goods and services, thereby improving the competitiveness 
of domestic producers in the export markets. Therefore, Vietnam’s ongoing reform 
programs are simulated to be pro-growth in both the short and long runs. Three major 
channels of output increases include: (i) export expansion; (ii) increased domestic 
usage of goods and services, especially in current production, aggregate investment, 
household consumption and government consumption; and (iii) substitution of goods 
and services away from imported sources and towards domestic sources in response 
to relative price changes that favour domestic goods and services.  
 In the short run, economic expansion will also lead to expansion in aggregate 
employment. Likewise, export expansion will result in a short-run trade surplus in 
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Vietnam. Nevertheless, these positive effects on exports and aggregate employment 
will fade out in the long run when the economy presumably achieves its full 
employment level and a trade balance. Due to the full employment assumption, the 
real wage will increase in the long run, leading to increased labour incomes. For this 
reason, the productivity improvement will generate positive welfare effects as 
measured by the increases in household consumption in the long run.49  
 With respect to industry employment, the demand for low-skilled workers 
grows at a faster rate than that for high-skilled workers in the short run. These short-
run changes are quite consistent with the current labour market conditions in 
Vietnam, in which the former account for 70 per cent of total wage bill while the 
latter account for 30 per cent. However, the demand for medium- and high-skilled 
workers will increase in the long run, relative to that for low-skilled workers. This is 
because the expanding industries, especially capital-intensive industries, will also 
expand their long-run investment activities in accumulating more capital, machinery 
and equipment. To work with these newly-invested technologies, machinery and 
equipment, the economy needs to acquire more medium- and high-skilled workers in 
the long run.  
 In addition, some of the winners and losers (in terms of output growth rates) 
from the Vietnamese reform programs have been identified. For instance, the most 
favourably affected industries in the short run include Steel, Electrical and TCF, 
while the least favourably affected industries include Construct and PubAdmin. 
Likewise, the most favourably affected industries in the long run include Electrical, 
Steel and OtherManuf, while the least favourably affected industries include RicePad 
and OGP.  
 Finally, the sensitivity analyses indicate that the projected macroeconomic 
results are sufficiently robust to changes with a few key model parameters (such as 
the Armington substitution elasticities, the transformation elasticities of output and 
individual export demand elasticities) as well as changes in the simulated value the 
across-the-board primary factor productivity. Overall, the results from VNGEM are 
consistent with some studies reviewed in Chapter 4, but contrast to or cannot be 
comparable directly with some other studies, largely because of differences in 
research methodologies and scope of analysis. 
                                                 
49 The reality may be somewhere in between the modelled short-run and long-run simulation 
scenarios. 
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 The next chapter summarises all of the main findings and/or arguments 
throughout Chapters 2 to 6, and provides several policy suggestions and/or 








Chapters 2 to 6 examined the Vietnamese economy after Doi Moi launched in 
1986. In essence, Vietnam’s impressive economic performance resulted from a vast 
number of policy changes implemented since 1986. The important policy changes in 
Vietnam include the industrial, trade and monetary policies. Most importantly, this 
study mainly focuses on Vietnam’s microeconomic reform of domestic enterprises 
through state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms, particularly focused on the 
equitisation program and the private sector development (PSD) policy. In this 
respect, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of Vietnam (referred to as 
VNGEM) has been developed to assess the likely effects of the future 
microeconomic reform programs on Vietnam’s national economic outcomes and 
industries. This final chapter is aimed at providing a brief summary of key findings 
and arguments that have already been covered in Chapters 2 to 6.  
This concluding chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 reports some key 
conclusions and/or findings throughout Chapters 2 to 6. In Section 7.3, some policy 
implications for Vietnam are identified, and measures to more effectively 
implemented policy changes are discussed, especially with respect to accelerating the 
SOE reform process, in order to sustain greater economic growth and development in 
the future. Section 7.4 specifies some research limitations and/or difficulties during 
the period of completing this thesis. These provide useful directions for subsequent 
studies in the future.  
7.2 Concluding Remarks 
 Throughout Chapters 2 to 6, several notable conclusions and/or findings 
include the followings. First, Vietnam’s economic performance has been very 
impressive since Doi Moi. The country experienced strong output growth, especially 
in the mid-1990s, improved BOPs, increasing labour incomes, high employment 
growth and a favourably low unemployment level. Nevertheless, Vietnam is still 
considered as a low-income country, with considerable income gaps between the 
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urban and rural areas, and between rich and poor regions. To finance its 
industrialisation process, Vietnam becomes more dependent on external debt, official 
development assistance (ODA) funds, overseas remittances and FDI. In terms of 
macroeconomic policies, during 1960-85, Vietnam implemented the heavy industry 
priority (HIP) strategy with limited successes because of the inefficient allocation of 
investment resources to heavy industry and away from light industry and agriculture. 
Since 1986, Vietnam has switched to developing light industry. Nevertheless, trade 
deficits continued to rise over time because the country kept exporting relatively low 
value-added products while importing relatively high value-added products (most of 
which could not be produced domestically) to accelerate its industrialisation process. 
Although Vietnam’s dualistic trade regime has been more liberalised than before, it 
is still characterised as restrictive, protectionist and interventionist with favourable 
treatment given to domestic industries (especially domestic SOEs), but these 
protected agents did not expand strongly enough to lead the economy. Regarding the 
monetary policy, the SBV has been somewhat successful in controlling high levels of 
inflation by adopting a tight and/or prudential loosening monetary policy stance since 
Doi Moi. Nevertheless, the financial market as a whole has been hampered by too 
many administrative interventions by the SBV such that the distortion effects of such 
practice on banks’ decisions are worth worrying. 
Second, the SOE sector has long been receiving government preferential 
treatment, resulting in unfair competition such that investment capital has been 
inefficiently allocated to the SOE sector and away from the non-state enterprise 
(NSE) sector. Surprisingly, the SOE sector had lower contribution to aggregate 
output, employment and government tax revenues compared with the private sector. 
A majority of SOEs operated inefficiently in both managerial and productive areas 
because they did not follow market disciplines and were not seriously penalised for 
their failures, and because they were guided by multiple conflicting objectives which 
prioritised job security over profit maximisation. Therefore, SOE reforms were 
implemented, largely through equitisation, to improve the efficiency and 
competitiveness of SOEs. Overall, the SOE reform and equitisation processes have 
been slow and incomplete, regardless of the reduced number of SOEs. On the other 
hand, because the NSE sector is seen to be more efficient than the SOE sector, 
developing the private sector offers three main benefits including: (i) job creation; 
(ii) productivity improvement, which in turn increases labour incomes and reduces 
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poverty, especially poverty in rural areas; and (iii) absorption of labour redundancies 
resulting from SOE reforms. However, the PSD process has been slow because many 
obstacles still remain, especially the unfavourable government treatment of this 
sector. 
Third, privatisation has been a common practice aimed at improving firms’ 
efficiency and profitability. Governments around the world privatise SOEs because 
of their poor performance (or inefficiency) resulted from their pursuit of multiple 
conflicting objectives and soft budget constraints. On theoretical grounds, one of the 
main benefits offered by privatisation is to achieve efficiency gains, but these gains 
can be achieved only under competitive environments. In effect, privatisation 
increases unemployment in the short run, but decreases it in the medium and long 
runs. In addition, privatisation contributes to an increase in GDP growth and wage 
rates, through productivity improvements. However, the empirical literature shows 
that privatisation produces mixed results due to differences in research methods 
(each has certain methodological limitations), study periods, sample sizes, and 
degrees and types of privatisation (for instance, partial and/or mass privatisations), 
and also due to data constraints and the potential selection bias, which partly explain 
why some results cannot be generalised for the economies under examination.  
Fourth, the key objective of this thesis is to develop a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of Vietnam (referred to as VNGEM) to assess the likely 
effects of SOE reforms and the PSD policy on Vietnam’s national economic 
outcomes and industries. VNGEM is a comparative-static model, largely based on 
ORANI-G and ORANI. In essence, VNGEM represents the Vietnamese economy 
with twenty four industries producing twenty four commodities, which can be 
produced domestically or imported from abroad. There are four margin commodities, 
six labour groups by educational qualifications and one representative household. 
The choice of VNGEM in this thesis is aimed at closing several literature gaps as 
follows: (i) this thesis contributes to the literature of privatisation in a context of a 
transition economy like Vietnam, which has not been investigated at the macro level 
in any great detail; (ii) this thesis extends the current literature by investigating the 
impacts of Vietnam’s reform programs not only on GDP growth and employment, 
but also on many other macroeconomic variables in a general equilibrium context, 
such as the trade balance, exports and imports, investment and consumption; (iii) 
while previous studies investigate whether or not privatisation, as part of the reform 
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packages, generates positive, negative, or neutral effects on productivity, this thesis 
deliberately assumes the positive impacts of Vietnam’s reform programs not only on 
firms’ efficiency, but also on industries’ efficiency. It then investigates the likely 
impacts of such efficiency gains on industries, and on the macro-economy of 
Vietnam; (iv) although there are many CGE models applied to Vietnam (see Annex 
10), research into SOE reforms, particularly focused on the equitisation program and 
the PSD policy in Vietnam at the macro level remains under researched. This thesis 
extends the work of Chisari et al. (1999) by using more generalised CES (constant 
elasticity of substitution) functional forms in replacement of the Cobb-Douglas ones. 
It also extends the work of Pham and Mohnen (2012) by adopting a more realistic 
assumption of a small open economy of Vietnam; and (v) the use of VNGEM could 
simulate both short-run and long-run effects of SOE reforms on the Vietnamese 
economy. In addition, VNGEM identifies winners and losers from such reforms, and 
quantifies the general welfare effects on the overall Vietnamese economy. The 
decomposition technique in VNGEM provides detailed expositions of the sources of 
output growth such as an output expansion through the export channel, or the local 
market and domestic share channels. 
Finally, the simulation results show that efficiency gains resulted in relatively 
lower domestic price levels, thereby improving the competitiveness of the domestic 
producers in the export markets. Therefore, Vietnam’s ongoing reform programs are 
simulated to be pro-growth as output increases through three major channels 
including: (i) export expansion; (ii) increased domestic usage of goods and services; 
and (iii) substitution between imported and domestic sources in response to relative 
price changes. In the short run, based on the modelling assumptions, economic 
expansion results in increases in the aggregate employment, while export expansion 
results in a short-run trade surplus in Vietnam. Nevertheless, these positive effects on 
exports and aggregate employment will fade out in the long run, as modelled, when 
the economy presumably achieves its full employment level and a trade balance. 
Under the full employment assumption, the real wage will increase in the long run, 
leading to increases in labour incomes and household consumption representative of 
welfare gains.50  
                                                 
50 It is quite likely that the actual outcomes from the proposed microeconomic reform will lie 
somewhere in between the short-run and long-run as modelled. 
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Regarding industry employment, the demand for low-skilled workers grows 
at a faster rate than that for high-skilled workers in the short run. These short-run 
changes are quite consistent with the current labour market conditions in Vietnam, in 
which the former account for 70 per cent of total wage bill while the latter account 
for 30 per cent. By contrast, the demand for medium- and high-skilled workers will 
increase strongly in the long run, relative to that for low-skilled workers, because the 
fast-growing, capital-intensive industries will expand their long-run investment 
activities in accumulating more capital, machinery and equipment. To work with 
these newly-installed facilities, the economy needs to acquire more medium- and 
high-skilled workers in the long run. Further, VNGEM’s results indicate that the 
most favourably affected industries in the short run include Steel, Electrical and 
TCF, while the least favourably affected ones include Construct and PubAdmin. 
Likewise, the most favourably affected industries in the long run include Electrical, 
Steel and OtherManuf, while the least favourably affected ones include RicePad and 
OGP. Overall, VNGEM’s results are sufficiently robust to withstand changes in a 
number of key behavioural parameters in the model, as well as changes in the 
simulated value of the primary factor productivity. Besides, the results are consistent 
with some empirical studies in the literature, but contrast to or cannot be comparable 
directly with some other studies, largely because of differences in research 
methodologies and scope of analysis. 
7.3 Policy Implications 
7.3.1 Implications for Macroeconomic Policies (based on the review) 
Reducing Population and Regional Imbalances 
First, Vietnam’s large population size indicates that the country continues to 
have a young and dynamic labour force to accommodate its economic growth and 
development process. However, high population growth will also cause pressures on 
the labour market and increase the need for housing, health care and education. 
These potential problems need to be carefully considered in Vietnam’s future 
development plans. 
 Second, Vietnam’s industrialisation and modernisation has created a number 
of negative side effects, especially regional imbalances (including income gaps) 
between rich and poor regions, and between rural and urban areas. To reduce these 
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imbalances, the government should adjust its national investment policy to encourage 
both foreign and domestic investors to allocate their investment portfolios in 
productive areas with attractive rates of return rather than investing in less productive 
areas with high walls of government protection. Likewise, to reduce income gaps, the 
government needs to pay more attention to regional development and improve its 
taxation and social security systems, in order to redistribute incomes more 
effectively.  
Improving the SBV’s Autonomy and Its Forecasting Ability 
 The SBV should be given more freedom in designing and implementing its 
monetary policy. It also needs to improve its forecasting ability available when 
formulating and implementing its monetary policy. To combat inflation more 
effectively, the current money-supply (M2) targeting regime should be shifted 
towards another regime such as the interest targeting regime, which is commonly 
adopted in many advanced economies such as the U.S. and Australia. 
Reducing Dependence on External Finance 
In recent years, Vietnam becomes more dependent on external finance. 
Hence, there is a high probability that the country will be vulnerable to any external 
shocks, causing massive withdrawals of financial resources, especially FDI, to their 
home countries as in the cases of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2001 American 
terrorist attack and the recent 2008 global financial crisis.51 To overcome this, 
Vietnam needs to strengthen its BOPs, especially its trade balance. This in turn 
requires the country to make long-term investments (particularly relied on internal 
rather than external financial resources) in upgrading skills and technologies, in order 
to gain greater competitive advantage in the export and import markets.  
Elaborating on the Industrial and Trade Strategies 
As mentioned previously, trade deficits in Vietnam have continued to rise, 
even though the country has successfully shifted to developing light industry since 
1986. Instead of having a broad aim of developing all industries, Vietnam should 
have a specific aim of promoting industries that are capable of improving the trade 
                                                 
51 As discussed in sub-section 2.2.7 of Chapter 2, the average debt burden (measured by external debt 
plus implemented FDI divided by nominal GDP) was extremely high during 1990-94 and 1995-99 
(233.7 and 103.2 per cent of nominal GDP, respectively), which was reduced substantially to 40.4 per 
cent during 2005-09 and 43.4 per cent during 2010-11. 
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balance significantly. That is, Vietnam needs to have clear and comprehensive 
objectives instead of pursuing multiple but conflicting objectives.  
 In addition, the government needs to minimise its interventions in the market 
and remove favourable treatment of SOEs across all industries. Most noticeably, 
when practicing the picking-winners game, the government should pick the right 
winners since picking the wrong ones would be costly to the economy. So far, the 
results in this study suggest that the TCF industry should be chosen as one of the 
right winners to be promoted. For other industries that have long been receiving 
government subsidies, the government needs to establish a strict time frame as to 
when it will cut all of the subsidies and let those industries be exposed to the 
competitive forces in the economy.  
7.3.2 Implications for Microeconomic Reform Programs (based on CGE modelling) 
Prospects for Job Creation 
This thesis has shown that Vietnam’s microeconomic reform on domestic 
enterprises is pro-growth, as reflected in the increasing rates of growth in aggregate 
output and employment. Therefore, promoting the private sector and, at the same 
time, reforming the SOE sector (more effectively) can solve Vietnam’s employment 
problem, at least in the short run. According to the GSO (Various Issues), in 2009, 
the number of employed people was approximately 43.93 million. The projected 
short-run increase in aggregate employment is 2.97 per cent (see Table 6.1), 
indicating that those reform programs will create about 1.3 million more jobs in the 
short run (43.93 million x 0.0297 = 1.3 million). These new job opportunities are 
sufficiently high enough for satisfying the demand of 1 million new job seekers each 
year, according to Webster’s (1999) estimates.  
Nevertheless, there are doubts about Vietnam’s statistical data. Although the 
unemployment rate was reported to be around 2.38 per cent in 2009, the number of 
people not actively seeking jobs was surprisingly high (17.78 per cent of the total 
working population) (GSO, Various Issues). It means, if the real unemployment 
figure is revealed or if the people outside the labour market start to search for jobs, 
the primary factor productivity needs to be increased by far more than 5 per cent 
assumed in the modelling in this thesis. Detailed suggestions of how to achieve this 
will be addressed in sub-section 7.3.3 of this chapter. 
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Creating Conducive Policy Environment for Better-Performing Industries 
Vietnam’s microeconomic reform of domestic enterprises will improve the 
competitiveness of domestic producers through price reductions. Hence, they will 
perform well in the export markets and that export expansion will contribute greatly 
to Vietnam’s economic growth. Intuitively, the government should create conducive 
policy environment for the domestic export-oriented and export-related industries 
(such as the TCF industry). If the government is concerned about job creation, it 
should stop picking specific industries and letting some labour-intensive activities in 
agriculture and light industries (such as RicePad, Agriculture, Chemicals, Machinery 
and Electrical) to expand.  
Short- and Long-run Labour Training Schemes 
The simulation results in this study have shown that the demand for low- and 
medium-skilled workers will increase. Hence, the government should create 
opportunities for vocational training for workers. The demand for high-skilled 
workers will increase over time. The government should have a long-term plan to 
develop domestic human capital through education and R&D, in order to acquire a 
sufficient number of high-skilled personnel to work with new technologies, 
machinery and equipment into the future. To do this, the government should 
reallocate its spending budget towards these activities, which can be financed from 
two sources: (i) government savings from waste: in the short term, the government 
can cut wasteful subsidies on inefficient SOEs and reduce waste from idle capital 
stock within the state sector; and (ii) revenue from a broader tax base: in the long 
term, the government will have a broader tax base, and hence increased tax revenues, 
due to expanding economic activities in the private sector.   
7.3.3 Towards a More Effective Policy Environment 
Full Coverage of SOE Reforms 
 As mentioned in sub-section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3, SOE reforms have been 
applied only to small and unprofitable SOEs across many non-strategic industries, 
according to the ‘keeping the big and releasing the small’ principle. This has been 
one of the main causes of a slow and incomplete reform process. Such a reform 
principle is not appropriate any longer. To achieve greater reform outcomes, a full 
coverage of SOE reforms is required, which means SOE reforms should be extended 
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to include medium to large SOEs across all industries. In so doing, the total effect of 
productivity improvement will become significantly larger, contributing more to 
increases in real GDP and aggregate employment, as shown in sub-section 6.4 of 
Chapter 6.  
Promoting the Private Sector 
Unarguably, the private sector has become more dynamic and more efficient 
in contributing to aggregate output, employment and government tax revenues. 
Therefore, the government needs to realise and promote its increasingly important 
role in the economy. Some useful proposals for PSD have already been discussed in 
sub-section 3.3.4 of Chapter 3. Essentially, the government’s PSD policy needs to be 
effective enough to generate some quality effect for NSEs to expand to their full 
potential. As a pre-condition, this requires a complete removal of the government’s 
preferential treatment of the SOE sector. It means a level playing field needs to be 
established such that all economic agents will be given a fair chance to do businesses 
and compete equally with each other.  
 In addition, the government needs to establish some business forums and 
business organisations as essential venues for NSEs to obtain useful information and 
seek opportunities to collaborate with other enterprises. Besides, the government 
needs to provide some training centres for upgrading skills and knowledge. Equally 
important, private enterprises should be given more chances to gain access to land 
and credit, similar to SOEs, because they also need those scarce resources for 
expansion.  
Speeding Up SOE Reforms 
To speed up the SOE reform process, Vietnam can learn from China’s 
experience, especially with respect to the equitisation of SOEs (Garnaut et al., 2005). 
First, the reform in China started in 1992 at the local level, which means local 
government was given a greater role in participating in the equitisation process. In 
the initial stage, China also equitised SOEs based on the ‘keeping the big and 
releasing the small’ principle. To accelerate the equitisation process, an increasing 
number of better performing SOEs and those with greater net assets were more likely 
to be equitised first because they would be more able to compensate workers and 
settle their debt liabilities. It means that for Vietnam, encouraging the participation of 
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local government might make the equitisation process more flexible, while equitising 
large SOEs first might reduce significantly the costs of equitisation. 
Second, to compensate SOE employees who lost their jobs due to 
equitisation, the Chinese government established a number of supporting funds 
including: (i) state asset exit funds; (ii) SOE bankruptcy provisional funds; and (iii) 
funds to assist retailers to prepare for enterprise reform. Further, China at a time 
introduced a new social security system covering the urban labour force only, but 
abandoned it after a few years. Key components of this system included: (i) a 
pension system providing pension funds and saving schemes; (ii) a medical insurance 
system; (iii) an unemployment insurance system; and (iv) a social relief system 
providing minimum living allowances to unemployed workers. In addition, the 
Chinese government established some re-employment centres to take the 
unemployed workers and provided them with minimum living expenses, training and 
job information. Besides, there were regulations outlining the benefits or 
compensation encouraging SOE employees to take early retirement, resign or take 
unpaid holidays. Likewise, tax holidays, deductions from taxable incomes, and some 
extra subsidies were also given to former SOE employees, who started their own 
businesses, or given to new enterprises employing a large number of former SOE 
workers. These newly-established firms were also assisted with business registration 
and access to bank loans.  
These suggest that the Vietnamese government could also establish attractive 
compensation and incentive schemes, in order to convince SOE employees to not 
resist the equitisation process, but accept and support it. In fact, Vietnam has already 
established the equitisation funds (EFs) and the worker redundancy fund (WRF) in 
1999 and 2002, respectively, for accommodating the equitisation process. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in Box 7.1, these funds have not been fully utilised in an 
efficient manner because: (i) idle funds remain significantly large; and (ii) these 
funds have not been adequately used and managed. Hence, it is suggested that the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) needs to coordinate effectively with the state capital 
investment corporation (SCIC), in order to deliver better equitisation results. Further, 
instead of wastefully subsidising SOEs and equitised SOEs, these funds need to be 
redirected towards: (i) compensating the adversely-affected workers and other 
creditors; (ii) providing more effective training and re-training facilities; and (iii) 
promoting the role of outside investors in the equitisation process. 
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Third, the Chinese government promoted the private sector and encouraged 
its participation in the equitisation process as a means to absorb the burden of SOE 
reforms. Evidence suggested that outside investors were more likely to care about 
efficiency, lay off workers and strengthen the firm’s internal management. As a 
result, equitisation involving outside investors was generally more productive than 
other forms of equitisation because outside investors injected new capital and 
dynamism to the firm, and also because they could redeploy employees more 
efficiently and effectively. Therefore, Vietnam should continue to promote the 
private sector by creating a policy environment that will improve the quality, rather 
than quantity, of PSD. 
 Fourth, similar to China, Vietnam should improve the fairness and 
transparency of the equitisation process by imposing regulations on: (i) the disclosure 
of information; (ii) the establishment of an orderly process of ownership 
transformation; and (iii) the expansion of the role of outside investors. Further, the 
process of transferring property rights must be made public and competitive through 
auctioning, public bidding and agreed transfer. With respect to asset valuation, 
Vietnam should establish a number of asset management companies (AMCs) acting 
as independent valuation professionals. To encourage more buyers of the state assets, 
the Vietnamese government should give them discounts for assuming more social 
obligations such as paying workers’ compensation and other related payments, or to 
redeploy employees in ways that minimise the number of layoffs.   
 Fifth, in Vietnam inside buyers of state assets are authorised to participate in 
the equitisation process, especially management buyouts (MBOs), similar to China. 
It may happen that some managers of equitised SOEs deliberately run the firms down 
before equitisation, in order to lower the equitisation prices. To prevent this moral 
hazard, poor-performing managers must be prohibited from buying state assets and, 
at the same time, outside buyers should be encouraged to compete in purchasing 
these equitised SOEs. In other instances, some SOEs subject to reform may use 
bankruptcy to evade paying back debt. Therefore, the Vietnamese government must 
not process bankruptcy cases if the main intention is to escape debt. Further, there 
must be some regulations aimed at strengthening the firms’ management of their debt 
liabilities and preventing them from avoiding paying debt. Generally, any 
equitisation plan needs mutual agreement among workers and creditors before it can 
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be implemented to ensure that workers will be fairly compensated and creditors will 
be guaranteed receipt of their debt repayments. 
 Sixth, following China’s experience, Vietnam needs a new structure of 
corporate governance to provide checks and balances in an enterprise. This new 
model should consist of three main components: (i) a shareholder conference to 
make decisions on investment and profit distribution; (ii) a board of directors to 
undertake audit functions; and (iii) a board of supervisors to investigate the firm’s 
financial health. Such a model may create a power sharing between the shareholders, 
the board of directors and management. The model also suggests firms appoint some 
legal representatives to handle complicated legal issues and ensure that all business 
activities are legitimate. In addition, the chief executive officer and the chairman 
must be two separate people to prevent any conflict of interests and moral hazards. 
Ideally, firms need to establish a reward system or incentive policies to reward 
managers and employees who deliver outstanding performance. The reward can be in 
the form of shares and bonuses determined by the board of directors instead of 
management. 
 Finally, there remains an unresolved problem with respect to the managerial 
appointment practice in Vietnam. It commonly happens that SOE mangers can be 
transferred suddenly to other SOEs based on political criteria without taking into 
account the interests of the company and its shareholders. In fact, SOEs and equitised 
SOEs can run very well if they are willing to hire professional managers from the 
private sector. Therefore, there is no need for the Vietnamese government to interfere 
in the firms’ decisions, especially on managerial appointment, employment and wage 
rates. Instead, there should be appropriate institution and regulatory framework to 
deal with the employment and wage-related issues. In other words, the Vietnamese 
government needs to reduce its political interference and let the new corporate 
governance in equitised SOEs function independently. Ideally, the government 
should withdraw its direct involvement in economic activities and focus on 






Box 7.1- Vietnam’s equitisation funds and worker redundancy fund 
 In 1999, Vietnam established the equitisation funds (EFs) for supporting SOE re-arrangement 
and equitisation. The EFs’ aims were: (i) to provide training and re-training for redundant workers and 
help them find new employment opportunities; (ii) to provide subsidies for employees who voluntarily 
terminate their labour contracts or lose their jobs from the equitisation process; (iii) to help equitised 
SOEs’ employees buy shares at preferential prices; and (iv) to provide additional capital to SOEs or 
equitised SOEs as directed by the state-approved plans.  
 By October 2001, the EFs’ total budget amounted to $US62.28 million while total 
expenditures amounted to $US26.32 million, indicating a surplus of $US35.97 million. A large 
proportion of the funds was spent on equitisation costs, followed by financial subsidies for SOEs and 
investment subsidies for equitised SOEs ($US11.62 million, $US9.94 million and $US2.91 million, 
respectively). Clearly, the government paid less attention to the provision of training and re-training, 
subsidies for redundant workers and other related worker compensation schemes, which altogether 
accounted for only $US1.84 million. This explains why the fund was in a big surplus of $US35.97 
million (Annex 14).  
 In 2002 Vietnam established the worker redundancy fund (WRF) for subsidising redundant 
workers due to SOE re-arrangement and equitisation. (The structure of revenues and expenditures of 
this fund is not discussed here since it is somewhat similar to that of the EFs). By December 2005, it 
was estimated that each redundant worker received an average subsidy of $VN30-40 million. In 
effect, the EFs and WRF were said to play a significant role in accelerating the equitisation process in 
the period 1999-2006.  
 Recently, two major changes were made by the government regarding the use and 
management of these funds. First, Decree 110 in 2007 terminated the operation of the WRF. Second, 
due to serious misuse of funds at the local level, Decree 187 in 2004 abolished the local EFs, but the 
central EFs still remained operative. In 2007, Decree 109 was issued to replace Decree 187, putting 
the central EFs under the SCIC’s management. In 2008, Decision 113 was issued to authorise the 
MoF to supervise the management and usage of the EFs while, at the same time, the SCIC managed 
and used the central EFs under the MoF’s guidance and supervision.    
Source: Nguyen (2010). 
7.4 Limitations and Focuses for Future Research 
Inevitably, there are several methodological limitations in this thesis. First, 
VNGEM does not disaggregate the industries to consist of the SOE sector and the 
private sector, in order to distinguish each sector’s contribution to the economy. It is 
obvious that SOEs and NSEs are coexistent in most industries in Vietnam. The SOE 
sector is believed to capture smaller output, employment and investment shares in 
non-strategic industries (such as agriculture and manufacturing), but larger shares in 
strategic industries (such as OGP, telecommunication and public utilities). To 
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advance the analysis, it is necessary to calculate each sector’s shares in the economy, 
but this is not an easy task since firm-specific and industry-specific data for Vietnam 
is not always available.  
Second, although one of the sensitivity tests shows that VNGEM’s results are 
sufficiently robust to withstand changes in several behavioural parameters, it is 
necessary to update such parameters to provide more accurate results. This requires 
substantial econometric works, which are far beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Likewise, it is also necessary to update the I-O database. The latest I-O database 
(namely, the 2010 version) is available by the time this thesis progresses to the final 
stage. Hence, it is too late to use this latest version since processing the raw I-O table 
is very time consuming. Anyway, VNGEM’s results are still valid, provided that 
there are not many significant structural changes in the Vietnamese economy from 
2005 to 2010. This condition may hold, given the fact that structural changes in 
Vietnam happen very slowly through time.  
Third, VNGEM is limited by its statics nature. Future works may employ a 
dynamic model, which has more powerful analytical ability. For instance, such 
model can show the dynamic adjustments of the capital stock and the employment 
level. In addition, VNGEM simulates the results by arbitrarily increasing the primary 
factor productivity by 5 per cent. To provide a better analysis, a dynamic model can 
distribute the rate of change in productivity (for instance, from 2005 to 2010) more 
flexibly, which in turn can be used to simulate and produce more useful projections.  
Fourth, VNGEM cannot effectively isolate the impacts of SOE reforms and 
the PSD policy. Future works can redress this limitation by modelling changes in the 
government budget and the dynamic adjustment in output, employment and 
investment from the SOE sector toward the NSE sector, in order to reflect the 
reduced role of the former and the increasing role of the latter.  
Fifth, VNGEM does not address the non-profit-maximising behaviour and the 
monopoly power of most SOEs. To improve the model, future works need to address 
one or all of these issues, taking into account the wage and price differentials 
between the SOE sector and NSE sector across all industries.  
Finally, VNGEM does not incorporate the impact of the Vietnamese stock 
market on privatisation and on the whole economy. Future works may address this 
issue to provide a better analysis. One of the problems facing research scholars is 
that, the Vietnamese stock market has been actually developed for a decade or so, 
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and is still in its infancy stage. Hence, it may be difficult to gain access to complete, 
accurate data and other related information for use in the model. In addition, there is 
relatively poor theoretical and empirical literature on the Vietnamese stock market 
and its impacts on privatisation and on the whole economy, making it difficult to 
communicate the potential findings with other related studies. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1- World’s 20 Most Populous Countries as of 2011 
Rank Country Population 
1 China 1,336,718,015 
2 India 1,189,172,906 
3 United States 311,705,000 
4 Indonesia 245,613,043 
5 Brazil 203,429,773 
6 Pakistan 176,554,000 
7 Nigeria 155,215,573 
8 Bangladesh 150,863,000 
9 Russia 138,739,892 
10 Japan 126,475,664 
11 Mexico 112,336,538 
12 Philippines 101,833,938 
13 Ethiopia 90,873,739 
14 Vietnam 87,375,000 
15 Germany 81,471,834 
16 Egypt 80,492,000 
17 Turkey 78,785,548 
18 Iran 75,448,000 
19 Congo 71,712,867 
20 Thailand 66,720,153 
Source: NationMaster (Various Issues). 
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Annex 2- Vietnam’s Poor Industry Performance (1960-1985) 
During the period 1960-85 the government failed to provide the necessary 
infrastructure and skilled workers to support heavy industry (Vo, 1990). Hence, 
heavy industry could not deliver the expected performance. Worse still, the over-
emphasis on industry, especially heavy industry, led to unbalanced growth between 
industry and agriculture, and between heavy and light industries. In other words, 
agriculture and light industry suffered seriously from this over-emphasis on heavy 
industry, leading to unbalanced economic structure and wasteful and inefficient 
investments. Consequently, heavy industry grew at the expense of the agriculture and 
light industry.  
Table A1 illustrates the poor performance of the industry sector (including 
light and heavy industry) in the period 1976-85 as a result of the unsuccessful HIP 
strategy. First, industrial production in 1980 was lower than that in 1976, with 
considerable declines in almost all industrial products. Coal production declined 
from 5.7 million tons in 1976 to 5.2 million tons in 1980. Other industrial products 
exhibited the same pattern as coal, except for electricity where output increased from 
3.1 billion kWh in 1976 to 3.7 billion kWh in 1980. For all products, the government 
failed to achieve all of its planned targets in 1980 as determined in the second FYP. 
Further, Vietnam faced severe economic hardship in the period 1979-80 because of 
engagement in two destructive wars against the Khmer Rouge in 1978 and China in 
February, 1979. 
Second, the industry’s performance in the period 1981-85 was better than in 
the previous period. Cement production grew strongly from 0.6 million tons in 1981 
to 1.5 million tons in 1985. Likewise, rolled steel production increased sharply from 
36.1 thousand tons in 1981 to 61.6 thousand tons in 1985. Other industrial products 
exhibited the same pattern, except for coal where output declined slightly from 6 
million tons in 1981 to 5.7 million tons in 1985. Nevertheless, none of the output 
targets were met in 1985, except for cigarettes and sugar and molasses where outputs 






Table A1- Output of Some Industrial Products, 1976- 1985 
 1976 1980 1981 1985 
  Target Actual  Target Actual 
Heavy industry       
Coal (million tons) 5.7 10.0 5.2 6.0 8- 9 5.7 
Electricity (billion kWh) 3.1 5.0 3.7 3.8 5.5- 6 5.2 
Rolled steel (thousand tons) 63.8 N/A N/A 36.1 72.2 61.6 
Steel (million metres) 63.8 300.0 63.5 N/A N/A N/A 
Phosphate fertilisers (million tons) 0.28 N/A N/A 0.17 0.35-0.4 0.32 
Chemical fertilisers (million tons) 0.43 1.3 0.36 N/A N/A N/A 
Cement (million tons) 0.74 2.00 0.64 0.60 2.00 1.50 
Light Industry       
Cloth & silk (million metres) 218.0 450.0 174.4 167.0 380-400 374.3 
Sugar & molasses (thousand tons) 72.8 N/A N/A 201.7 350-400 401.7 
Cigarettes (million packages) 404.2 N/A N/A 545.3 1,000.0 1,050.6 
Paper & cardboard (thousand tons) 75.0 130.0 48.3 45.2 90-100 78.5 
Note: Data was compiled and re-edited to align with the discussion. N/A = Not Available. 
Source: Vo (1990). 
Finally, the implementation of the HIP strategy involved substantial amounts 
of imported inputs, such as raw materials and equipment, most of which could not be 
produced domestically. This led to persistent trade deficits in the period 1976-87 
because Vietnam’s imports of material inputs always exceeded exports due to the 
increasing demand for capital accumulation. Trade deficits increased remarkably 
from $US659.6 million during 1976-80 to $US1.34 billion during 1985-87 (Table 
A2).  
Table A2- Vietnam’s Trade Balance ($US million, Period Average), 1976-1987 
 1976-80 1981-85 1986-87 
Trade Balance -659.6 -778.4 -1,340.5 
Exports 412.4 574.6 832.5 
Imports -1,072.0 -1,353.0 -2,173.0 
Note: Data was compiled and re-edited to align with the discussion.  
Source: Vo (1990). 
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Annex 3- Vietnam’s Improvement in Industry Performance (1986-88) 
As shown in Table A3, Vietnam’s gross industrial production increased 
steadily from $VN112.5 billion in 1986 to $VN132.3 billion in 1988. In this period, 
light industry began to play a leading role in the economy. Its output increased from 
$VN76.6 billion in 1986 to $VN93 billion in 1988, while heavy industry’s output 
increased from $VN35.8 billion to $VN39.3 billion in the same period. The four 
largest industries in this period were food and foodstuffs; construction; weaving, 
leather and dyeing; and machinery.   
Table A3- Industrial Production ($VN million at 1982 prices), 1986-88 
 1986 1987 1988 
Gross industrial production 112,451 121,410 132,336 
By sector    
Heavy industry 35,862 37,625 39,335 
Light industry 76,589 83,785 93,001 
By industrial branches    
Energy, combustibles 7,059 7,714 N/A 
Metallurgy 1,594 1,567 N/A 
Machinery 16,178 18,221 N/A 
Chemicals 10,815 11,736 N/A 
Construction 22,962 23,670 N/A 
Food & foodstuffs 30,495 32,732 N/A 
Weaving, leather & dyeing 18,835 20,116 N/A 
Other industries 4,058 5,169 N/A 
Note: Data was compiled and re-edited to align with the discussion. N/A = Not Available. 
Source: Vo (1990).
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Annex 4- Vietnam’s Trade Reform in the Period 1987-98 
Year Changes in Trade and Exchange System 
1987 * Law on Foreign Investment — introduction of open-door policy 
  
1988 * Foreign exchange control decree liberalises retention of foreign exchange, opening of 
foreign currency accounts, use of transfers to pay for imports and repay foreign loans 
* Devaluation of trade and invisible payments exchange rates 
* Restrictions on establishment of foreign trading organisations relaxed and central 
government monopoly of foreign trade terminated 
* Law on Import and Export Duties introduces the customs tariffs 
  
1989 * Quotas removed on all but ten export and 14 import commodities (subsequently reduced to 
seven export and 12 import commodities 
* Requirement that SOEs fulfil CMEA export targets before exporting to convertible currency 
area removed 
* Number of export commodities subject to export duties reduced from 30 to 12 and most 
rates reduced 
* Producers of exportables allowed to sell to any appropriately licensed foreign trade 
company 
* Number of import commodities subject to duties reduced from 124 to 80, range of rates 
expanded from 5–50 per cent to 5–120 per cent 
* Foreign exchange rate system unified 
* All budgetary export subsidies removed 
  
1990 * Special sales tax introduced 
* Turnover tax and profit tax introduced 
* Law on Foreign Investment revised 
* Special import duties imposed on selected goods such as mopeds and tourist vehicles 
* General export–import companies required to register with regulatory organisation for 
individual commodities 
* Exports of certain commodities limited to members of relevant exporters associations 
  
1991 * Foreign exchange trading floors opened at SBV 
* Regulation on setting up export processing zones (EPZs) promulgated 
* Export duty on rice reduced from 10 per cent to 1 per cent 
* Imported inputs used to produce exports exempted from duty 
* Private companies allowed to directly engage in international trade 
  
1992 * Harmonised system of tariff nomenclature introduction 
* Foreign investment law amended to reduce discrimination in favour of joint ventures 
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* 100 per cent foreign owned enterprises permitted, and the introduction of build-operate-
transfer (BOT) concept for infrastructure projects 
* Trade agreement signed with European Union (EU) establishes quota on exports of textiles 
and clothing to EU and grants tariff preference on selected imports from EU 
  
1993 * Export shipment licensing relaxed− six monthly licenses issued for 22 export commodities 
* 90-day duty suspension system for inputs into export production introduced 
* Tariff and revenue laws amended to add provisions for other than normal importation (such 
as, goods in transit) 
* Vietnam joins Customs Cooperation Council 
* United Nations (UN) layout key for customs declaration adopted 
  
1994 * Elimination of import permits for all but 15 products 
* Responsibility to initiate change in tariff passes from MoF to MoT 
* Vietnam gains GATT observer status 
* Introduction of interbank foreign exchange market 
* Steps in process of licensing to engage in international trade reduced from three to two 
* Duty exemption system for exports extended to suspend duty payments for 90 days 
* Export shipment licensing further relaxed− completely lifted for all commodities except 
rice, timber and petroleum 
1995 * Coverage of export quotas reduced to one commodity− rice 
* Export tax rates raised on 11 products 
* Vietnam joins ASEAN and accedes to protocols of membership of AFTA 
* Reduction in number of turnover tax rates from 18 to 11 
* Requirement for importers to get import permits on a by-shipment basis eliminated for a 
wide range of consumer and producer goods 
* Range of goods subject to management by import quota reduced to seven 
* 1996 List of goods under the common effective preferential tariff (CEPT) for AFTA 
promulgated (involves no change in duties) 
* Major reorganisation of ministries establishes leading role for the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment in approval and regulation of foreign investment 
  
1996 * Maximum tariff rate reduced to 80 per cent special sales tax imposed at rates up to 100 per 
cent on imported (but not locally produced) passenger cars following reduction in tariff rate 
* List of commodities under CEPT of AFTA for 1997 promulgated 
* New Law on Foreign Investment reduces scope of import duty exemptions for foreign 
investment projects 
* Inward foreign exchange remittance tax lifted  




1997 * Decree allocates rice export quotas to Provincial People’s Committees as well as agencies 
under central management thus opening the way for direct export by the private sector. All 
restrictions on domestic trade in rice abolished 
* Imports of sugar prohibited. Number of goods subject to import quotas to achieve natural 
balances increases 
* Temporary prohibitions imposed on imports of wide range of consumer goods then lifted 
* Approval of certain foreign investment projects decentralised to selected peoples’ 
committees and industrial zones 
* Import stamp system introduced as anti-smuggling measure 
  
1998 * Forward and swap foreign exchange transactions authorised 
* Foreign invested enterprises allowed to export goods not specified in investment license 
* Highest tariff rate reduced to 60 per cent 
* Informal road map of CEPT tariff reductions to 2006 issued 
* List of commodities under CEPT for 1998 promulgated, completing coverage of inclusion 
list 
* Management of imports of most consumer goods shifted to tariffs rather than quotas or 
licensing 
* Decision to allocate rice export and fertiliser import quotas to private sector enterprises 
announced 
* Domestic enterprises authorised to directly export production without an export/import 
license 
* Partial surrender requirements imposed on enterprises holding foreign exchange accounts 
* Restrictions imposed on imports of alcohol 
* Use of minimum price list for valuation of imports by foreign invested enterprises 
terminated 
* Amendment to import/export tax law introduces 3- schedule tariff, and provision for 
antidumping and countervailing duty 
* Special sales tax amended, partially extending tax to local motor vehicles, increasing rates 
on luxuries 
* General conditions and procedures for Vietnamese enterprises to undertake international 
trading activities simplified with elimination of requirement for licensing by Ministry of 
Trade 
Source: CIE (1998, p. 5). 
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Annex 5- Summary of Tariff-related Regulations and Decrees  
Regulation Date Content 
Decree 33/CP  19/ 04/ 94 State management of import and export operations. 
Provides general provisions for import and export 
20 TC/TCT  16/ 03/ 95 Import and/or export tax exemptions for foreign investors 
640 TCHQ/KTTT  03/ 04/ 95 Guidance of import and/or export tax exemption or 
reduction for foreign capitalised enterprises 
615 TC/TCT/QD  10/ 06/ 95 Amendments of names and tax rates of some commodity 
categories in the import and export tariff 
615A TC/TCT/QD  10/ 07/ 95 List of tariff changes to go with 615 TC/TCT/QD 
293-NQ/UBTVQH9  08/ 11/ 95 Amending import tax rates. Provides list of commodities 
having tariff rates reduced 
1188 TC/QD/TCT   20/ 11/ 95 List of tariff changes 
1220 TC/QD/TCT  28/ 11/ 95 Amendment to import tariff on cement 
1233 TC/TCT/QD  09/ 12/ 95 Amendment of tax rates of some commodity groups in the 
import tariff. Provides list of rate changes 
1234A TC/QD/TCT  09/ 12/ 95 Amendment to tariff rate for heading 240300 (tobacco) 
1324 TC/QD/TCT  21/ 12/ 95 Amendment to tariff rate on fuels 
146 TC/QD/TCT  01/ 03/ 96 Amendments to minimum price list 
18/CP  04/ 04/ 96 Regarding import tariff reduction against EU 
397 TC/QD/TCT  19/ 04/ 96 Amendments to tariff rates. 
443 TC/QD/TCT  04/ 05/ 96 Amendments to tariff rates 
542 TC/QD/TCT  12/ 06/ 96 Amendments to tariff rates 
659A TC/QD/TCT  25/ 07/ 96 Amendments to tariff rates 
856 TC/QD/TCT  11/ 09/ 96 Amendments to tariff rates 
861A TC/QD/TCT  15/ 09/ 96 Amendments to tariff rates 
02 TC/QD/TCT  02/ 01/ 97 Amendments to tariff rates 
242 TC/QD TCT  26/ 03/ 97 Amendments to tariff rates 
257 TC/QD/TCT  31/ 03/ 97 Amendments to tariff rates 
320 TC/QD/TCT  07/ 05/ 97 Amendments to tariff rates 
496A TC/QD/TCT  15/ 07/ 97 Amendments to tariff rates 
516 TC/QD/TC  21/ 07/ 97 Amendments to tariff rates 
590 TC/QD/TCT  15/ 08/ 97 Amendments to tariff rates 
848 TC/QD/TCT  01/ 11/ 97 Amendments to tariff rates 
103/1998/QD/BTC  01/ 02/ 98 Amendments to tariff rates 
Source: CIE (1998, p. 38). 
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Annex 6- Tariff Rates (%) on Consumer and Other Goods by Industry 









Mining  0.0 2.4 0.0 108.9 
Tobacco  50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Petroleum refineries  0.0 27.8 0.0 82.2 
Petroleum & coal products  5.0 10.6 0.0 93.3 
Glass & glass products  1.0 22.8 0.0 67.0 
Other non-metallic mineral products  30.0 14.3 0.0 79.2 
Iron & steel basic metal industries  0.0 7.2 0.0 191.1 
Non ferrous basic metal industries  40.0 1.6 0.0 304.0 
Wood, cork & products  42.2 11.0 9.8 122.8 
Paper & paper products  36.2 14.9 17.3 79.2 
Beverages  48.9 38.8 19.8 50.3 
Textiles  38.6 13.0 26.7 87.2 
Footwear  44.0 0.0 27.3 0.0 
Wearing apparel  43.6 0.0 29.4 0.0 
Metal products nec  25.5 11.8 43.4 91.5 
Ceramic products  35.1 1.0 46.6 0.0 
Motorcycles  43.0 30.0 47.4 52.7 
Non electrical machinery  27.2 5.6 54.3 189.7 
Wooden furniture & fixtures  25.0 10.0 60.0 0.0 
Electrical machinery  26.5 10.3 61.8 113.1 
Food manufacturing  24.3 11.5 62.9 89.0 
Plastic products nec  26.2 15.7 65.2 72.0 
Other manufacturing  19.8 2.0 78.7 92.9 
Rubber products  15.5 20.5 82.1 84.6 
Motor vehicles  78.6 22.6 84.1 123.0 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing  10.5 9.7 90.5 102.0 
Scientific equipment  16.4 5.7 93.5 180.3 
Leather products  18.2 5.9 93.6 30.7 
Printing and publishing  16.3 10.0 106.6 141.4 
Other transport equipment  22.5 0.0 110.6 0.0 
Industrial chemicals  0.3 1.9 152.8 185.8 
Other chemical products  10.7 8.3 159.1 118.7 
All items  24.2 13.8 82.5 123.2 
Source: CIE (1998, p. 43). 
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Annex 7- Import-Substituting Activities Allowed to Purchase Foreign Exchange 
 Import-Substituting Activities 
1 Milk and diary products  
2 Laminated steel  
3 Wheat flour  
4 Coated steel  
5 Vegetable oil 
6 Steel pipes  
7 Sugar  
8 Steel housing frames 
9 Animal feed  
10 Metal roofing 
11 Cement  
12 Aluminium structures for construction 
13 Lubricant oil  
14 Metal and plastic boxes 
15 Bitumen 
16 Electrical transformers  
17 Phosphoric acid, hydrochloric acid, glutamine acid 
18 Electrical equipment 
19 Sodium hydroxide  
20 Electricity control panels 
21 Sodium carbonate  
22 Electric lamps  
23 Chemicals for the production of soap and detergent 
24 Starters for fluorescent bulbs 
25 Chemicals used in construction 
26 Electricity cables  
27 Vaccines  
28 TVs  
29 Fertilisers  
30 Radios, cassette players 
31 Pesticides  
32 Bulbs and components 
33 Paints and raw material for the production of paint 
34 Electronic components 
35 PVC for the production of plastic articles 
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36 Gasoline or diesel engines  
37 Tyres and tubes for cars, tractors and motorcycles 
38 Electricity and water meters 
39 Natural fibres  
40 Disposable plastic syringes 
41 All types of medical equipment  
42 Mechanical equipment and industrial moulds 
43 Kraft packaging paper 
44 Handling machines (including lifts and escalators) 
45 Fabrics, including fabrics used in the production of tyres 
46 Agricultural machinery  
47 Garment materials  
48 Cars  
49 Construction glass and industrial glass 
50 Motorcycles 
51 Neutral bottles made of glass and PET bottles 
Source: CIE (1998, p. 32). 
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Annex 8- Vietnam’s Trade Reform in the Period 1999-2009 
Year Trade Policy Changes 
1999 * A value added tax (VAT) introduced in January 1999 (in place of the cascading 
turnover tax), along with a special sales tax (levied on cars, gasoline, cigarettes, 
beer and other alcoholic beverages, and a few other items) 
* The number of commodities under quantitative restrictions increased (from nine 
to 17) as a temporary measure to avert balance of payments pressure in the wake of 
the East Asian crisis 
* The suspension periods for duty payments on imported inputs under the duty 
rebate scheme extended to 275 days 
* Foreign exchange surrender requirement reduced from 80 per cent to 50 per cent 
  
2000 * The bilateral trade agreement with the US signed in July, paving the way for 
MFN accession of Vietnamese exports to the US market and gradual opening up of 
the Vietnamese economy trade in goods and services, and investment from the US 
  
2001 * The USBTA comes into effect on 10 December, granting Vietnam MFN status in 
the US market, resulting in an immediate reduction in US tariff on imports from 
Vietnam from around 40 per cent to 4 per cent 
* A Five Year Import-Export Regime that significantly advances the removal of 
quantitative restrictions (QR) announced (April) with a view to providing a more 
stable export–import regime and provide a road map for elimination of QRs and 
other trade measures 
* All legal entities (companies and individuals) permitted to export most goods 
without having to acquire special licenses 
* QRs on liquor, clinker, paper, floor tiles, construction glass, some types of steel 
and vegetable oils removed 
* Some tariff commitments under AFTA implemented in January: 713 items 
transferred from the Temporary Exclusion List (TEL) to the Inclusion List (IL), 
leaving 1200 items still in the TEL (these are expected to be moved to IL by 2003) 
* The foreign exchange surrender requirement for exporters reduced from 50 per 
cent to 40 per cent of realised export proceeds effective May 2001 
* On 3 October 2001 the US Senate passes legislation implementing the landmark 
bilateral trade agreement between the US and Vietnam (the Agreement signed on 
13 July 2000). The National Assembly ratifies the agreement in November 
* A resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the Party in August 2001, calls 
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for an accelerated phasing out of the dual pricing system (much of which originally 
authorised to take place in 1999) as well as further streamlining of licensing and 
administrative procedures for FIEs. The dual pricing system for foreign investors to 
be phased out by 2003 for almost all charges and fees, except those for power, 
which are to be removed by 2004 
* A new Customs Law announced in October with the aim of improving customs 
operation and customs clearance 
* QRs on construction glass, remaining steel products and vegetable oil replaced by 
tariffs in December (with effect from 1 January) 
* A revised tariff schedule announced (in November) to reflect tariffs for goods on 
which QRs were removed 
* All legal entities (individuals and companies) permitted to export most goods 
without a license (under the Decree 44/2001/ND-CP, August 2001) 
  
2002 * FIEs granted the right to export commodities other than those they produce 
(January) 
* Under the AFTA commitments, an additional 498 items transferred from the TEL 
to the Inclusion List, leaving 719 items still in the TEL. Of the 5568 items now in 
the IL, 65 per cent are subject to a tariff rate between 0 and 5 per cent and the 
remainder to an average tariff rate of 16.4 per cent (November) 
* Quotas on motorcycles and certain parts thereof, and passenger vehicles with up 
to nine seats abolished (December) 
  
2003 * The last tranche of tariff lines in the Temporary Exclusion List under CEPT 
transferred to the Inclusion List 
* A list of seven agricultural commodities subject to tariff rate quotas (TRQs) 
announced on 9 August by Decision No. 91/2003/QD: raw milk (HS 0401), 
condensed milk (0402), poultry eggs (0407), maize (1005), raw tobacco (2401), salt 
(2501) and cotton (5201, 5202, 5203). The last three items to come under TRQs 
with effect from 1 July 2003 and the Ministry of Trade assigned the responsibility 
for introducing TRQs on the remaining four commodities depending on conditions 
of domestic production and foreign trade 
* Within quota and beyond quota tariff for tobacco, salt and cotton imports 
announced on 7 August (Decision 126/2003/QD-TTg) 
* Issued the tariff schedule under the ASEAN CEPT program for the period 2003 
to 2006 (Ministry of Finance Decision No. 78/2003/ND-CP) 
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* Issued the MFN tariff schedule based on 8-digit ASEAN Harmonised Tariff 
Nomenclature (AHTN) (Ministry of Finance Decision No. 110/2003/QD/BTC) 
  
2004 * EU-Vietnam bilateral agreement on WTO accession 
* Almost all import quotas were eliminated, except raw tobacco, salt, cotton, 
condensed and non-condensed milk, maize, seed and chicken eggs 
  
2005 * New/amended Law on Commerce and Trade 
* Aimed at creating a market economy, protecting free trade, ensuring legal 
transparency and harmonisation with international legal standards 
  
2006 * Final bilateral agreements for WTO accession reached, CEPT/AFTA 
requirements should be fulfilled 
  
2007 * WTO accession on January 11, 2007 
* Improved trading relations with about 150 WTO members 
* The effective rate of protection decreased from 59.5 per cent in 1997 to 26.2 per 
cent in 2001 and further decreased to 20.43 per cent in 2006 and 16.93 per cent at 
the time of WTO accession 
  
2008 * Signed a less expansive FTA with Japan, which committed to eliminate tariffs on 
93 per cent of goods exported from ASEAN 
* Signed a preferential trading deal with Laos People’s Democratic Republic 
focusing on import tariff reductions 
* Signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan on trade, financial 
services, and migration 
  
2009 * Signed a comprehensive free trade deal (implemented by the end of 2009) with 
Australia and New Zealand 
* Signed a FTA (implemented in January 1, 2010) with India 
Source: Information for the period 1999-2003 sourced from APEC (2005, p. 18); information for the 




Annex 9- Vietnam’s Banking System 
1 Characteristics of Vietnam’s Banking System 
1.1 The SOCBs-SOEs Nexus Weakened Vietnam’s Banking System 
Over time, Vietnam’s banking system was uniquely characterised by a strong 
connection between banks, especially SOCBs, and SOEs. In reality, SOEs 
administratively dominated the real sector and represented the images of the state 
government while SOCBs dominated the banking sector. This abnormally close 
relationship existed because, under the current regulatory environment, one of the 
SBV’s tasks was to facilitate SOEs’ business operations by providing them necessary 
financial resources. Accordingly, other commercial banks including SOCBs were 
also forced to supply cheap credit to SOEs, either implicitly or explicitly.52 In most 
bankers’ view, lending to SOEs was perceived to be safer because they were more 
likely to be bailed out when in trouble. Hence, in 1995, more than 75 per cent of 
bank loans were saved for SOEs, naming them the biggest customers of commercial 
banks (Le and McCarty, 1995). 
Consequently, the state-directed policy loan53 (or directed lending) would 
adversely affect the overall profitability and efficiency of the banking sector and 
entail high risks of default. In late 1997, the banking sector recorded a large volume 
of non-performing loans (NPLs) mostly made to SOEs: NPLs of SOCBs were 
estimated to be 30-35 per cent of their total loans, while NPLs of JSBs were in 
between 30 and 40 per cent (Doan, 2000).54 The available evidence suggested that 
the weaknesses of the banking system were strongly related to the inefficiency of the 
SOE sector (Vo et al., 2002). This problem continued to exist in the aftermath of the 
Asian financial crisis during which most banks ended up incurring an even larger 
amount of NPLs from the SOE sector. From 2007 onwards, a significant proportion 
of loans went into speculative activities in the real estate and stock markets instead of 
going into productive investments, resulting in a significant overheating of the 
                                                 
52 Under state directions, commercial banks could not resist financing most SOEs’ investment projects 
or make loans to many inefficient SOEs. As a result, most commercial banks, especially SOCBs, 
operated on a non-commercial basis or even violated their profit-maximisation principles. 
53 Whenever the government had a policy to be implemented (such as a rural development project), 
banks were forced to provide funds for such project quickly and easily. 
54 Reliable estimates on NPLs are still difficult to retrieve for illustration purposes (Leung, 2009). The 
central issue here is that NPLs continue to be one of the major problems that greatly affect the 
soundness of the Vietnamese banking sector. 
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economy and an increased vulnerability of the banking sector in subsequent years, 
especially in 2008 (Leung, 2009). 
Most noticeably, large SOEs’ borrowings were found to adversely affects (or 
crowd-out) the development of the domestic private sector and the macroeconomic 
stability mainly because the private sector continuingly faced many difficulties in 
gaining access to credit. As observed by Malesky and Taussig (2008), most banks 
continued to practice credit rationing by allocating a disproportionate share of credit 
to closely related enterprises with better borrowing conditions such as lower interest 
rates and/or easier collateral requirements. In addition, most SOCBs’ loan officers 
were too cautious to lend to the private sector for fear of potential losses. Besides, 
SOCBs were authorised to provide unsecured lending to private enterprises having at 
least two consecutive years of profits, indicating that this facility was not applicable 
to newly established firms. Worse still, most private firms had difficulties in gaining 
access to land-use rights, especially in urban areas, preventing them from using land 
as collateral to acquire credit (Leung, 2009). 
1.2 Underdeveloped and Segmented Financial Market 
Vietnam’s banking system remained underdeveloped over the same period 
for two reasons. First, the underdevelopment of the banking sector was reflected in 
the country’s relatively low income and saving levels, which restricted its ability to 
mobilise and allocate financial resources in an efficient manner (Soo-Nam, 1998).55 
Second, Vietnam lacked modern banking technologies and experienced professionals 
to operate in the financial sector. Local banking was almost non-existent because 
most banks had little interest in providing loans to individuals and small businesses 
(Gottschang, 2001). 
On the other hand, over the past decades, the Vietnamese banking system was 
separated into two segments such that: (i) SOCBs usually operated on a non-
commercial basis in compliance with the state-directed lending policy; and (ii) the 
rest of the banking system was relatively more market- and profit-oriented. Due to 
this particular segmentation, SOCBs did not face intense competition, enabling them 
to have a larger customer base, compared with JSBs and other smaller private banks 
                                                 
55 On average, in the 1990s, Vietnam’s gross domestic savings accounted for 16 per cent of GDP and 
gradually increased to 28.3 and 28.6 per cent in the 2000s and during 2010-11, respectively (World 
Bank, Various Issues). 
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(Camen, 2006). In 1998, SOCBs dominated the financial market with significantly 
large shares in total banking assets: share in total loans accounted for 82 per cent 
while share in total deposits accounted for 80 per cent (Gottschang, 2001). By 2002, 
SOCBs still captured more than half of the banking sector’s assets even though their 
share in total loans decreased to 74 per cent while share in total deposits remained 
unchanged at 80 per cent (Leung, 2009).  
Regardless of its dominant position, the banking sector including SOCBs did 
not deliver outstanding performance. According to Nguyen (2007), during 2001-03, 
this sector performed poorly, with relatively low cost efficiency (60.6 per cent) and 
decreasing technological efficiency (by 4.3 percentage points). Vu and Turnell 
(2010) find that, in the same period, JSBs and foreign banks experienced 
considerable short-term reductions in cost efficiency due to increased spending on 
opening new bank branches, meeting new capital requirements, upgrading 
technology, improving and diversifying banking products and services.56 However, 
the restructuring of the banking system, alongside with technological upgrade, 
offered a long-run benefit of improving most banks’ cost efficiency (averaging at 
87.21 per cent during 2000-06). Nahm and Vu (2008) continue investigating the 
performance of 56 commercial banks and find that, during 2000-06, most SOCBs 
were technologically and allocatively efficient, but their scale efficiency was 
relatively low and tended to decline over time. The authors also find that, for all 
sample banks, the main source of profit inefficiency tended to be allocative 
inefficiency. Likewise, Leung (2009) finds that, during 2006-07, the average rate of 
return on assets of SOCBs was lower than that of Asian banks while their capital 
adequacy ratios57 were below the average ratios of the Asia and the Pacific region 
and the East Asia region (13.1 and 12.3 per cent, respectively). 
1.3 The SBV Lacked Autonomy 
Historically, the SBV had little autonomy in conducting its monetary policy. 
The National Assembly (NA) and the government had great influence on the design 
of monetary policy, while the SBV’s role was to implement it as directed (Camen, 
                                                 
56 Since the accession into WTO, the Vietnamese banking system has changed dramatically with the 
application of banking software to computerise transactions, the expansion of automatic teller 
machine (ATM) networks, the introduction of debit and credit cards, and the development of internet 
and electronic banking services. 
57 The capital adequacy ratio is measured by total equity divided by total risk-weighted assets. This 
ratio recognises that an asset may have different levels of risk. Therefore, it is used to determine a 
bank’s ability to meet its time liabilities and other risks (such as operational risk and credit risk). 
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2006). Under the Law governing the State Bank, the SBV’s monetary policy was 
guided by a multiple, conflicting objectives such as economic growth, price and 
currency stability and financial system stability (Nguyen, 2008). Among these, 
economic growth appeared to be the primary goal of the government. Le (2009) 
argues that the Vietnamese political leaders were unwilling to sacrifice the output 
growth and employment objectives to meet the inflation target even though 
controlling inflation was very important for growth to be sustainable. Accordingly, 
the SBV’s monetary policy was primarily aimed at accommodating the government’s 
socio-economic development plans rather than combating inflation. Its main task was 
to report the implementation of previous year’s monetary policy and provide future 
economic outlooks. As a routine, the SBV submitted a draft of the next year’s 
monetary policy to the government for consideration and approval. In turn, the 
government submitted the draft to the NA for final approval (Le and Pfau, 2009). 
2 Vietnam’s Banking Structure 
The central bank of Vietnam was established in 1951 as the Vietnam National 
Bank and was renamed as the SBV in 1960. From 1976 to 1989, the government 
owned and controlled a mono-banking system in which the SBV provided almost all 
domestic banking services. Lending activities were monitored by the government and 
credit rationing became the norm since financial resources were scarce (Le, 2009). 
From 1990 onwards, a two-tier banking system was introduced with two new 
features: (i) the SBV remained as a central bank and was authorised to issue 
banknotes, manage currency trading, design and implement monetary policy; and (ii) 
the commercial banks provided commercial banking services. They included SOCBs, 
JSBs and JVBs (SBV, Various Issues). 
Until recently, Vietnam has made a significant progress towards liberalising 
its banking system, which allowed foreign banks to operate in the Vietnamese 
market. In June 2012, Vietnam’s banking structure consisted of 1 SBV, 5 SOCBs, 35 
JSBs, 50 foreign banks’ branches, 4 JVBs, 18 finance companies, 12 financial 
leasing companies and 49 foreign banks’ representative offices (Table A4). Among 
these, JSBs and SOCBs were relatively large in terms of charter capital ($US7.95 
billion and $US4.29 billion, respectively), followed by foreign banks’ branches, 
finance companies and wholly foreign-owned banks ($US2.38 billion, $US965.9 
million and $US929.2 million, respectively). 
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Table A4- Vietnam’s Banking Structure as of June, 2012 
Qty Bank Names Charter Capital 
($US million) 
1 SBV N/A 
5 SOCBs, including: 4,286.8 
 Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam 1101.6 
 Vietnam Bank for Industry and Trade 961.7 
 Bank for Investment & Development of Vietnam 1,093.9 
 Vietnam Bank for Agricultural & Rural Development 984.4 
 Housing Bank of Mekong Delta 145.2 
35 Joint-Stock Commercial Banks 7,950.1 
50 Foreign Banks’ Branches 2,383.1 
4 Joint-Venture Banks 457.0 
5 Wholly Foreign-Owned Banks 929.2 
18 Finance Companies 965.9 
12 Financial Leasing Companies 178.4 
49 Representative Offices of Foreign Banks N/A 
Note: Some of the charter capital was originally expressed in VND, and was converted into USD  
(1 USD = 21,036 VND). N/A = Not Available. 
Source: SBV (Various Issues). 
 152 
Annex 10- A Survey of CGE Models Applied to Vietnam  
Annex 10 is worth considering because it is necessary to review the 
application of the CGE methodology, which is intended to be used in this thesis, in 
order to assess the economy-wide impact of Vietnam’s microeconomic reforms and 
the private sector development (PSD) policy on its national outcomes and industries. 
However, it is important to note that the studies reviewed in Annex 10 are not 
necessarily related directly to the privatisation issue. Therefore, instead of having a 




Table A5- Survey of CGE Models Applied to Vietnam 






Impacts of trade 
liberalisation on 
aggregate welfare and 
welfare of households by 
expenditure groups in 
Vietnam 
CGE 10 household 
groups 
1996 I-O table 
VLSS(97-98) 
Efficiency gains from tariff reform 
are modest, but significant 
redistribution occurs. Generally, 




Impacts of Vietnam’s 




4 labour types 6 
household groups 
1996 I-O table Overall welfare improvement 
resulted from Vietnam’s accession 
to the WTO 
Nguyen et 
al. (2005) 
Distributional effects of 
trade liberalisation 
CGE 10 household 
groups 
1997 data Without adjustment costs, trade 
liberalisation is pro-rich and anti-
poor. There are large distributional 

































3 labour types 
6 household 
groups 
SAM 2000 Trade policy provides incentives 
that determine both level and 
allocation of investment, hence 
export expansion 
Pham et al. 
(2008) 
Welfare impacts of 
Vietnam’s small livestock 
producers under trade 
liberalisation 
GTAP 20 countries 





Small households in the livestock 
sector benefit from trade 
liberalisation. The effect is largest 




Impacts of Vietnam’s 
WTO commitments in 
reducing tariffs and 
domestic taxes on the 
nation’s economy 
CGE 17 sectors 
10 household 
groups 
2000 I-O table GDP increases, a trade surplus, and 
the overall welfare gains, 
moderately increased inequality 
between the richest and the poorest, 
and decreased inequality between 
urban and rural population 
Nguyen et 
al. (1998) 
Welfare impacts of tax 
reform on households 
ranked by income group 
CGE 5 household 
groups 
1995 data Gains from indirect tax reform and 




Tax reform CGE 5 household 
groups 
1995 data Similar conclusion as above 










2000 I-O table 
VLSS(2002) 
Removal of restriction on labour 
mobility strongly improved per 
capita GDP, income per worker, 




Poverty impacts of a cut 
in public subsidies to 
higher education 





50% cut in education subsidies 
results in welfare loss and 
increased poverty. Rural and 
agricultural households benefit 
from the reform, but urban and 





Poverty and Vietnam’s 
accession to the WTO 




Aggregate poverty will decrease 
when Vietnam remove all import 





Vietnam’s growth and 






3 labour skills 
1 representative 
household 
1996 I-O table Three important sources of growth 
are technical improvement, shift in 
foreign preferences for Vietnamese 
goods, and employment growth 
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Annex 11- VNGEM’s 2005 Base-year Database 
 
This section provides a number of tables showing some key data entries and 
parameters extracted from VNGEM’s 2005 base-year database. 
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Table A6- Joint Production Matrix (MAKE) ($US million) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 RicePad 9,045  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
2 Agriculture 0  6,758  22  0  0  0  49  0  0  0  0  0  0  
3 Forest 0  0  1,058  0  50  0  0  0  0  38  0  0  0  
4 Fish 0  0  0  3,405  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
5 Mining 0  0  0  0  1,149  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
6 OGP 0  0  0  0  0  7,536  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
7 FoodBev 230  0  0  0  0  0  9,467  0  7  0  0  0  0  
8 ConsMat 0  0  0  0  15  0  0  3,474  139  66  0  0  0  
9 OtherManuf 0  0  0  0  0  0  11  14  2,896  0  37  0  0  
10 Services 0  0  0  0  0  0  21  24  0  9,362  0  0  6  
11 Machinery 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  20  5  107  7,606  0  16  
12 Electrical 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  10  3  1,014  0  
13 Steel 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  162  0  380  
14 TCF 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  34  0  0  0  0  0  
15 Chemicals 0  0  0  0  15  0  28  49  0  8  3  0  0  
16 ElecGas 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
17 Water 0  0  0  0  0  0  13  0  0  0  0  0  0  
18 Construct 0  0  0  0  7  0  0  27  0  548  4  0  0  
19 Trade 0  0  0  0  2  0  37  0  0  350  32  0  0  
20 RdWtrTrans 0  0  0  0  2  0  0  6  0  23  0  0  0  
21 RailAirTrans 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
22 PostTelecom 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
23 FinInsur 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
24 PubAdmin 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  124  0  0  0  
Total 9,275  6,758  1,080  3,405  1,241  7,536  9,628  3,648  3,048  10,636  7,846  1,014  403  
Note: Column header = commodities; row header = corresponding industries.  
Data was converted from VND to USD using the IMF’s 2005 exchange rate (1 USD = 15,859 VND). 
Source: VNGEM’s base-year database (2005). 
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Table A6- Joint Production Matrix (MAKE) ($US million) (continued) 
 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Total 
1 RicePad 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  9,045  
2 Agriculture 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  6,830  
3 Forest 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1,146  
4 Fish 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  3,405  
5 Mining 0  0  0  0  55  0  0  0  0  0  0  1,204  
6 OGP 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  7,536  
7 FoodBev 0  9  0  0  0  191  0  0  0  0  0  9,904  
8 ConsMat 0  3  0  0  313  0  0  0  0  0  0  4,009  
9 OtherManuf 0  0  0  0  0  25  8  0  0  0  0  2,992  
10 Services 56  2  0  0  77  41  0  0  0  59  0  9,648  
11 Machinery 0  2  0  0  0  83  14  0  0  0  0  7,854  
12 Electrical 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1,027  
13 Steel 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  543  
14 TCF 11,491  0  0  0  240  0  0  0  11  0  0  11,774  
15 Chemicals 59  4,961  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  5,124  
16 ElecGas 0  0  2,416  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2,416  
17 Water 0  0  0  138  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  154  
18 Construct 0  0  0  12  10,430  0  0  0  0  0  0  11,029  
19 Trade 0  23  27  0  0  9,515  25  0  0  0  0  10,013  
20 RdWtrTrans 10  0  0  0  0  2  1,233  0  0  0  0  1,276  
21 RailAirTrans 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1,000  0  0  0  1,000  
22 PostTelecom 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1,416  0  0  1,416  
23 FinInsur 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  841  0  841  
24 PubAdmin 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  7,252  7,376  
Total 11,616  5,001  2,443  151  11,117  9,858  1,281  1,000  1,427  900  7,252  117,563  
Note: Column header = commodities; row header = corresponding industries.  
Data was converted from VND to USD using the IMF’s 2005 exchange rate (1 USD = 15,859 VND). 
Source: VNGEM’s base-year database (2005). 
 
 159 
Table A7- GDP on the Expenditure Side ($US million) 
 Consumption Investment Government Exports Imports Inventories 
1 RicePad 2,755  250  64  1,450  26  386  
2 Agriculture 3,659  682  74  1,845  938  157  
3 Forest 6  150  3  26  14  0  
4 Fish 1,702  361  0  223  73  32  
5 Mining 45  151  32  348  441  19  
6 OGP 86  986  0  7,469  5,286  322  
7 FoodBev 6,935  856  7  3,350  1,777  497  
8 ConsMat 193  441  96  400  576  135  
9 OtherManuf 936  261  0  1,976  4,611  72  
10 Services 6,132  4,001  637  494  1,523  -23  
11 Machinery 1,487  790  0  3,153  7,435  9  
12 Electrical 212  70  0  531  1,287  -38  
13 Steel 80  59  0  447  1,649  55  
14 TCF 1,715  812  0  9,462  4,633  -280  
15 Chemicals 3,194  535  6  1,295  6,363  104  
16 ElecGas 195  1,588  0  1  15  -0  
17 Water 6  89  0  0  0  0  
18 Construct 0  1,089  238  0  0  0  
19 Trade 2,202  1,911  0  877  483  0  
20 RdWtrTrans 112  503  14  184  168  0  
21 RailAirTrans 298  239  6  213  302  0  
22 PostTelecom 617  643  0  176  189  0  
23 FinInsur 518  237  0  133  625  0  
24 PubAdmin 717  1,150  5,956  986  852  0  
Total 33,802  17,855  7,133  35,037  39,265  1,446  
Note: Data was converted from VND to USD using the IMF’s 2005 exchange rate (1 USD = 15,859 VND).  
GDP = C + I + G + (X – M) + Inventories = $US56,008 million. 
Source: VNGEM base-year database (2005). 
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Table A8- GDP on the Income Side ($US million) 
  Land Labour Capital Indirect taxes 
1 RicePad 1,176  1,919  342  3,850  
2 Agriculture 1,121  2,557  961  5,734  
3 Forest 47  453  184  698  
4 Fish 526  864  478  1,973  
5 Mining 167  247  199  1,072  
6 OGP 1,856  1,160  1,263  9,887  
7 FoodBev 0  1,267  1,001  4,543  
8 ConsMat 0  519  545  1,775  
9 OtherManuf 0  261  303  5,247  
10 Services 0  2,512  4,331  8,343  
11 Machinery 0  1,068  835  9,347  
12 Electrical 0  92  83  1,423  
13 Steel 0  93  64  1,861  
14 TCF 0  883  916  6,152  
15 Chemicals 0  781  610  7,859  
16 ElecGas 0  793  839  1,647  
17 Water 0  53  57  109  
18 Construct 0  1,677  1,456  3,133  
19 Trade 0  2,846  2,252  5,581  
20 RdWtrTrans 0  390  370  927  
21 RailAirTrans 0  211  194  706  
22 PostTelecom 0  420  549  1,157  
23 FinInsur 0  342  261  1,229  
24 PubAdmin 0  3,472  734  5,058  
Total 4,893  24,881  18,826  7,408  
Note: Data was converted from VND to USD using the IMF’s 2005 exchange rate (1 USD = 15,859 VND).  
GDP = Land + Labour + Capital + Indirect taxes = $US56,008 million. 
Source: VNGEM base-year database (2005). 
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Table A9- Sources of Indirect Taxes ($US million) 
Note: Data was converted from VND to USD using the IMF’s 2005 exchange rate (1 USD = 15,859 VND).  
Source: VNGEM base-year database (2005). 
 Intermediate Investment Household Exports Government Production Tariffs Total 
1 RicePad 60  0  70  0  2  28  1  160  
2 Agriculture 20  0  88  0  2  74  36  220  
3 Forest 13  0  0  0  0  81  0  94  
4 Fish 22  0  43  0  0  33  7  104  
5 Mining 21  0  2  1  2  22  1  49  
6 OGP -262  0  8  2  0  1,278  38  1,065  
7 FoodBev 34  0  1,186  0  0  55  73  1,348  
8 ConsMat 20  0  16  0  10  21  24  91  
9 OtherManuf 24  0  67  0  0  18  83  192  
10 Services 126  0  250  0  30  211  37  654  
11 Machinery 108  334  218  3  0  39  339  1,041  
12 Electrical 10  0  20  0  0  5  60  95  
13 Steel 4  0  4  0  0  2  6  16  
14 TCF 6  0  139  0  0  50  449  643  
15 Chemicals 104  0  166  0  0  25  109  404  
16 ElecGas 48  0  20  0  0  20  0  88  
17 Water 2  0  0  0  0  3  0  5  
18 Construct 13  375  0  0  27  103  0  517  
19 Trade 36  0  211  1  0  122  0  370  
20 RdWtrTrans 4  0  8  0  1  22  0  35  
21 RailAirTrans 7  0  16  0  0  9  0  32  
22 PostTelecom 28  0  56  0  0  17  0  101  
23 FinInsur 4  0  23  0  0  8  0  35  
24 PubAdmin 6  0  0  0  21  21  0  48  
Total 455  709  2,611  8  96  2,267  1,262  7,408  
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Table A10- Primary Factor Costs ($US million) 
Note: Data was converted from VND to USD using the IMF’s 2005 exchange rate (1 USD = 15,859 VND).  
The share columns (%) are used to determine factor intensities in each industry. 
Source: VNGEM base-year database (2005). 
 1 Labour 2 Capital 3 Land Total 
 Value Share (%) Value Share (%) Value Share (%) Value Share (%) 
1 RicePad 1,919  55.8  342  10.0  1,176  34.2  3,438  100.0  
2 Agriculture 2,557  55.1  961  20.7  1,121  24.2  4,639  100.0  
3 Forest 453  66.2  184  27.0  47  6.8  684  100.0  
4 Fish 864  46.2  478  25.6  526  28.2  1,868  100.0  
5 Mining 247  40.3  199  32.5  167  27.2  613  100.0  
6 OGP 1,160  27.1  1,263  29.5  1,856  43.4  4,279  100.0  
7 FoodBev 1,267  55.9  1,001  44.1  0  0  2,268  100.0  
8 ConsMat 519  48.8  545  51.2  0  0  1,064  100.0  
9 OtherManuf 261  46.3  303  53.7  0  0  564  100.0  
10 Services 2,512  36.7  4,331  63.3  0  0  6,842  100.0  
11 Machinery 1,068  56.1  835  43.9  0  0  1,903  100.0  
12 Electrical 92  52.5  83  47.5  0  0  175  100.0  
13 Steel 93  59.3  64  40.7  0  0  157  100.0  
14 TCF 883  49.1  916  50.9  0  0  1,799  100.0  
15 Chemicals 781  56.1  610  43.9  0  0  1,392  100.0  
16 ElecGas 793  48.6  839  51.4  0  0  1,632  100.0  
17 Water 53  48.3  57  51.7  0  0  109  100.0  
18 Construct 1,677  53.5  1,456  46.5  0  0  3,133  100.0  
19 Trade 2,846  55.8  2,252  44.2  0  0  5,098  100.0  
20 RdWtrTrans 390  51.3  370  48.7  0  0  759  100.0  
21 RailAirTrans 211  52.1  194  47.9  0  0  404  100.0  
22 PostTelecom 420  43.3  549  56.7  0  0  969  100.0  
23 FinInsur 342  56.8  261  43.2  0  0  603  100.0  
24 PubAdmin 3,472  82.5  734  17.5  0  0  4,207  100.0  
Total 24,881  51.2  18,826  38.7  4,893  10.1  48,601  100.0  
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(c) γ(c) EPS 
1 RicePad 0.50  0.34  4.74  0.50  1.06  0.90  -9.48  0.55  
2 Agriculture 0.50  0.23  2.79  0.50  1.75  0.85  -5.57  0.85  
3 Forest 0.50  0.20  2.50  0.50  2.00  0.83  -5.00  1.03  
4 Fish 0.50  0.20  1.25  0.50  2.00  0.83  -2.50  0.98  
5 Mining 0.50  0.20  1.55  0.50  2.00  0.82  -3.10  1.04  
6 OGP 0.50  0.21  2.82  0.50  0.40  0.82  -5.64  1.05  
7 FoodBev 0.50  1.12  2.31  0.50  1.44  0.87  -4.62  0.90  
8 ConsMat 0.50  1.26  2.90  0.50  0.00  0.83  -5.80  1.03  
9 OtherManuf 0.50  1.26  4.06  0.50  2.19  0.83  -8.13  1.03  
10 Services 0.50  1.26  2.37  0.50  0.00  0.80  -4.74  1.25  
11 Machinery 0.50  1.26  3.70  0.50  2.80  0.83  -7.39  1.03  
12 Electrical 0.50  1.26  4.40  0.50  2.80  0.83  -8.80  1.03  
13 Steel 0.50  1.26  3.35  0.50  1.27  0.83  -6.70  1.03  
14 TCF 0.50  1.26  3.82  0.50  2.83  0.83  -7.64  1.01  
15 Chemicals 0.50  1.26  3.30  0.50  1.95  0.83  -6.60  1.03  
16 ElecGas 0.50  1.26  2.80  0.50  0.00  0.82  -5.60  1.04  
17 Water 0.50  1.26  2.80  0.50  0.00  0.82  -5.60  1.04  
18 Construct 0.50  1.40  1.90  0.50  0.00  0.82  -3.80  1.04  
19 Trade 0.50  1.68  1.90  0.50  0.00  0.80  -3.80  1.20  
20 RdWtrTrans 0.50  1.68  1.90  0.50  2.00  0.82  -3.80  1.05  
21 RailAirTrans 0.50  1.68  1.90  0.50  2.00  0.82  -3.80  1.05  
22 PostTelecom 0.50  1.26  1.90  0.50  0.00  0.82  -3.80  1.05  
23 FinInsur 0.50  1.26  1.90  0.50  0.00  0.78  -3.80  1.35  
24 PubAdmin 0.50  1.26  1.90  0.50  0.00  0.80  -3.80  1.20  
Note: ϭL
(1)
(i) = substitution elasticities between skill types; ϭPR
(1)
(i) = substitution elasticities between primary factors; ϭ
(1)
(c) = Armington substitution elasticities 
between domestic and imported sources; ϭO
(1)
(i) = transformation elasticities of output; ϭ
(2)
(c) = Armington investment elasticities; ϭ
(3)
(c) = household 
Armington elasticities; γ(c) = individual export demand elasticities; EPS = household expenditure elasticities (this EPS is not reported in the model equations, 
but is used to generate simulation results for household consumption). 




Annex 12- Aggregation Mapping from 113 to 24 Sectors 
 113 Sectors Mapping  24 Sectors Description 
1 Paddy RicePad 1 RicePad Rice & Paddy 
2 RawRubber Agriculture 2 Agriculture Agriculture 
3 CoffeeBean Agriculture 3 Forest Forestry 
4 SugarCane Agriculture 4 Fish Fisheries 
5 RawTea Agriculture 5 Mining Mining 
6 OthCrops Agriculture 6 OGP Oil, Gas & Petroleum 
7 Pigs Agriculture 7 FoodBev Food & Beverage 
8 Cows Agriculture 8 ConsMat Construction Materials 
9 Poultry Agriculture 9 OtherManuf Other Manufacturing 
10 OthLivestock Agriculture 10 Services Services 
11 IrrigServ Services 11 Machinery Machinery 
12 OthAgrServ Forest 12 Electrical Electricals 
13 Forest Forest 13 Steel Steel 
14 Fishing Fish 14 TCF Textile, Clothing & Footwear 
15 FishFarming Fish 15 Chemicals Chemicals 
16 Coal Mining 16 ElecGas Electricity & Gas 
17 MetalOres Mining 17 Water Water 
18 Stone Mining 18 Construct Construction 
19 SandGravel Mining 19 Trade Trade 
20 OthMining Mining 20 RdWtrTrans Road & Water Transportations 
21 CrudeOilGas OGP 21 RailAirTrans Rail & Air Transportations 
22 Meat FoodBev 22 PostTelecom Post & Telecommunication 
23 OilFat FoodBev 23 FinInsur Finance & Insurance 
24 Dairy FoodBev 24 PubAdmin Public Administration 
25 BakeryConf OtherManuf    
26 FruitVeg FoodBev    
27 AlcoholWine FoodBev    
28 Beer FoodBev    
29 NonAlcBev FoodBev    
30 SugarProd FoodBev    
31 CoffeeProd FoodBev    
32 TeaProd FoodBev    
33 TobacoProd FoodBev    
34 SeaFood FoodBev    
35 Rice RicePad    
36 OthFoodProd FoodBev    
37 Glass ConsMat    
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38 Ceramics ConsMat    
39 BricksTiles ConsMat    
40 Cement ConsMat    
41 CementProd ConsMat    
42 OthBldgMat ConsMat    
43 PaperProd Services    
44 WoodProd OtherManuf    
45 OrgChem Chemicals    
46 InOrgChem Chemicals    
47 ChemFert Chemicals    
48 OthFert Chemicals    
49 Pesticides Chemicals    
50 PharmVeter Chemicals    
51 PharmHuman Chemicals    
52 RubberProd Chemicals    
53 SoapDeterg Chemicals    
54 PerfOthToil Chemicals    
55 PrimPlastic Chemicals    
56 OthPlastProd Chemicals    
57 Paint Chemicals    
58 VarnOthPaint Chemicals    
59 OthChem Chemicals    
60 HealthEquip Machinery    
61 OthPrecEquip Machinery    
62 HomeAppl Electrical    
63 Motorbike Machinery    
64 Bicycle Machinery    
65 AgricMach Machinery    
66 GenMach Machinery    
67 OthSpMach Machinery    
68 MotorVehicle Machinery    
69 OthTranEquip Machinery    
70 Transformers Machinery    
71 OthElecMach Machinery    
72 RadioTVEquip Electrical    
73 NonFeMetal OtherManuf    
74 FeMetal Steel    
75 Fabrics TCF    
76 FibreThreads TCF    
77 Clothing TCF    
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78 Carpet TCF    
79 OthTextile TCF    
80 Leather TCF    
81 LeatherProd TCF    
82 AnimalFeed FoodBev    
83 Printing Services    
84 Publishing Services    
85 SprtRecOthEq Machinery    
86 PetrolLub OGP    
87 GasElect ElecGas    
88 Water Water    
89 CivlConstrct Construct    
90 OthConstrct Construct    
91 Trade Trade    
92 Repairs Trade    
93 Hotels Trade    
94 Restaurants Trade    
95 RoadTrans RdWtrTrans    
96 RailTrans RailAirTrans    
97 WaterTrans RdWtrTrans    
98 AirTrans RailAirTrans    
99 PostTelecom PostTelecom    
100 TouristServ Trade    
101 FinancServ FinInsur    
102 Lottery Services    
103 Insurance FinInsur    
104 SciTechServ PubAdmin    
105 PropertyServ Services    
106 OthBusServ Services    
107 PubAdminDef PubAdmin    
108 Education PubAdmin    
109 Healthcare PubAdmin    
110 CultureSport Services    
111 Association Services    
112 OthServ Services    
113 Dwellings Services    
Note: Commodities in bold represent margin commodities. Before aggregation, there are only six 
margin commodities. However, the mapping incorporates five additional commodities as 
margin including Repairs, Hotels, Restaurants, TouristServ and FinancServ.  
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Annex 13- Model Equations in VNGEM 
 These sets of equations represent the main structure of VNGEM, which are 
largely expressed in percentage-change forms. They are sufficient for generating 
simulation results. Besides, there are many other (optional) add-on equations (or 
back-of-the-envelop equations) used for explaining the results. However, they are not 
included in this section for simplicity. 
 
1. Demand for labour by industry and skill group 
 
xL(1)(io) = xL_O(1)(i) – ϭL(1)(i)*[ pL(1)(io) – pL_O(1)(i) ] 
 
where 
                                   O 
 pL_O(1)(i) = Σ SL(1)(io)*pL(1)(io) 
                                  o=1 
 
2. Industry demands for effective labour 
 
xL_O(1)(i) – aL_O(1)(i) = xPR(1)(i) − ϭPR(1)(i)*[ pL_O(1)(i) + aL_O(1)(i) – pPR(1)(i) ]  
 
3. Industry demands for capital 
 
xK(1)(i) – aK(1)(i) = xPR(1)(i) − ϭPR(1)(i)*[ pK(1)(i) + aK(1)(i) – pPR(1)(i) ] 
 
4. Industry demands for land 
 
xLD(1)(i) – aLD(1)(i) = xPR(1)(i) − ϭPR(1)(i)*[ pLD(1)(i) + aLD(1)(i) – pPR(1)(i) ] 
 
where 
                                 V 
 pPR(1)(i) = Σ S(1)(v)i*[ p(1)(v)i + a(1)(v)i ]  
                      v=1 
(v = 1: effective labour; v = 2: capital; and v = 3: land) 
 
5. Demands for intermediate inputs (domestic and imported) 
 
x(1)(cs)i – a(1)(cs)i = x_s(1)(c)i – ϭ(1)(c)*[ p(1)(cs)i + a(1)(cs)i – p_s(1)(c)i ] 
 
where 
                                   S 
 p_s(1)(c)i = Σ S(1)(cs)i*[ p(1)(cs)i + a(1)(cs)i ] 
                                 s=1 
6. Demands for intermediate input composite 
 
x_s(1)(c)i – [ a_s(1)(c)i + aT(1)(i) ] = xT(1)(i) 
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7. Demands for primary factor composite 
 
xPR(1)(i) – [aPR(1)(i) + aT(1)(i) ] = xT(1)(i) 
 
8. Demand for ‘other costs’ 
 
xOC(1)(i) – [ aOC(1)(i) + aT(1)(i) ] = xT(1)(i) 
 
9. Supplies of commodities by industries 
 
q(1)(c)i = xT(1)(i) + ϭO(1)(i)* [ pQ(1)(c)i – pT(1)(i) ] 
 
where 
 pQ(1)(c)i =  pC(0)(c)  
                               C 
 pT(1)(i) = Σ M(c)i*pQ(1)(c)i 
                              c=1 
 
10. Total output of commodities 
              I 
xC(0)(c) = Σ M(c)i*q(1)(c)i 
             i=1 
10.1. Supply of commodities to export market 
 
Ψ*[ xD(0)(c) – x(4)(c) ] = pD(0)(c) – pE(c) 
 
10.2. Supply of commodities to domestic market 
 
xC(0)(c) = [ 1 – SX(c) ]*xD(0)(c) + SX(c)*x(4)(c) 
 
10.3. Zero pure profit in transformation 
 
pC(0)(c) = [ 1 – SX(c) ]*pD(0)(c) + SX(c)*pE(c) 
 
11. Source-specific investment demands 
 
x(2)(cs)i – a(2)(cs)i =  x_s(2)(c)i – ϭ(2)(c)*[ p(2)(cs)i + a(2)(cs)i – p_s(2)(c)i ] 
 
where 
                                                     S 
 p_s(2)(c)i = Σ S(2)(cs)i*[ p(2)(cs)i + a(2)(cs)i ] 
                                                   s=1 
 
12. Investment Demands for Composite Commodities 
 
x_s(2)(c)i – [ a_s(2)(c)i + aT(2)(i) ] = xT(2)(i) 
             C 
pT(2)(i) = Σ S_s(2)(c)i*[ p_s(2)(c)i + a_s(2)(c)i + aT(2)(i) ] 
            c=1 
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13. Household demands for commodities (domestic and imported) 
 
x(3)(cs) – a(3)(cs) = x_s(3)(c) − ϭ(3)(c)*[ p(3)(cs) + a(3)(cs) – p_s(3)(c) ] 
 
14. Effective prices for commodity composites 
                S 
p_s(3)(c) = Σ S(3)(cs)*[ p(3)(cs) + a(3)(cs) ] 
               s=1 
 
15. Household demands for composite commodities 
 
x_s(3)(c) = BLX(3)(c)*xLX(3)(c) + [ 1 – BLX(3)(c) ]*xSU(3)(c) 
 
where  
 xSU(3)(c) = q + aSU(3)(c) 
 
 xLX(3)(c) + p_s(3)(c) = wLX(3) + aLX(3)(c) 
 
                   C 
 u + q = Σ SLX(3)(c)*xLX(3)(c) 
                  c=1 
                                                        C 
 aLX(3)(c) = aSU(3)(c) – Σ SLX(3)(k)*aSU(3)(k)  (k ≠ c) 
                                    k=1 
 
                                                        
C 
 aSU(3)(c) = a_s(3)(c) – Σ S_s(3)(k)*a_s(3)(k) (k ≠ c) 
                                                k=1 
 
15.1. Real Household Consumption 
           C  S 
xT(3) = Σ Σ SPUR(3)(cs)*x(3)(cs) 
        c=1 s=1 
 
15.2. Consumer Price Index 
           C  S 
pT(3) = Σ Σ SPUR(3)(cs)*p(3)(cs) 
        c=1 s=1 
 
15.3. Household Budget Constraint 
 
wT(3) = xT(3) + pT(3) 
 
16. Individual export demand functions 
 
x(4)(c) – fQ(4)(c) = –│γ(c)│*[ pF(4)(c) – fP(4)(c) ] 
 
where    
 pF(4)(c) = p(4)(c) – Φ 
 
 170 
17. Collective export demand functions 
 
x(4)(c) – fQ(4)(c) = xNT(4) 
 
where 
 xNT(4) – fQNT(4) =  –│γNT│*[ pNT(4) – Φ  – fQNT(4) ] 
 
                              NT 
 pNT(4) = Σ VPUR(4)(c)*p(4)(c) 
                              c=1 
18. Government demands 
 
x(5)(cs) = f(5)(cs) + fT(5) 
 
where    
 fT(5) = xT(3) + fT2(5) 
 
19. Inventory demands 
 
P(0)(cs)*∆x(6)(cs) = VBAS(6)(cs)*xCOM(0)(c) + fX6)(cs) (i.e. stock flow domestic output) 
 
20. Margin demands 
 
xMA(1)(cs)i(m) = x(1)(cs)i + aMA(1)(cs)i(m) 
 
xMA(2)(cs)i(m) = x(2)(cs)i + aMA(2)(cs)i(m) 
 
xMA(3)(cs)(m) = x(3)(cs) + aMA(3)(cs)(m) 
 
xMA(4)(c)(m) = x(4)(c) + aMA(4)(c)(m) 
 
xMA(5)(cs)(m) = x(5)(cs) + aMA(5)(cs)(m) 
 
21. Supply equals demands for domestic commodities 
                                 U 
0.01*∏D(c)*xD(0)(c) = Σ ∆Sale(c1)u 
                                u=1 
 
22. Total supply of imported goods 
                                   U 
0.01*VM(0)(c)*xM(0)(c) = Σ ∆Sale(c2)u 
                                  u=1 
23. Purchasers prices− production 
                                                                  M 
p(1)(cs)i = SBATX(1)(cs)i*[ p(0)(cs) + t(1)(cs)i ] +  Σ SMA(1)(cs)i(m)*[ pD(0)(m) + aMA(1)(cs)i(m) ] 
                                                                                                 m=1 
24. Purchasers prices− investment 
                                                                                                    M 
p(2)(cs)i = SBATX(2)(cs)i *[ p(0)(cs) + t(2)(cs)i ] +  Σ SMA(2)(cs)i(m)*[ pD(0)(m) + aMA(2)(cs)i(m) ] 
                                                                                                  m=1 
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25. Purchasers prices− households 
                                                              M 
p(3)(cs) = SBATX(3)(cs)*[ p(0)(cs) + t(3)(cs) ] + Σ SMA(3)(cs)(m)*[ pD(0)(m) + aMA(3)(cs)(m) ] 
                                                                                            m=1 
26. Zero pure profits in exporting 
                                                         M 
p(4)(c) = SBATX(4)(c)*[ pE(c) + t(4)(c) ] + Σ SMA(4)(c)(m)*[ pD(0)(m) + aMA(4)(c)(m) ] 
                                                                                   m=1 
27. Zero pure profits in distribution to government 
                                                                                                M 
p(5)(cs) = SBATX(5)(cs)*[ p(0)(cs) + t(5)cs) ] + Σ SMA(5)(cs)(m)*[ pD(0)(m) + aMA(5)(cs)(m) ] 
                                                                                              m=1 
28. Power of taxes on sales 
 
t(1)(cs)i = fTX(0)(c) + fTX(1) 
 
t(2)(cs)i = fTX(0)(c) + fTX(2) 
 
t(3)(cs) = fTX(0)(c) + fTX(3) 
 
t(4)(c) = fTX(0)(c) + fTXT(4) 
 
t(4)(c) = fTX(0)(c) + fTXNT(4) 
 
t(5)(cs) = fTX(0)(c) + fTX(5) 
  
29. Zero pure profits in importing 
 
pM(0)(c) = pF_CIF(0)(c) + Φ + tM(0)(c) 
 
30. Tariff revenue equation  
 
∆VTAR(0)(c) = 0.01*VTAR(0)(c)*[ xM(0)(c) + pF_CIF(0)(c) + Φ ] + 0.01*VIMP(0)(c)*tM(0)(c) 
 
31. Trade balance and other indices 
 
31.1. Trade balance 
 
100*∆B = ST(4)*wT(4) – SCIF_C(0)*wCIF_C(0) – S∆X*wGDPEXP(0) 
 
31.2. Import volume index 
                C 
xM_C(0) = Σ SM(0)(c)*xM(0)(c)  
               c=1 
 
31.3. Import price index 
                C 
pM_C(0) = Σ SM(0)(c)*p(0)(c2) 
               c=1 
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31.4. Value of imports plus duty 
 
wM_C(0) = xM_C(0) + pM_C(0) 
 
31.5. Terms of trade 
 
pTOT(0) = pT(4) – pCIF_C(0) 
 
31.6. Real devaluation 
 
pDE(0) = pCIF_C(0) – pGDPEXP(0) 
 
32. Primary factor aggregates 
 
32.1. Employment by industry 
        O 
l(i) = Σ SL(1)(io)*xL(1)(io) 
       o=1 
32.2. Aggregate employment 
          I 
l_I =  Σ SL_O(1) (i)*l(i) 
         i=1 
32.3. Aggregate capital stock  
              I 
xK_I(1) = Σ SK(1)(i)*xK(1)(i) 
             i=1 
32.4. Aggregate land stock 
                I 
xLD_I(1) = Σ SLD(1)(i)*xLD(1)(i) 
               i=1 
32.5. Aggregate primary factor usage 
 
xPR_I(1) = CL_IO(1)*l_I + CK_I(1)*xK_I(1) + CLD_I(1)*xLD_I(1) 
 
32.6. Average nominal wage 
                I 
pL_IO(1) = Σ CL(1)(io)*pL(1)(io) 
               i=1 
32.7. Average real wage 
 
wR = pL_IO(1) – pT(3) 
 
32.8. Average capital rental 
              I 
pK_I(1) = Σ RK(1)(i)*pK(1)(i) 
             i=1 
32.9. Average land rental 
                I 
pLD_I(1) = Σ RLD(1)(i)*pLD(1)(i) 
               i=1 
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32.10. Index of factor cost 
 
pPR_I(1) = CL_IO(1)*pL_IO(1) + CK_I(1)*pK_I(1) + CLD_I(1)*pLD_I(1) 
 
33. Investment Equations 
 
gK(i) = xT(2)(i) – xK(1)(i) 
 
gR(i) = pK(1)(i) – pT(2)(i) 
 
gK(i) = fI(1)(i) + 0.33*[ 2.0*gR(i) – iSLK ] 
 
xT(2)(i) = xT_I(2) + fI(2)(i) 
 
gK(i) = fI(3)(i) + iSLK 
 
xT_I(2) = xT(3) + fT(2) 
 
gR(i) = fR(i) + kSLK 
 
34. Demand equals supply for labour of each skill 
                 I 
xL_I(1)(o) = Σ CL(1)(io)*xL(1)(io) 
                i=1 
35. Flexible setting of money wages 
 
pL(1)(io) = pT(3) + fL_IO(1) + fL_O(1)(i) + fL_I(1)(o) + fL(1)(io) 
 
36. Average wage of occupation 
                 I 
pL_I(1)(o) = Σ CL(1)(io)*pL(1)(io) 
                i=1 
37. Miscellaneous equations 
 
37.1. Indexing of prices of ‘other cost’ tickets 
 
pOC(1)(i) = pT(3) + fOC(1)(i) 
 
37.2. Consumption function 
 
wT(3) = wGDPEXP(0) + fT(3) 
 
37.3. Basic price of domestic goods 
 
pD(0)(c) = p(0)(c1) 
 
37.4. Basic price of imported goods 
 
pM(0)(c) = p(0)(c2) 
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Description of Variables and Parameters 
 
Technical change and shift variables 
 
aL_O(1)(i) = labour-augmenting technical change by industry 
aK(1)(i) = capital-augmenting technical change by industry 
aLD(1)(i) = land-augmenting technical change by industry 
a(1)(cs)i = intermediate input technical change  
a_s(1)(c)i = composite input-augmenting technical change  
aT(1)(i) = all input-augmenting technical change  
aPR(1)(i) = all factor-augmenting technical change  
aOC(1)(i) = ‘other cost’ tickets-augmenting technical change  
a(2)(cs)i = investment basic technical change  
a_s(2)(c)i = investment composite technical change  
aT(2)(i) = neutral investment technical change  
a(3)(cs) = household basic taste change 
aSU(3)(c) = subsistence demand taste change 
aLX(3)(c) = luxury demand taste change 
a_s(3)(c) = household composite commodity taste change 
aMA(1)(cs)i(m) = intermediate margin technical change 
aMA(2)(cs)i(m) = investment margin technical change 
aMA(3)(cs)(m) = household margin technical change 
aMA(4)(c)(m) = export margin technical change 
aMA(5)(cs)(m) = government margin technical change 
fQ(4)(c) = quantity shift in export demands 
fP(4)(c) = price shift in export demands 
fTX(0)(c) = general sales tax shifter 
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fTX(1) = uniform % change in power of tax to intermediate  
fTX(2) = uniform % change in power of tax to investment  
fTX(3) = uniform % change in power of tax to households 
fTXT(4) = uniform % change in power of tax to traditional exports 
fTXNT(4) = uniform % change in power of tax to non-traditional exports 
fTX(5) = uniform % change in power of tax to government 
fQNT(4) = uniform quantity shift for collective exports 
fPNT(4) = uniform price shift for collective exports 
f(5)(cs)  = government demand shift 
fT(5) = overall shift term for government demands 
fT2(5) = ratio between fT(5) and real household consumption ( xT(3) ) 
fX6)(cs) = shifter on rule for stocks 
fI(1)(i) = shifter to enforce DPSV investment rule  
fI(2)(i) = shifter for exogenous investment rule 
fI(3)(i) = shifter for long-run investment rule  
fT(2) = ratio of investment to consumption  
fR(i) = shifter to lock together industry rate of return  
fL_IO(1) = overall wage shifter  
fL_O(1)(i) = industry-specific wage shifter  
fL_I(1)(o) = occupation-specific wage shifter  
fL(1)f(io) = wage shift variable  
fOC(1)(i) = shift in prices of ‘other cost’ tickets  






Demand- and supply-related variables 
 
xL(1)(io) = employment by industry and occupation 
xL_O(1)(i) = effective labour input  
xPR(1)(i) = primary factor composite  
xK(1)(i) = current capital stock by industry 
xLD(1)(i) = use of land by industry 
x(1)(cs)i = intermediate input demands 
x_s(1)(c)i = intermediate input composite 
xT(1)(i) = activity level or value added 
xOC(1)(i) = demands for ‘other cost’ tickets 
xC(0)(c) = output of commodities 
xD(0)(c) = output of commodities for local market 
x(2)(cs)i = investment basic demands 
x_s(2)(c)i = investment demands for composite commodities 
xT(2)(i) = investment by using industry 
xT_I(2) = aggregate real investment expenditure 
x(3)(cs) = household basic demands 
x_s(3)(c) = household demands for composite commodities 
xLX(3)(c) = household luxury demands  
xSU(3)(c) = household subsistence demands 
xT(3)  = real household consumption 
x(4)(c) = export basic demands 
xNT(4) = collective (or non-traditional) export composite 
x(5)(cs) = government basic demands 
xMA(1)(cs)i(m) = intermediate margin demands 
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xMA(2)(cs)i(m) = investment margin demands 
xMA(3)(cs)(m) = household margin demands 
xMA(4)(c)(m) = export margin demands 
xMA(5)(cs)(m) = government margin demands 
xM(0)(c) = total supplies of imported goods 
xM_C(0) = import volume index, duty paid weights 
xK_I(1) = aggregate capital stocks, rental weights 
xLD_I(1) = aggregate land stocks, rental weights 
xPR_I(1) = aggregate primary factor use (excluding technical change) 
xL_I(1)(o) = employment by occupation  
q(1)(c)i = supplies of commodities by industry 
l(i) = employment by industry, wage bill weights 
l_I = aggregate employment, wage bill weights 
Price-related variables 
 
pL(1)(io) = wages by industry and occupation 
pL_O(1)(i) = wages of labour composite by industry 
pPR(1)(i) = effective price of primary factor composite  
pK(1)(i) = rental cost of capital by industry 
pLD(1)(i) = rental cost of land by industry 
p(1)(cs)i = purchaser prices of intermediate inputs 
p_s(1)(c)i = prices of intermediate input composite 
pQ(1)(c)i = price of commodity c produced by industry i 
pT(1)(i) = average input/output price 
pC(0)(c) = general output price of locally produced commodity 
pD(0)(c) = basic price of domestic goods 
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pE(c)  = basic price of exportables 
p(2)(cs)i = purchaser price of investment 
p_s(2)(c)i = investment price of composite commodities 
pT(2)(i) = cost of units of capital 
p(3)(cs) = household purchaser price  
p_s(3)(c) = household price of composite commodities 
pT(3) = consumer price index 
pF(4)(c) = foreign currency export prices 
p(4)(c) = purchaser prices of exports in local currency 
pNT(4) = average price of collective exports 
P(0)(cs) = basic prices in level forms 
p(0)(cs) = basic prices for local users (in percentage-change forms) 
p(5)(cs) = government purchaser price 
pGDPEXP(0) = GDP price index from expenditure side 
pT(4) = export price index, local currency 
pCIF_C(0) = c.i.f import price index, local currency 
pM(0)(c) = import price of goods C or basic price of imported goods C ( p(0)(c2) ) 
pF_CIF(0)(c) = foreign currency import (c.i.f) prices 
pM_C(0) = duty-paid import price index, local currency 
pTOT(0) = terms of trade 
pDE(0) = real devaluation 
pL_IO(1) = average nominal wage 
pL_I(1)(o) = average wage of occupation 
pK_I(1) = average capital rentals 
pLD_I(1) = aggregate land rentals 
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pPR_I(1) = index of factor cost (excluding technical change) 
wR = real wage 
pOC(1)(i) = price of ‘other costs’ tickets 
Tax and ordinary-change variables 
 
t(1)(cs)i = power of tax on sales to intermediate 
t(2)(cs)i =  power of tax on sales to investment 
t(3)(cs) =  power of tax on sales to households 
t(4)(c) = power of tax on sales to exports 
t(5)(cs) = power of tax on sales to government 
tM(0)(c) = power of tariff 
∆x(6)(cs) = inventory demands (ordinary change) 
∆Sale(c1)u = sales aggregates (excluding export) of local categories 
∆Sale(c2)u = sales aggregates (excluding export) of imported categories 
∆B = nominal trade balance/ nominal GDP 
Miscellaneous variables 
 
q = number of households 
u = household utility 
Φ = exchange rate (local currency/$world) 
wLX(3) = total nominal luxury expenditure 
wT(3) = nominal total household consumption 
wGDPEXP(0) = nominal GDP from expenditure side 
wT(4) = local currency border value of exports 
wCIF_C(0) = c.i.f. local currency value of imports 
wM_C(0) = value of imports plus duty 
gK(i) = gross growth rate of capital (= investment/capital) 
gR(i) = gross rate of return (= rental/price of new capital) 
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iSLK = investment slack variable for exogenising total investment 
kSLK = slack variable to allow fixing aggregate capital 
Parameters 
 
ϭL(1)(i) = substitution elasticities between skill types 
ϭPR(1)(i) = substitution elasticities between primary factors 
ϭ(1)(c) = Armington substitution elasticities between dom and imp sources 
ϭO(1)(i) = transformation elasticities of output 
ϭ(2)(c) = Armington investment elasticities 
ϭ(3)(c) = household Armington elasticities 
Ψ = reciprocal of transformation elasticities (Ψ = 0.0) 
γ(c) = individual export demand elasticities 
γNT = collective export demand elasticities 
Sale and Cost Shares 
 The sale and cost shares are denoted by capital letters such as S’s, M’s, B’s, 
C’s, R’s and V’s. These shares are calculated directly from the I-O database.  
 
Annex 14- EFs’ Budget and Expenditures ($US million) by October, 2001 
 Total Central Local GCs-91 
Fund Balance 35.97 9.87 18.44 7.66 
Total Budget 62.28 22.50 27.09 12.70 
Total Expenditures, of which: 26.32 12.63 8.65 5.04 
Training & re-training 0.80 0.27 0.39 0.13 
Subsidies for redundant workers 0.43 0.06 0.16 0.21 
Payments for social insurance 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Help employees buy preferential shares 0.59 0.26 0.06 0.26 
Financial subsidies for SOEs 9.94 1.58 4.35 4.01 
Investment subsidies for equitised SOEs 2.91 0.11 2.53 0.27 
Equitisation costs & other expenses 11.62 10.34 1.13 0.16 
Note: Data was compiled and re-edited with currency conversion from VND to USD by the author (by 
2001, 1 USD = 15,000 VND, approximately). 
Source: Nguyen (2010). 
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